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Abstract
Polanyi argues that it is not possible for a scientist 
to be objective for he has to rely on heuristic passion 
and a commitment to his beliefs. This leads him to virtually 
reject the concept of the objectivity of the scientific 
community controlling the development of science by the 
application of impersonal tests. Science he claims is contro­
lled by the inter* personal knowledge of the scientific 
community, by a consensus of opinion.Yet science progresses 
and progress can only come about by the initiatives of ind­
ividual scientists. This leads Polanyi to develop a theoryof 
liberal conservatism: a situation where the excesses of 
individual initiatives are controlled by the authority of 
the scientific community, who judge new claims toknowledge 
by reference to their inter-personal or traditional knowledge.
It is Polanyi's claim that the scientific community can be 
used as a prototype to study other communities concerned 
with scholarship and intellectual activity. The expansion of 
his concepts to the judicial community and schools of history 
is therefore examined. But Polanyi has a further claim and 
this is that non-intellectual communities, although not 
developing a systematic tradition will have a coherent one 
and therefore will operate in a similar way to the scientific 
cpmmunity. This enables us to see how he can expand his 
concepts to the moral community, the community of politicians 
apd society as a whole.
In this thesis Polanyi's philosophy of science is critically 
examined, as well as his attempts to use the scientific 
community as aj^ti^ype f0p other communities. We also 
examine and criticise his use of a vitalist theory of 
evolution, and his attempt to provide a unification of all 
knowledge.
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Introduction
Professor- Michael Polanyi F.R.S. was born in Budapest in 1891, and 
during the Great War he served in the Austro-Hungarian array as a medical 
officer* After the -w«r he became a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute 
in Berlin where he collaborated with Eritz Haber, In 1933 he left 
Germany and became Professor of Physical Chemistry at the University of 
Manchester. Elf teen years later in 19^8 he gave up his chair and became 
Professor of Social Studies in the same University. He held this chair 
until 1938 when he became Emeritus Professor. In that year he moved 
to Oxford as a Senior Research Fellow at Merton College.
In 19^0 he formed, together with Dr. J.R. Baker, the Society of Freedom 
in Science. The Society was originally formed to oppose the views of 
the central planning of science put forward by Professor J.D. Bernal F.R.S. 
and his associates. By 19^6 the society had a membership of over 4.50 
in Great Britain and the U.S.A., and in the U.S.A. Professor Percy Bridgman 
became the leader of the society. By the late forties the Society for 
Freedom in Science seemed to have emerged as the victor, and the victory 
was further strengthened by the publication of sociological material by 
Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton which argued for the necessity for 
freedom in science.
Michael Polanyi states that he first became interested in philosophy 
when he first met the Soviet ideology which was prevalent under Stalin, 
and which denied justification for the pursuit of science. He states:
"I was struck by the fact that this denial of the very existence 
of independent scientific thought came from a socialist theory 
which derived its tremendous persuasive power from its claim to 
scientific certainty. The scientific outlook appeared to have 
produced a mechanical conception of man and history in which 
there was no place for science itself. This conception denied 
altogether any intrinsic power to thought and thus denied also 
any grounds for claiming freedom of thought.” ^
He argues that this led him to see that a moral inversion 
had taken place, ’’Scientific skepticism would trust only- 
material necessity for achieving universal brotherhood. 
Skepticism and utopianism had thus fused into a new
p
skeptical fanaticism.” " Extreme criticism and a fanatical 
morality, which denied the existence of morality as it 
considered it only a subjective belief in certain values 
and therefore attached the moral fervour to a material 
interpretation of the world, were fused together.
In considering this fusion his philosophy began to emerge*
It was based on two concepts: firstly, that man was essent­
ially a moral creature^, and secondly, that a knower can 
know more than he can tell^. In the sphere of knowledge 
what Polanyi was doing was to stress the personal commitment 
qf the knower to what he knew, and at the same time indicating 
the tacit unspecifiable element of knowledge.
: The unspecifiable element in knowledge made it extremely 
difficult to refute entirely a claim to knowledge, and 
provides an explanation as to why a seemingly false theory 
can be fruitful. Man in the sphere of science was not 
concerned solely with basic facts, but with why things 
happened 'as they did. He was concerned not just wfth 
appearances but with ultimate reality, with the controlling 
elements behind appearances. But if man was concerned with 
ultimate reality then the testing of this knowledge became 
npt; only difficult, as it was in the physical chemical sphere, 
bpt impossible as there are no concrete facts by which such 
knowledge can be judged. Personal knowledge, Polanyi*s term 
for knowledge claiming universal validity, although controlled 
by the morality of. man, which in the case of knowledge meant 
an obligation to the truth, let the individual out into a 
field of wild and wonderful speculations. How could such 
individual initiatives be controlled in the non sensible world 
beyond physical and chemical appearances ? Polanyi turned 
to the field he was eminent in. How were wild and wonderful 
speculations controlled in the world of science when to the 
participants it seemed that they were not controlled
by facts, experimental data? The answer was clear they were controlled
by the consensus of opinion within the scientific community: by the
inter-personal knowledge of the members of that community.
This thesis in its first three chapters provides an interpretation and
criticism of Polanyi1 s concept of perosonal knowledge, and its judgment
by the members of the scientific community. In the fourth chapter we
consider how far Polanyifs concept of the scientific community can be
considered a reasonable interpretation of the scientific community when
compared with some of the work'of historians and sociologists of science.
We then use his concept of personal knowledge and especially the concept
of inter-personal knowledge as a tool to examine other intellectual
communities, in particular schools of history and the judicial community,
and a non-intellectual community; !the community of moral agents1,
Finally we expand the analysis to include the community of politicians
and the political community as a whole.
5
Polanyi hoped as early as 1951 that the many strands of his philosophy 
would be developed into a coherent theory which could justify a free 
society, and has since that date continually returned to the task without 
completing it. This thesis is in fact a suggestion as to how it could be 
completed. It brings together an analysis made of the judicial community
g
in the Logic of Liberty and of the study of history made in The Study of 
7
Man and adds to them, as well an analysis of a free society made in these
8and other works, and in particular in Personal Knowledge. The thesis 
alters the emphasis of Polanyirs work, for it stresses to a greater degree 
the notion of communal or inter-personal knowledge, where he puts great 
emphasis on the notion of personal knowledge.
s
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CHAPTER ONE
A Theory of Discovery
1 2 Michael Polanyi in his bo Ok Personal Knowledge produces a model of
the scientific community0 It is a community bound together by a common
faith, and by the joint task of its memberso Their task is to attempt
to gain contact with an external reality, and to reveal to each other the
understanding they gain about this reality. The community is then made
up of people with the same belief and the same intention: all members
of the community believe in the existence of an external reality, and all
intend to apprehend and reveal aspects of it.
The members of this community are pure scientists who have gained their 
own contact with reality. Polanyi calls these scientists mature 
scientists. They are scientists who are able to make an original 
contribution to science. He argues that there is no formal method by 
which they can begin to understand reality. A budding scientists has to
■z
pass through a master/apprenticeship relationship before he can become an
independent scientist. He needs to submit himself to the authority of
a master, and learn from him the approach to reality. Polanyi states:
"You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing 
things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for its 
effectiveness, Ey watching the master and emulating his efforts 
in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks 
up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly 
known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated 
only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically 
to the imitation of another.
And to stress the difficulty of analysing this learning process he states:
"The large amount of time spent by students of chemistry, biology 
and medicine in their practical courses shows how greatly these 
sciences rely on the transmission of skills and connoisseurship 
from master to apprentice. It offers an impressive demonstration 
of the extent to which the art of knowing has regained unspecifiable
5
at the very heart of science."
Eventually a scientist breaks away from his master, and adds 
techniques and approaches of his own. He establishes his ©wn 
contact with reality.
Polanyi argues that after the scientist has assimilated
the skills of his master and added his own he approaches
reality by a combination of faith and commitment to his own
beliefs. The understanding gained by this method is far from
being purely objective knowledge but is a special type of
knowledge which Polanyi calls personal knowledge,^and this
knowledge is not a subjective knowledge as it claims universal
validity. He in fact criticises the lay concept of science
as a formulation of objective knowledge. He states:
"It goes without saying that no one - scientiists included- 
looks at the universe this way ...Nor should this supiise 
us. For as human beings, we must inevitably spe the 
universe from a centre lying within oursleves and speak 
about it in terms of human language shaped by; the exig­
encies of human intercourse. Any attempt rogourously to 
eliminate our human perspective from our picture of 
the world must lead to absurdity.11 7
Pure objectivity, so he claims, is ruled out by the very
process of knowing.
Yet cannot it be argued that this may be so but should 
not we attempt to be as objective as possible and cultivate 
a detached approach to our research ? We should try and 
withdraw our emotions. Polanyi argues that firstly this is 
impossible to do, and secondly that it is the very emotional 
attachment which leads to discovery so it would be unwise 
to qttempt the impossible. Emotions create the wi|l to 
pndertake the necessary research, and growing intellectual 
excitement tells the scientist when the discovery^ is at 
hand. He states:
"Intellectual passions do not merely affirm the existence 
of harmonies which foreshadows an indeterminate range
of future discoveries, but can also evoke intimations
of specific discoveries and sustain their persistent
pursuit through years of laboufc." 8
Emotional attachment then is a necessary condition for 
continuing a successful research programme.lt is only by an 
emotional immersion in his research that a scientist can 
begin and continue to gain knowledge.
HThe question arises as to why we need this emotional attachment to achieve 
discovery. We certainly need an interest in a problem before we attempt 
to solve it but is it necessary to.have an intellectual passion? ..For. , 
instance, is it necessary to exhibit intellectual passion in analysing 
the results of our experiments? The reason why Polanyi thinks it is 
necessary is closely bound up with his concept of reality* He seems to 
have two concepts reality: a concept of a reality which exists far beyond
our senses, and a concept of a reality which merges into the reality 
available to our senses. The book Personal Knowledge in fact marks a 
watershed in the development of Polanyi*s philosophy. It marks the 
culmination of a rather two simple theory of knowledge and the beginning 
of a more sophisticated epistemology and ontology, although the later 
developments continue to retain a number of the important characteristics 
of the old.
Polanyi throughout his work is trying to develop a philosophy of belief*
Like Hume he rejects the validity of induction. There is no adequate
reason to suppose that what has gone before will repeat itself in. situations
not examined. Our belief, for instance, that A causes B is not based on
a necessary connection between A and B but is based on our experience that
in fact A does follow B, on the continuous association of B with A.
Hume thates that our knowledge of causal relations, n arises entirely
from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar
objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by
9custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other •” Our1 knowledge1
is therefore based on a belief not a necessary connection. If the validity
of induction is therefore challenged in this way two alternative approaches
seem to open up: we can attempt to formulate a semi-deductive method or
10develop a philosophy of belief* Karl Popper takes the former course,
and argues that science is not inductive but hypothetico-deductive*
As H e w  states:
”It is a ^method of conjectures and refutationsf which takes
advantage of the logical truism, that any universal proposition
may be conclusively falsified by one counter example, whereas
an *unrestricted1 or fopenl universal proposition could not be
conclusively vei^xied by the occurence of any finite number of
11exemplifications•”
Michael Polanyi takes the other alternative and accepts that we have to 
rely on our beliefs. He attempts to develop a philosophy of belief where 
the stage of knowledge one reaches depends on a commitment to one*s belief* 
Antetotional attachment to one*s research is therefore needed as it brings 
about and sustains one4s beliefs.
Yet the philosophy of belief which Polanyi develops is very different to
that sketched out by Hume. Hume recognises that it is an alternative
to deduction but limits the possibility of developing such a philosophy
by the - disallowing the possibility of generalising beliefs. He states,
t!We can never be' induced to believe any matter of fact, except where its
12
cause, or its effect is present”, and that causation is the only relation 
which ”can be traced beyond our senses and informs us of existences and 
objects which we do not see or feel”. H.H. Price suggests that Hume 
would probably also accept an addition to this: ”constant conjunctions in
which the conjuncta are co-exlstent, not successive - regularities of 
concomitance, as opposed to regularities of sequence.” ^  Beliefs arising 
from constant conjunctions then are reasonable, as they come directly from 
our experience but if they do not arise from this sort of experience they 
must be unreasonable. A reasonable person is one who learns from experience, 
and behaves according to it. Hie reasonableness in this case is an 
inductive reasonableness and not a deductive one.
Price also points out that Hume fs doctrine of belief is a very narrow one 
and does not allow generalisation, for example, water expands when it 
freezes. He states:
i *3
”It will not apply to general beliefs about matters of fact
but only beliefs about particular matters of fact. This is because
he insists that an idea which we believe must be related to or
lA
associated with a present impression.”
In the case of Polanyi, Polanyi relies on the necessity for reasonable
beliefs based on experience but widens out the notion of experience to
include that of the supersensible world* His method of gaining knowledge
can give us an experience of the supersensible world, and we certainly
can and do make generalisations from this experience. For Hume this
first move would be outrageous and the second not possible. Indeed the
whole exercise would be beyond the bounds of human capacity.
That in Polanyi*s work the pure scientist is trying to move beyond the
bounds of our senses can be especially seen in his earlier writings. In
the 19^6 edition of Science, Thith, and Society Polanyi states:
”It may appear perhaps more appropriate to regard discoveries 
in natural sciences as guided not so much by the potentiality of 
a scientific proposition as by an aspect of nature seeking realisa­
tion in our minds. The process of scientific intuition is then 
brought into analogy with extra-sensory perception as established 
by Rhine.” ^
This quotation, and according to the introduction of the 196b edition he 
has now given up the idea of something analogous to a telepathic communicat­
ion with nature, has the rathor startling implication that not only does 
external reality actively participate in bringing a scientist to a discovery, 
but that it has mind like attributes. Although moving away from this 
particular speculation Polanyi continues to believe that external reality 
can itself be active in leading a scientist to a discovery.
It would appear then that Polanyi is definitely rejecting the Kantian 
concept of science as an attempt to gain an increasing knowledge of 
appearances that can be given to us through our senses. He is arguing 
that the reality the scientist is trying to apprehend is beyond appearances.
14-
Re is attempting an apprehension of the essence of things: things in
themselves. Kant argued in the Critique of Pure Reason that in order
to gain a knowledge of things in themselves we would need to have
intellectual intuitions but ‘t h i scannot  do as our intuitive .capacity is
confined to our senses. Science does not and cannot give us a knowledge
of things in themselves but only an increasing knowledge of appearances.
Polanyi is taking up a Platonistic position. He is putting forward a
two world theory, and arguing that we can and do have a knowledge of
supra-sensibilia. He states:
”To jay that the discovery of objective truth in science consists
in the apprehension of a rationality which commands our respect
and arouses our contemplative admiration; that such discovery,
while using the experience of our senses as clues, transcends
this experience by embracing the vision of a reality beyond the
depression of our senses, a vision which speaks for itself in
guiding us to an even deeper understanding of reality - such an
account of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside
as out dated Platonism: a piece of mystery-mongering unworthy of
an enlightened age. Yet it is precisely on this conception of
17objectivity that I wish to insist in.”
There are three contentions in this statement: that there is an external
reality, that in order to discover this reality we must transcend the 
experience of our senses, and that the vision we gain somehow vitalises 
itself mi us tp m  ev#h gpeofcir e#
argues that in order to cross the gap between the experience of our senses 
and super sensible reality we must make a'., logical jump.: ”the plunge by
18which we reach at another shore of reality.”
Although his view seems to be Platonistic it is not strictly a platonic 
solution. He is not arguing that we cannot gain a knowledge of appearances 
because they are in a state of flux but can gain a knowledge of supra 
sensibilia by intellectual intuitions. He is arguing that we can gain 
a knowledge of appearances but that this is only a knowledge of the lowest 
level of reality, and in no sense should we imagine that we are gaining
a knowledge of ultimate reality* He states:
’’What is the most tangible has the least meaning and it is 
perverse to identify the tangible with the real. For to regard 
a meaningless sub-stratum as the Ultimate reality of all things, 
must lead to the conclusion that all things are meaningless. And 
we can avoid this conclusion only if we acknowledge instead that 
deepest reality is possessed by higher things that are least 
tangible.” ^
Polanyi believes then that our knowledge of appearances signifies only
the lowest level of reality, and that we can progress to a higher level
of reality j- to super sensible reality - only by the use of our intuitive
faculties. The method of stimulating our intuitive faculties, or tacit
co-efficient of knowledge, is by ’’relying on*-our awareness of them
(particulars) for attending to the coherent entity to which they 
20contribute.” He continues:
”We may say for example that we know the clues of perception by
dwelling in them, when we attend to that which they jointly indicate;
and that we see the parts of the whole forming a whole by dwelling
21in the parts. We arrive thus at the conception of indwelling.”
This then is Polanyifs epistemology. We findwellt, or we immerse 
22
ourselves, in the clues of perception to gain a knowledge of the whole. 
This does not mean that we concentrate on the particulars and that this 
gives us a knowledge of the whole, as this would have the opposite result.
It would prevent a concept of the whole from being formed. What Polanyi 
claims we do is assimilate the particulars. We make them part of ourselves
p*£
(a similar notion to Plato!s idea of digesting abstract concepts ) and
then we are able to achieve a knowledge of a whole. He states:
”0ur body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, 
whether intellectual or practical. In all our waking moments we are 
relyinghon/oui awareness of contacts of our body with things 
outside for attending to these things. Oar own body is the only 
thing in the w©x-ia wliAoh we normally never experience as an object,
but! -wo “3 n tenn^ & f the World to which we are
attending from our body. It ie by making this intelligent us® 
of our body that we feel it to be our body, and not a thing 
out side.
I have described how we learn to feel the end of a tool or a probe
hitting things out side. We m iy regard this as the transformation
of the tool or probi into a sentient extension of our body, as
Samuel Butler has said. But our awareness of our body for
attending to things outside it suggests a wider generalization
of the feeling we have of our body. Whenever we use certain things
fox* attending from them to other things, in the way in which we
always use our body, these things change their appearance. They
appear to us in terms of entities to which we are attending from
them, just as we feel our own body in terms of the things out side
to which we we are attending from our body. in thi$ sense we
can say that when we make a thing function as the proximal terms
of tacit knowledge, we incorporate It into our body - or extend
2kour body to include it - so that we dwell in it."
He argues that by indwelling in things or by interiorising things we 
come not to view them as particulars but to use them to attend to the 
comprehensive entity which they form.
This is a peculiar notion as quite obviously we cannot literally assimilate
particulars, and make them part of ourselves. Polanyi apparently means
w© assimilate concepts of the particulars, and after a time an abstract
pattern emerges which we can consider to be the whole. Th-is is an idea
taken from Gestalt psychology, and, as in the numerous examples given by
the Gestalt psychologists, concentration on the particulars makes the
pattern, or the whole dissappear. Only when we remove our gaze from the
particulars and transfer it to a search for the whole does the pattern
emerge again. He gives the example of a painting to demonstrate how by
Concentrating on the particulars we can destroy the whole:
!,I shall demonstrate this by recalling Sir Kenneth Clark*s 
experiment, made about twleve years ago, in viewing las Meninas 
by Valazquez. Owing to its rough structure, Las Meninas must 
be viewed from a distance. Clark wanted to observe how, by
app^ -'orxohin^  it from a distance to a closer point, one sees the 
painting dissolving into fragments. He hoped to see a gradual 
transition - but there was none* He wralte:
*1 would start from as far away as I could, when the illusion 
was complete, and come gradually nearer, until suddenly, what 
had been a hand, and a ribbon, and a piece of velvet dissolved 
into a fricasse of beautiful brushstrokes.1 (Six Great Pictures1, 
The Sunday Times, London, June 2, 1957)
Now if we are asked two questions: 1) which view showed a canvas
plus brushstrokes? and 2) which view showed the painting? the 
answer would be that the view at close quarters showed a canvas 
plus brushstrokes and the view from a distance showed the painting. 
We can see only one or the other of these two sights, never the 
two at the same time. And this is indeed what Gombrich 
(E.H. Gombrich in Art and Illusion) concludes from this kind of 
observation. He says that we see either a canvas and blobs 
or a painting, never the two at the same time.
But the situation changes if we admit two different ways of seeing
an object. Gestalt psychology has long since observed that to
look at the several parts of a whole can destroy our view of the
whole.......It would be nonsense to say that when, by moving away
some distance, we come to see a collection of parts as one whole,
we no longer see the parts. What happens is that we see the parts
now in a new way, namely, as parts of a whole. To introduce my
own terms, let me say to look at the parts separately is to see
them focally, while to see them together forming a whole is to
25be aware of them subsidiarily.*1
It would seem that it is possible to discover a pattern in different ways.
It is possible after concentration on an apparently chaotic agglomeration
of particulars for a pattern to spontaneously emerge. It is also
possible that one can be led to perceive a pattern by having the elements
of a pattern and its connections indicated to one. On the other hand
it is sometimes possible consciously to create patterns in apparent
chaos (gestalten-b?ildung). Transferred to the realm of abstract thought
we could argue in the following way. We perceive certain facts, primary 
26
aboriginal facts. We build up concepts about them, and our concepts 
about these primary facts are given the value of factual existence.
For us these mental concepts ore our w&j- *>£ millerstcuiding the primary facts
and for us they virtually are the facts. Already the process of organising
chaos has begun, we have built up mental images or concepts of the primary
27facts and in doing so we have isolated them from other things. We
then may spontaneously perceive the relationship between them so that a
pattern is created whi ch ties the concepts togoblioi- 3 nto a 3 J ? - ^
concept of them all or in part. Spontaneity in this case may be related
to our previous experiencei as a pattern may emerge which is analogous to
28other patterns we have perceived. It emerges suddenly and comprehensively
and could be compared to a vision. On the other hand we could be taught
a comprehensive pattern, although it could be argued that a pattern taught
in this way may not be perceived in exactly the way the teacher expects.
To teach a pattern a teacher would have to specify certain concepts about
primary facts so that the pupil could understand how the pattern could be
made to emerge, and then gradually indicate the connecting links between
the different facts in order to create the comprehensive picture. Owing
to the difficulty of knowing whether or not the concepts have been assimilated
in the way the teacher intends we can never be sure that the comprehensive
pattern which the pupil forms will be the same as that of the teacher (a
29reason for the urge to mathematise in all sciences ). The teaching 
method Polanyi advocates is that the pupil, as far as possible, should be 
led to create his own pattern, i.e.,he should make the discovery himself. 
Eventually when the pupil can perceive patterns without the help of the 
teacher he becomes an independent scientist.
The spontaneous emergence of a pattern comes about so Polanyi claims, by 
trying to think about the facts, our concepts of the facts, as a whole 
until suddenly we perceive the connecting links, and see them, or rather 
understand them as a whole. This seems to be his main concept of 
discovery but as we have seen there is a third possibility, and this is 
a conscious attempt to create a pattern on the seemingly disconnected facts.
/<t
If a pattern does not spontaneously appear we can create one by attempting
to fit different patterns on the disconnected facts or if this fails by
imposing a pattern on the facts* An experienced scientist will have
different ecperimental, mathematical, and statistical techniques which
sometimes will bring about the emergence of a pattern in apparently
disconnected facts• The pattern may arise not as a result of indwelling,
or a growing feeling of certainty but purely as a result of the application
30of certain techniques* It is possible to argue that this would be 
accidental discovery but this would not strictly be so as a scientist 
would be consciously using a number of techniques in the hope that some 
will bear fruit* The seeming contradiction of this possibility with the 
notion of indwelling can be weakened somewhat by an argument which states 
that a scientist will systematically go through a series of techniques 
with a fairly strong belief that some of them will bear fruit* He will 
use his experience in judging which are the more likely to bring about the 
hoped for results* Generally I think that this method is not really the 
method of indwelling, although it may be a superficial level of it, as in
this case it would be unlikely that a scientist would develop an absolute
commitment to his discovery*
Polanyifs notion of assimilating particulars has another function within 
his system* The act of assimilation as well as being an aid, or rather 
a necessary step in the perception of gestalten, enables one to forget 
about the particulars and automatically use the knowledge of the whole
which one has gained. For instance, we cannot learn to drive a car cerely
by-reading an instruction book. We must practice each operation until it 
becomes second nature to us. Until we no longer have to think about what 
we have to do but do it* Only then can we drive a car. However, even 
in this case if we begin to think about each operation, that is, our 
attention moves from the,whole to the particulars, we very soon find 
ourselves crashing the gears, and our driving technique sadly declines*
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This may demonstrate how we progress from the lawoo-fc of reality to
the next level but how can we, when we have a knowledge of the whole,
progress to a still higher level of reality? A clue to the answer has
already been given for we build on the knowledge that we have gained: a
knowledge that has become completely accepted by us so that we no longer
try and break it down or analyse it* In Polanyifs language we can say
that we heighten our indwelling* He produces the example of speech to
demonstrate in an allegorical way the progress from one level to another:
"The first level, lowest of all is the production of the voice; 
the second, the utterance of words; the third, the joining of
words to sentences; the fourth, the working of the sentences into
a style; the fifth and highest, the composition of the texts*
The principle of each level operates under the control of the 
higher level” ^
Polanyi points out that each level is subject to a dual control: by the
laws that apply to its elements in themselves, and by the laws that control
the comprehensive entity formed by them* And this multiple control is
made possible by the fact ”that the principle governing the isolated
particulars of a lowest level leave indeterminate their bounday conditions
32for the control by a higher principle”. He indicates that, for
instance, voice production leaves largely open the combination of sounds
to words, which is controlled by a vocabularly; whereas a vocabularly
leaves largely open the combination of words to form sentences, which is
controlled by grammar; and the sequence continues* He states:
’’Consequently, the operations of a higher level cannot be accounted 
for by the laws governing its particulars forming the next lower 
level, for example, you cannot derive a vocabularly from phonetics, 
and you cannot derive a grammar from a vocabularly.”
This analogy is intended to show us how we progress from one level of
reality to another, and why we are able to progress in such a way. In
particular, when used as an explanation of the scientific task it is
indicative of Polanyi*s belief that a scientist is not solely concerned
"with the study of appearances, the physics and chemistry of entities,
but that he is attempting to understand ultimate reality* Even so he
points out that this task can never be completely accomplished as reality 
3*fis inexhaustible*
Polanyi then is attempting to provide a theory of discovery which bridges 
the gap between the sensible world and the super sensible world, the 
phenomenal and the noumenal world, by the process of indwelling, and 
the gradual movement of a knower to a knowledge of a mainly hidden reality, ■ 
rather than by nthe plunge by which we gain a foothold on another shore 
of realityn the expression he used in the work Personal Knowledge*
It is an attempt to overcome the problem of the two worlds coming apart, 
the world of sensible things and the world beyond sense, a problem which
z^ir
is so apparent to Polanyi in his Science, Eaith and Society* His
insistence that we move gradually from our knowledge of appearances to 
a knowledge of a super sensible reality by the process of indwelling seems 
to be a direct attempt to overcome this problem. He sees the distinction 
and the problem, and attempts to provide a solution. Certainly there 
remains the gap to be crossed in the movement from the one world to the 
other, but the necessity for the plunge no longer exists.
In his earlier works, up to the writing of Personal Knowledge Polanyi 
postulated a Spinozan type of intuition: an intuition with an intrinsic
quality of rightness about it. He needed this concept of intuition 
because of his concept of reality as being very much !out there* but as 
he no longer takes up this position he can now postulate the intuition 
of supra sensibilia as a workaday skill: the tacit co-efficient of
knowledge. ^
37Thomas A. Langford in his paper Michael Polanyi and the Task of Theology 
considered Polanyi *s explanation of discovery as a visionary method of 
arriving at the truth. To a certain extent he was justified in considering
e x
the process in such a way because of Polanyi!s phraseology, and the
relationship of his work to Gestalt psychology. Yet Polanyi is not
really advocating a visionary method in the way that we could consider
* 38Swedenborgfs method to be visionary. His vision is not a vision in
the sense that it is a picture of reality, for he uses the term in a
metaphorical sense. It is a vision in the sense that it is a very strong
feeling of the nearness of reality. We first have a feeling that we
are near to apprehending reality, and as we continue to indwell in our
research the feeling becomes stronger until we are absolutely certain that-'
we are apprehending an aspect of reality, and as Polanyi states this
39certainty "deserves to be called a vision".
It does seem possible to explain the method of indwelling in a more 
simple way, and also to challenge the notion that it allows us to pass 
beyond the phenomenal world to the noumenal world as we heighten our 
indwelling and move beyond our knowledge of physical and chemical appearances. 
Is hot the scientist in the same way as the philosopher merely providing 
an interpretation of the available facts, an interpretation which he 
believes to be the best, or the truth as Polanyi would say? Such an 
interpretation does, and is intended to provide a certain stability in 
seemingly disconnected facts, and to supply clues for further interpretat­
ion. By arranging the facts into a theoretical framework the scientist 
of philosopher is able to give an explanation about them. This task of 
arranging chaos into a pattern is by no means an easy process but an 
arduous one. It is an attempt to make sense of the facts by understanding 
them as a whole, and in such a way that all important elements amongst the 
facts are accounted for* Yet by its very nature the interpretation that 
is given cannot be on the same level as the facts themselves, as at the 
lower level there is only chaos. One has to delve into the facts and try 
and find some connecting links or principles which can lead the way to 
some interpretation, and stabilise the seemingly chaotic phenomena.
However by providing an interpretation one is moving away from the immediate 
facts, and this process continues as a good interpretation of theory 
should lead to further developments. Gradually as new interpretations 
are built up"on previous ones, one moves even further away from the 
original facts until it may be difficult to envisage the connecting links 
between them and this later interpretation. Yet nevertheless links 
there must be for, although at each stage one lifts the conclusion of 
an earlier stage on to a new level and in the process changes it into 
something that seems different, the new interpretation does remain an 
expansion of the earlier stage, and is necessarily related to it even 
if it is not immediately apparent that it is so.
As an explanation of the development of science Polanyi !s psychology of
discovery and epistemology faces numerous difficulties. How, for
instance, can the individual scientist adjudicate between different
interpretations? As Langford asks, "How can one adjudicate between
rival visions or how a rival vision may be related to another must be 
IfO
answered." The answer for Polanyi is relatively easy to produce for
rival visions do not occur to the scientist. If we examine Polanyi*s
concept of indwelling and his argument about the different levels of
reality it is possible to provide an explanation as to why this is so.
I do so in my paper "Michael Polanyi and the Problem of Personal Knowledge"
"The visionary is at first immersed in his research and gains an 
inkling of reality: the first vision. He continues his immersion
until a second insight arises: the second vision. TM.q process
is continued until an absolute vision of reality is reached.
However, at each stage there is only one vision: one insight that 
deserves to be called a vision. It may indeed be the case that 
a vision on a higher plane of reality may contradict a vision on 
a lower plane, but this is because the vision on the lower plane 
only revoaled a smaller aspect of reality, and the new vision is 
a higher synthesis. Only to the outsider can there be a contradict­
ion, for the process of revealing the planes of reality prevents
the appearance of a contradiction to tn® Tisionary* He knows
ifl
why and how he has arrived at his new vision.”
In less esoteric language, the scientist moves on from his original 
interpretation to a higher interpretation. This does not mean that he 
sees only one possibility for expanding the original interpretation, but 
that the one interpretation best satisfies the scientist *s requirements*
He becomes committed to this interpretation as it seems to provide a 
true interpretation (really the best interpretation possible at that 
time) and "deserves to be called a vision”• He then develops from this 
interpretation a further interpretation, and so on. Quite naturally no 
contradiction is apparent to him in the development of his theory, as he 
has worked it out and knows how one set of ideas lead to another* However, 
as the process of discovery, or of interpretation, is not necessarily 
deductive but can arise by association and analogy the train of thought 
in the development of a fully fledged theory is not necessarily apparent 
to the observer, although when the train of thought is produced in a 
paper the scientist will tend to produce it as a deductive development* 
However, as the process of discovery is not deductive it is possible for 
rival theories to appear, and the problem arises of choosing between 
them. The problem is heightened as the theory is really an interpretation 
of the facts, and the facts as far as they go can support alternative 
theories* Erom a descriptive point of view it could be argued that the 
best theory is the one that explains the largest amount of facts* We 
could say that the more general a theory is the better it is as long as 
it remains internally consistent in its generalised form. So long as a 
descriptive theory is internally consistent we can designate it correct 
but the better theory is the one that it is able to describe, or provide 
an explanation of, a greater number of facts. It creates greater
in chaos* Even so, the problem i?‘ in creased further as a 
theory often has to be used, for predictive pu'Poa6jS• The controversy 
over the testability of theories arises a+ this point: whether it is
possi hi e verify or falsify a theory ^  neither.
If as Polanyi suggests the process of indwelling takes us beyond the
phenomenal world into the noumenal world, and the phenomenal world does
not exhibit the same characteristics as the noumenal world then quite
clearly it is not possible to provide any test of noumenal knowledge from
the world available to uor senses: the world of appearances* If,
however, the phenomenal and the noumenal world exhibit the same
characteristics as Newton thought, then theoretically at least it would
seem possible to provide some test of our ideas about the noumenal world
by our knowledge of the world of appearances. Unfortunately we could
never know in the strict sense of the word whether our test was conclusive,
at best we could only provide confirmation. Our belief that the phenomenal
and noumenal world exhibit the same characteristics has to be of necessity
a matter of faith. Polanyifs doctrine is then that we can confirm
2*2
theories but neither verify or falsify them.
Paul Tillich suggested that ontological knowledge can be tested by the
2*3
life process. Unfortunately a much quicker confirmation of a theory
is needed in science, although in a sense if a theory is to be tested at
all it must be tested by the life process* There is also the possibility
that a theory although virtually completely wrong continually gives correct
k kpredictions, and thereby receives confirmation as to its accuracy*
This opens up the possibility of arguing against any predictive theory
by stating that although the prediction is correct the reason for its
success is other than that stated in the theory. An amusing example of
this appears in the Old Testament* Jeremiah predicts that the punishment
of Yahweh will be inflicted on his people. The day of Yahweh comes and
the punishment takes place but a number of the Jews argue, to Jeremiah,s
utter anger, that although the prophesy was correct the reason for the
punishment was not as Jeremiah claimed* The people were not punished
because of their failure to obey Jahweh but because of their failure to pray
2*5
to the Queen of Heaven.
2_b
For Polanyi then our belief in a theory arises because of our indwelling.
At each point in our development of a theory we arrive at a point of 
absolute commitment, and then move on to the next stage. However he
 ^k6does produce certain criteria for fudging the worth of a theory*
They are its beauty, Which includes a notion of simplicity and internal
2*7
consistency but has wider connotations than this, and its fruitfulness,
that is its ability to lead to further development (It ’’foreshadows an
indeterminate range of future discoveries,”)* In other words there
are certain facets in a theory which our indwelling allows us to appreciate,
and which help to give rise to our commitment to a theory. Our commitment
o!r feeling of certainty then acts as a criterion of truth for us.
Karl Popper, for instance, would argue at this point that in fac** our
commitment to a theory or our feeling of certainty could never be a
2*8
criterion of truth, although it could be the reason why we put the 
theory forward to the scientific community as an explanation of the
v
facts. He would accept that the beauty of a theory, although he would 
bp reluctant to use the term, and its usefulness (fruitfulness) would 
provide a reason for developing a commitment but by themselves could not 
create certainty. This is recognised by Polanyi, and why he would argue 
that beauty and fruitfulness by themselves could not create certainty.
Qfce feeling of certainty can only arise by indwelling, and some of the 
elements which arise from this indwelling are a recognition qf beauty
and fruitfulness. Polanyifs argument is really expressing a psychology
/
of discovery and not a logic of certainty in spite of his use of the term 
truth. He is really saying that the process of indwelling gives rise to 
a feeling of certainty. The scientist after the process is absolutely 
committed to his theory and believes in its truth. To use Polanyi*s 
terminology, he has arrived at a position of personal knowledge which 
is a subjective knowledge which claims universal applicability.
in
ZfQ
This is really an attempt to develop a philosophy of belief# Theories
to which we are absolutely committed can be used by us to develop 
further theories, and to describe and predict happenings in the actual 
world. And as for Polanyi there are no external criteria to estimate 
the truth of a theory we have to reply on our own certain belief 
(personal knowledge), as there is nothing else to rely on unless we 
accept the authority of others.
Polanyi then rather than proposing a logic of discovery is providing 
a psychological analysis of how a scientist makes a discovery by an 
emotional immersion in his research. Yet the resultant commitment 
that the scientist has to his discovery cannot be oonsidered as a 
justification of truth. At best it can provide an explanation as to 
why the scientist makes a claim that his theory is true. This is why 
a scientist when presenting a paper does not refer to the strength of 
his commitment but provides arguments and experimental evidence to 
support his theory. Some reasons are irrelevant, for instance, to 
state that one absolutely believes in the validity of one fs theory 
because one has a feeling which one knows indicates its validity may be 
the case but is not the sort of evidence the scientific community would 
take into account when judging a theory. They want evidence that can 
be confirmed. Arguments that can be examined for inconsistencies, 
and logical jumps, and experimental evidence that can be duplicated.
Ey postulating a two world theory, something like a Kantian phenomenal 
and noumenal world, both of which can be understood Polanyi certainly 
needs intellectual intuitions ”to reach the other shore of reality”, 
and an active reality to help him on the way. Yet if we can have 
intellectual intuitions over and above sense experience the only way we 
can judge these intuitions is by repeating the intuitions. A notion of 
consensus of intuitions arises which is difficult because the scientists
other than the discoverer have not gone through the necessary process 
of indwelling to achieve such intuitions. They in practice can only 
judge the discovering scientists intuition by related fields of knowledge 
which they accept. However, by the time Polanyi has written Personal 
Knowledge he has virt_.-J.ly given up a two world theory. At least they 
seem so closely tied together that we can progress from one to. the other 
by the process of indwelling and work-a-day skills rather than by 
Spinoz: .an type intuitions. We can progress smoothly from the world of 
appearances to the world of things in themselves• But if a 'knowledge of 
appearances is necessary before we move on to higher things, and Polanyi 
states that it is, then how can we be moving towards a study of things 
in themselves? As I have already pointed out all we are doing is 
providing a further explanation of appearances, and there is no need for 
a two world theory. We are in fact building up concepts abqut the 
sensible world, and these concepts about the sensible world can not be 
said to make up another world, and indeed are meaningless unless we do 
relate them to the sensible world.
If Polanyi recognised this he would not claim that science is concerned
with understanding ultimate reality but only that science is looking at
appearances in a special way, as Oakeshott would say, under the category 
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of quantity. However, if science is the examination of appearances 
under the category of quanity then theoretically at least we should be 
able to test scientific theories. And likewise gestalten would not 
spontaneously arise out of appearances but we would put them there 
(gestalten buldung), and neither would it be necessary to claim that a 
theory draws back a veil and reveals a hidden reality. The theory would 
propose an explanation of reality from a particular point of view*
Yet even within Polanyi fs theory if we need to understand appearances or 
the ’’physics and chemistry” of reality before we move on to higher levels
of reality why cannot we provide some test of our higher level of reality 
by reference to our lower level? If the high level theory does not seem 
consistent with what we know about the lower level then surely this is 
good evidence to suggest that it is probably incorrect?
3>o
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in pure science; a knowledge of the field of plausibility, value 
criteria, and the value of the act of discovery in terms of 
originality. The first one arises from the scientist’s experience, 
and provides a background for the use of other criteria. He states:
"The excitement of the scientist making a discovery is 
an intellectual passion, telling that something is 
intellectually precious and more particularly, that it is 
precious to science..*.....
The function which I attribute here to scientific passion 
is that of distinguishing between demonstrable facts which 
are of scientific interest and those which are not 
...•••••••I want to show that this appreciation depends
ultimately on a sense of intellectual beauty......*
In fact, without a scale of interest and plausibility 
based on a vision of reality, nothing can be discovered 
that is of value to science; and only our grasp of
scientific beauty, responding to the evidence of our senses
can evoke this vision." (Personal Knowledge, op. cit. 
pp. 134-5)
If a scientist’s knowledge of the field of plausibility affirms
a fact then it is adjudged by the value criteria, which are
accuracy (certainty), systematic relevance, which is related 
to profundity and scientific beauty, and the intrinsic interest 
of the subject matter. The first two of these value criteria 
are scientific, the third non-scientific but a deficiency in one 
can be compensated for by excellence in another. Originality 
includes the notion of introducing a new way of looking at 
things but also that the new way of looking should be dynamic 
and lead to further davelopment.
A fruitful theory is a theory that receives confirmation and 
leads to the development of other theories but as indicated its 
fruitfulness is not necessarily indicative of its truth. However 
it has to be admitted that it is a theory’s ability to cope with 
tests that leads to its development. The tests can be either 
attempts at verification or falsification, although it would appear 
that attempts at refutation combined with the theory being 
produced in a negative existential form would lead to a more rapid 
development of science, as a theory that was refuted could be 
discarded and a new theory looked for. In the case of verification 
a theory which was not verified could lead to a further unfruitful 
search for verifying evidence.
An unfruitful theory can be either true or false but in any case 
it is likely to be trivial. ‘
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effects the process of discovery has on the scientific community#
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Decision of the Community
Polanyi has argued that itl is the individual scientist who decides on 
the truth of a discovery, but quite obviously his own commitment to 
a theory cannot automatically guarantee its acceptance# Before a 
theory can be considered to be part of scientific knowledge it has to 
be accepted by the scientific community as a whole. And as solany has 
argued it is not possible to verify or falsify a theory only one 
alternative remains. A theory must be judged by the consensus of 
opinion within the community.
The scientists will not have the discovering scientists fait bin the
t h 2cry but will use the same criteria for judging a theory: its
systematic relevance, internal consistency, and beauty. They will also
consider another major factor, and that is how far the discovery fits
into the general framework of science. Polanyi states:
"Very little inherent certainty will suffice to secure the
highest scientific value to an alleged fact, if only it fits in
with a great scientific generalisation, while the most stubborn
facts will be set aside if there is no place for them in the
1established framework of science11.
A consensus of opinion about a theory can be formed, so Polanyi argues, 
because in the Republic of Science1 there can be found the overlapping 
of labours. A scientist may know one per cent of all scientific 
knowledge, another whose work is near to his overlaps and a joint 
authority is exercised in the overlapping area. This phenomenon is 
continued throughout the scientific community until a network of knowledge 
is formed and controlled by the combined authority of the members of 
the community. The individual scientist submits himself to the 
authority of his peers but at the same time will exercise a certain 
amount of authority himself. He will have some authority where his sector 
overlaps with others, and complete authority in his own sector where it 
does not*
2The 1 Republic* then is controlled by an organic, general authoritiative 
structure, and its authority is shared by all mature scientists*
Polanyi states * "There are differences in rank between scientists, but
3
these are of secondary importance: everyone*s position is sovereign.11
It is organic becau? all the scientists are bound together by a mutual 
faith , and each attempts to be instrumental in serving the community 
by producing discoveries* The community has of necessity two conflicting 
elements* It is authoritative, and thereby creates a certain amount 
of conformity, but at the same time needs to allow for individual 
initiative. Initiatives do not and cannot come from the community as 
a whole but from the mature scientist utth his personal contact with 
reality.
Polanyi argues that the aggregate of individual initiatives on the
part of the mature scientists creates a spontaneous order which is able
to exist because of the coherence of science. He states:
"In so far as there exists a steady underlying purpose in 
each step of scientific discovery and each step can be 
competently judged as to its conformity to this purpose and its 
success in approaching it, these steps can be made to add up 
spontaneously to the most efficient pursuit of science*11
In other words science can now be spontaneously co-ordinated as our
knowledge has been systematized. This allows us to relate each new
discovery to the system and, in fact, to be a discovery it must be
related to the system. The system of knowledge is automatically used
by the mature scientists to judge a theory* However, the possibility
of acquiring and then using this knowledge originally arises because
of the faith the scientist has in the existence of external reality.
It is this faith, and the confirmation of the faith by the gaining of
knowledge, which ultimately gives coherence to science.
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Polanyi claims that this process of spontaneous co-ordination although
not perfect does produce the best possible results* He argues:
"There is no warrant to assume*• that any particular instance 
of free mutual adjustment will produce a desirable result**** 
even the most wonderful successes achieved by such adjustment 
will hot be j.ree of manifest shortcomings nor represent more 
than a relative optimum. But it suggests, nevertheless, that 
such tasks as a system of free adjustment may achieve, cannot
5be effectively perform ed by any other technique of co-ordination*"
The medium for this co-ordination is the instant publicity which is
given to the results of research so that an immediate judgement is made
possible. The spontaneous co-ordination of knowl< dge allows a consensus
of opinion to arise* A consensus which rises to the level of being
the General Will of the scientific community. Polanyi s quite explicit
in his use of the term General Will:
"The Republic of Science realises the ideal of Rousseau, of a 
community in which each is an equal partnerin the General Will*
But this identification makes the General Will appear in a new 
ligiht* It is seen to differ from any other will by the fact 
that it cannot alter its own purpose. It is shared by the 
whole community because each member of it shares a joint task."
The own purpose of the General Will is, of course, the continued revelation
of reality, which is the reason for the very existence of the community*
He argues that independent research activities guided and controlled by
scientific opinion is the only possible way of organising pure science*
The scientific community exhibits a polycentric system of mutual
co-ordination and cannot be controlled by a central authority. The
polycentric system is the only possible way to organise science because
of the nature of science itself* Science is the attempt to understand
an external reality which has an independent existence to ourselves*
The reality can only be understood by our intuitive faculties and in
order for them to come into play the scientist needs to be passionately
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committed to the traditions and values of science and to the search
for reality* When a discovery is made he needs to be absolutely
committed to its contents before he submits it to the community for their
judgment* Scientific research then is an intensely personal act and
this necessitates th scientist choosing his own research* Nothing
must come between the scientist and his personal contact with external
7
reality or discovery will be minimal* He achieves his discovery by 
the process of indwelling and any interference can only weaken or destroy 
the passionate commitment which grows through indwelling*
Only when the scientist has finally decided on the truth of his discovery 
does he submit it to the community for a«ceptance into the general body 
of scientific knowledge. He "asserts his independence by obeying the
Q
dictates of his own conscience"* but his obedience to his conscience
means that he rigorously checks his discovery before submitting it.
Polanyi actually attempts to describe the conscience in action:
"We can clearly distinguish in all these spheres of discovery
the two different personal elements which enter into every
scientific judgment and make it possible for the scientist to
judge in his own case. Intuitive impulses keep arising in him
stimulated by some of the evidence but conflicting with other
parts of it. One half of his mind keeps putting forward new
claims, the other half keeps opposing them. Both these parties
are blind, as either of them left to itself would lead to
extravagant wishful conclusions; while rigorous fulfillment
of any set of critical rules would completely paralyse discovery.
The conflict can be resolved only through a judicial decision
by a third party standing above the contestants. The third
..party in the scientists mind which transcends both his creative
impulses and his critical caution, is his scientific conscience.
We recognise the note struck by conscience in the tone of personal
responsibility in which the scientist declares his ultimate
claims. This indicates the presence of a moral element in the
9
foundation of science."
The rigorously tested theory will only be put before the community if 
the discovering scientist is convinced of its truth. His conscience 
will not allow him to put a discovery before the community if he thinks 
it is something less than the truth. The members of the community will 
then judge the discovery by their own knowledge, and for Polanyi they 
can judge it by nothing else as he has denied the effective use of 
impersonal tests. We can say that they will judge it by the yisions 
of reality that have already been received and accepted by the community 
as-knowledge. As each scientist is himself bound by his conscience to 
reveal the truth the judging scientists are bound to hold strictly to 
that which has already been revealed as the truth. The new theory will 
have to fit in some way into theories that have already been accepted.
It is not an arbitrary way of judging a new theory but a reasonable method 
of judging the truth of a theory by comparing it with knowledge one 
already possesses.
The decision as to the worth of a theory can only be a conservative judgment 
and cannot be too radical or speculative. If it is then this would be 
an indication that the community was losing its faith in that which had 
already been revealed, or that the conscience of its members was weaking. 
Change then can and does come about but it is continuous with the past, 
and arises because of the intimations of future discoveries which are 
contained in the present accepted theories. ^
Three confusing strands of thought can be seen in Polanyifs explanation of 
the community so far: he appears to be stating that the individual
scientist can perceive the truth; that the community can produce a General
Will, which presumably as it is a Rousseaunian General Will is also the
truth; and that the real truth is that which is in accordance with
external reality. The blanket term *the truth* seems unable to cope with
the distinctions which evidently exists between the three different 
truths* This can be explained because Polanyi often uses the term in 
a psychological sense, for instance, the individual scientist produces a 
theory which he believes is true* This is merely saying that the truth 
for the scientist is that which he believes is the truth. He cannot 
accept something which he does not believe to be the truth as the truth, 
therefore the truth for him must be that which he believes. Again the 
truth for the scientific community is that which it believes is true.
The members judge a theory by that which they believe to be true, for 
obviously they will not judge it by that which they consider to be false. 
The main criterion in doing this is whether or not the new theory fits 
into their jointly held beliefs. However the real truth, we can say 
the philosophical truth, is that which is in accordance with reality 
but this we cannot know. Polanyi is taking up this position when he 
states* "Though every person may believe something different to be true, 
there is only one truth." ^
The use of the term truth in these different senses can create an
unfortunate situation. Consider for instance the following. If a
scientist declares the truth and is correct, and yet his theory is
rejected, how can the community of scientists declare that it is not
true and also be correct? This is further complicated by Polanyifs
claim that if a scientist has gone through the process of indwelling he
is almost bound to be correct. He argues that it can only be incorrect
if a wrong interpretative framework has been used but in this case it
would be subjective knowledge and not personal knowledge. He states:
"If an active mental process, aiming at universality, can turn 
out to have been altogether mistaken, can we still say that in 
it the subject has risen to the level of the personal by reaching 
out to reality?" ^
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He answers this question by stating that it cannot be personal knowledge
as a wrong interpretative framework has been used. Yet this is a
matter of belief. We cannot actually know whether a wrong interpretative
framework has been used so alternative beliefs have to be in conflict.
13As he states, "They are contesting each other!s mental existence."
The conflict can never be conclusively resolved. The life process may 
seem to demonstrate that one interpretative framework is probably more 
true that another but as time goes by the situation may reverse itself. 
This is really an extension of the situation one gets when a theory is 
rejected. If a theory is rejected and that theory is correct then a 
right interpretative framework has been used, and if the theory is 
incorrect then not only the theory but the interpretative framework must 
be wrong, as the process of indwelling, if a right interpretative frame­
work has been used, will reveal a correct aspect of reality. This 
analysis demonstrates that Polanyi is using the term truth in a special 
sense meaning a belief that it is true. However, if this is so then 
surely this allows us to challenge his concept of the General Will, or
at least make it useless for practical purposes? In his paper the
1A
Potential Theory of Absorption he points out that a true theory 
after many years of rejection can eventually be accepted as part of a 
scientific knowledge because the progress of science allows it to be 
fitted into the system of science. But this would mean that the General 
Will as at first expressed by the community was incorrect but if it is 
really a Rousseaunian General Will it cannot be incorrect. This 
contradiction can be resolved by arguing that the General Will is always 
correct and if it is not correct then it cannot be the General Will 
but something else. A similar move to the manoeuvre in the case of
personal knowledge: if personal knowledge does not reveal the truth 
then it cannot be personal knowledge but subjective knowledge. In both
cases of the General Will and personal knowledge their truth is a matter
of belief but Polanyi is claiming if we are to call something the General
Will or personal knowledge then it must be in accordance with reality.
Unfortunately we cannot know whether it is so there is no way of telling
beyond all doubt whf or a community consensus is the General Will or
whether a discovery, in spite of the scientists absolute commitment to
it, is the real truth. This is why, so Polanyi argues, throughout
the process of discovery we have to rely on faith, "We must now recognise
15
belief once more as the source of all knowledge."
Two important insights into Polanyi*s philosophy can be gleaned from 
the foregoing analysis: the process of discovery for the individual
scientist can lead to error, and the decision of the community can be in 
error.
The process of discovery can lead to error, although it is unlikely that
the discovering scientist will perceive his error. He can have used
the wrong interpretative framework but he will be incapable of realising
this because of the very process of making a discovery. He will perhaps
be too heavily committed to his discovery, and in any case there can be
no absolutely certain demonstration that he is wrong. No one can say
for certain that he is wrong, although they can believe that he is wrong.
In other words an individual is fallible even though he may be incapable
of recognising his fallibility. That occasionally he is capable of
recognising his fallibility is accepted by Polanyi as he gives examples
of where interpretative frameworks have been weakened and eventually
rejected, for instance, the cases of Arthur Koestler*s Marxist framework
l6and Karen Horney*s Freudian framework. However, within Polanyi*s own
system there is room to allow the recognition of error, for as the 
individual scientist is bound by his conscience to reveal the truth then 
presumably he would be prepared to consider all conflicting evidence,
and if he could not explain it away within his system, or if he could not
see how his system may in the future cope with the problem, then he would
perhaps become a little less committed to his system. The problem here
is that as every attack is met the result of the attack Mis to strengthen
17the fundamental convjctions against which it was raised.” Combined
with this tendency is the tendency just to ignore conflicting evidence.
However, as he has given examples of the breakdown of interpretative
frameworks it does appear that occasionally the pile up of contradictory
evidence Can begin to weaken one*s faith in an interpretative framework.
lie has also suggested that there are degress of commitment for they can be
strengthened by succesfully meeting attacks, and presumably therefore
weakened by failure to meet attacks. As the support of.theories and
interpretative frameworks is a matter of belief and not knowledge they
are open to the force of persuasion which can destroy the belief. Polanyi*s
use of his own interpretative framework can be seen in his criticism of
Karl Popper*s doctrines:
”Sir Karl Popper has pointed out that, though not strictly
verifiable, scientific generalisations can be strictly refuted.
But the application of this principle cannot be strictly prescribed.
It is true that a simple piece of contradictory evidence refutes
a generalisation, but experience can present us only with apparent
contradictions and there is no strict rule by which to tell
whether any apparent contradiction is an. actual contradiction.
The falsification of a scientific statement can therefore no more
be strictly established than can its verification. Verification,
l8and falsification are both formally indeterminate procedures.”
In fact within Popper*s interpretative framework a generalisation put in
19a negative form can be falsified by one instance but Polanyi*s real 
argument is that science does not lie within Popperfs interpretative 
framework. It is not that sort of logical system. Prom a terminological 
point of view Popper would state that an attempt at refutation that fails 
confirms a theory, and Polanyi should say that a criticism which is met
strengthens one*s belief that the theory one holds is true and one that 
is not met weakens it (For Popper a refutation attempt that succeeded 
would finish off the theory). However, as we are dealing with the 
psychology of commitment, in the case of Polanyi, whether or not a 
successful criticism Could in fact weaken or destroy the whole theory, 
or rather our commitment to the theory, would depend on the strength of 
our present convictions, and whether or not we saw the possibility of in 
the future coping with the criticism. Whether we had a strategic intuit­
ion about expansions of the theory which would cope with the criticism.
The criticism would have no effect on the real truth of the theory but 
only on our commitment to it (this of course applies equally well to 
Popperfs and Polanyi*s argument). It seems then that Polanyi does admit 
the possibility that we may be able to recognise our errors, although 
the possibility may be a little remote.
The decision of the community can also be wrong, in other words the General 
Will is not always expressed. Thisi.srecognised in the quotation I have 
already given, when he states that ’’there is no warrant to assume..... 
that any particular instance of free mutual adjustment between individuals 
will produce a desirable result....even the most wonderful successes 
achieved by such adjustment will not be free of manifest shortcomings.”
This was written before Polany!s formulation of the General Will thesis 
but there is no reason to believe that he has changed his mind. Likewise 
when he considers the rejection of his own theory of adsorption and other 
theories he again suggests that the General Will is wrong or not expressed. 
Perhaps the strongest argument to indicate Polanyi*s acceptance of the 
fallibility of the General Will can be derived from his treatment of 
individual discoveries. As it appears that he accepts the notion that 
an individual scientist can be wrong in spite of the fact that he has 
passed through the process of indwelling then quite clearly he could not
then claim that the aggregate of beliefs of the individual scientists 
is infallible. Particularly as he is at pains to argue that it is the 
individual scientist and not the community as a whole who is in contact 
with reality and brings about progress.
If we reject the infallible connotations that go along with the
20Rousseaunian notion of the General Will, then what does Polanyi mean 
by the use of the term? I think he is really attempting to explain that 
In a community working in a particular sphere of knowledge there grows 
up a rapport between its members. It is likely that they will hold 
similar biiefs, for instance, not only beliefs about the existence of 
external reality and the coherence of science but beliefs about what can 
be accepted in science and vhat can not. This makes it much easier 
for a consensus to arise between members of the community but the consensus 
is much more than a mere consensus, it is a strong feeling of the rightness 
of their decision. It is a powerful feeling because it has arisen from 
the interlocking system of knowledge which is exhibited in the community, 
a system to which all members are committed. In a sense we could say it 
is the spontaneous development of a decision about a theory without much 
argument for the simple reason that there is a general agreement.
Polanyi wants to lift the process of community decision making beyond 
the idea expressed in the term consensus but by doing so leaves himself 
open to the sort of criticisms that can be made against Rousseau’s concept 
of the General Will. The element of infallibility which arises in 
Polanyi!s use of the term, as in the case of personal knowledge, is not 
absolute certainty (philosophical certainty) but psychological certainty. 
However, as every scientist knows that rejected theories have as time 
progresses been accepted and because it is likely that one will not be 
so committed to a decision about another person’s theory as one about 
one’s own, the degree of certainty will not be as great as in the case of 
personal knowledge.
We have seen that a new theory will be judged by the spontaneous 
development of a consensus about its worth. !£he consensus that develops 
relies heavily on the present knowledge of the community so a new theory 
will greatly increase the liklihood of its acceptance if it fits into 
present knowledge. Even, so it is possible for the community to make 
a wrong decision, although the mistake should be recognised as science 
develops. Likewise a discovering scientist may be in error, and it is 
possible that he may eventually be able to recognise his error. As 
there are not impersonal tests for estimating absolutely accurately 
the truth of a theory we can do nothing else but rely on our own beliefs. 
Beliefs which are reasonable because they have withstood the gamut of 
our own and other people’s criticisms.
In developing his notion of consensus it occasionally seems that Polanyi 
is arguing for a coherence theory of truth* for instance, that a theory 
must be consistent with other accepted theories before it is judged to be 
true. If this is the case then it suggests the possibility that a theory 
can be tested, as if it is consistent with other theories it is true and 
if it is not it is false. Likewise when he develops his notion of the 
individual discoverer’s decision to accept a theory* for example, because 
of its beauty i This again seems to be suggesting that we have a criterion 
to judge whether a theory is true or false* as if it is beautiful it is 
true and if It is not it is false, In other words by introducing theories 
of truth he is denying his own argument that a theory cannot be tested.
Yet although he seems to be introducing such theories, he, in fact, is not 
doing so, and the reason why he appears to be introducing such theories 
is his misuse of the word ’truth’. The truth for the individual scientist 
is something he believes to be true, and one of the reasons he believes 
a particular theory to be true is because of its beauty. Beauty then 
is not a criterion of truth but a reason for a particular belief.
Likewise with the decision of the scientific community, consistency is 
not a criterion of truth but a reason why a theory is acceptable* The 
same argument applies to his notion of commitment. Commitment is not a 
criterion of truth but a reason why a scientist makes a claim that his 
theory is true. Polanyi, I think, is not making the elementary error 
which it appears he is* He is not really stating that something is true 
because we believe that it is, for belief cannot justify knowledge, but 
he is stating that the strength of our belief is a reason why we claim 
knowledge: that as we can never be sure that we have knowledge then we
have to rely on our beliefs. He then argues that as we have to rely on 
our beliefs we are more likely to get closer to the truth if we have 
lived over a period of time with our beliefs, have examined them looking 
perhaps for consistency and beauty, and have criticised them, and by 
doing this seeming to have confirmed them. We have therefore built up 
a commitment to them, and the beliefs we then put forward as a theory 
are more likely to be true than a mere hypothesis put forward on the spur 
of the moment, although such a commitment built up after this process 
cannot be a guarantee of the truth. The same reasoning applies to the 
scientific community* It only possesses a body of beliefs but a body of 
beliefs that have been confirmed, and because of this confirmation the 
community has become committed to them. When a new theory is put forward 
the community will judge it by these beliefs, and in doing so it will 
be more likely to be correct in its decision than if it made a judgment 
based on beliefs it did not accept or on a reliance on the discovering 
scientists own claim of the validity of a theory.
Polanyi, of course, has a theory of truth and this is that a theory is 
true if it is in accordance with reality. Unfortunately, as he well 
realises, this theory is of no practical use because of his argument that 
we cannot know reality but only have beliefs about it.
The conclusion Polanyi comes to is not really unorthodox® We cannot 
be certain that we have arrived at the truth so we therefore have to 
rely on our beliefs. It is better to rely on beliefs that we have 
examined and criticised, and therefore have confidence in than beliefs we 
have not examined and criticised and thereby confirmed. However, this 
seemingly pessimistic doctrine is rejuvenated and made far more optimistic 
by his belief in an active reality which presumably can be activated by 
indwelling, and will therefore lead the scientist on towards the truth 
(Popper is less fortunate as he cannot be Sure his approximations to 
reality are improving), and by a theory of evolution which postulates 
a connecting link between the intuitions of the scientist and reality 
(see Chapter 5)*
A more general criticism can be made of Polanyi fs argument as he seems 
to be continually moving between prescription and description with no 
clear indication when he is describing or prescribing. For instance, 
the master/apprenticeship relationship where the novice attaches himself 
to a master. In Polanyi fs youth and early career it does seem that this 
was how scientists were educated but this relationship is not so clear 
today when the number of scientists has rapidly expanded. Polanyi 
therefore slides into prescription. The relationship should exist, and 
where it does not we are not going to get good scientists. In considering 
the structure of the scientific community he postulates a spontaneously 
co-ordinating network (In the Logic of Liberty he even develops a 
mechanical model to show how it would work). This seems to be intended 
as an actual description but when it does not work like that it should work 
like that. His claim that scientists are concerned with the study of 
ultimate reality: sometimes he argues that they are, sometimes that they
are without realising it, and when they claim they are not, well they 
should be. Polanyi also claims that scientists are searching for the 
truth but in case they are not he develops a deontology to indicate that
they ought to be. In the examination of the scientific community this 
does not cause great difficulties because on the whole one of the concerns 
of a scientist is probably to reveal what he believes to be true but it 
does when he develops a more general social philosophy, as it leads to 
the claim that peop" in politics are generally concerned with searching 
for the truth.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Republic of Science
The community of scientists is a special type of community whose membership 
is restricted to scientists who meet certain requirements. A scientist 
to be accepted as a .ember must have gone through an apprenticeship and 
made his own contact with reality. His contact with reality will be 
recognised by other scientists when his work shows originality by providing 
additions to accepted knowledge. The evidence a scientist can produce 
as a demonstration of his originality is restricted to evidence which 
expands in some way this knowledge. We can say that membership of the 
community is gained when a scientist by his own originality shows that 
he has become a master in his own particular field of research, and when 
this mastery is recognised by all the other members of the community.
A scientist then to be a scientist must be recognised by other members of 
the community and the fact that he may or may not be recognised by the 
lay public is irrelevant.
It is a special type of community because all its members participate 
in the joint task of apprehending and revealing external reality, and 
each shares in a joint faith for all believe in the existence of this 
reality, and that it is possible to apprehend and reveal it.
The individual scientist's method of disvovery by the process of indwelling 
and the community's method of checking discoveries has an interesting 
effect on the structure of the republic. It means that freedom has to 
be allowed for individual scientist to conduct his research but at the same 
time an authority based on traditional beliefs is needed to exercise 
control over the results of the research. Polanyi in fact claims that 
there are two sorts of freedom which can be found in the Republic of 
Science. An English utilitarian form of liberty where the individual 
is free from external restraints but limits are put on his freedom by
other people's right to freedom, and a Lutheran type of freedom where 
the individual can gain freedom from personal ends by submission to 
impersonal obligations * The former achieves its ends through individual 
initiative, and the latter by moving outside individual selfishness by 
devotion to universal ideals. These two types of freedom are apparently 
contradictory as the former has selfish and perhaps uninspiring overtones, 
while the latter, although perhaps inspiring, restricts the individual 
in any attempt to pursue his own salvation in his own way. Polanyi 
claims that these two types of freedom are interwoven in the Republic of 
Science, and that their contradiction is resolved* In the Foundation of 
Academic Freedom he argues that the two liberties taken together help 
to create the most efficient method for organising science, and that this 
fact explains why it is possible to resolve their apparent conflict. 
However, this does not seem to be the case for the fact that they are 
instrumental in leading to the most efficient form of organisation cannot 
provide an explanation why they are resolved, although it may provide an 
explanation as to why the two freedoms are accepted. The fact that they 
are resolved within the Republic seems to be because the two freedoms 
do not exist within the Republic* It seems that there is only one 
concept of freedom operating in the Republic of Science. The freedom 
which Polanyi calls Lutheran freedom. It is true that Polanyi, when 
arguing outside the context of the scientific community, is arguing for 
the existence of these two freedoms in the hope perhaps that utilitarian 
freedom will lead to Lutheran freedom but in the case of the Republic of 
Science it is extremely questionable whether these two freedoms exist.
In the context of the Republic of Science the scientist in order to be 
a member of the community must share the faith and task of the other 
scientists. As a member of the Republic he has not the freedom to
do nothing. He is not really free in the sense of being free from
external pressures, and there is a considerable amount of pressure on him
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to undertake research and produce his results. If in fact he does not 
do this then very soon he would cease to be a member of the Republic of 
Science, as he would be showing no originality, and would cease to be 
a master in his own particular area of science. Certainly he is free 
in the sense that there is no pressure on him from outside the scientific 
community or from inside it to follow a particular line of research.
He can choose his own research but this is really covered by the Lutheran 
freedom which Polanyi writes about.
In the Foundation of Academic Freedom he argues that Luther is the •
prototype person who gains freedom from personal ends by submission to
impersonal obligations. In the same way the scientist submits himself
to the ideals of science: ideals which declare that a scientist must
struggle to achieve the truth, and present it to his colleagues for
recognition. Luther declares that every Christian should be a priest,
and like the Lutheran priest Polanyi fs scientist is bound by his own
conscience without reliance on anyone else to declare that which his
conscience indicates. Yet nevertheless this conscience remains bound
by the traditions of the community or, as we have seen, the scientist
cannot remain a member of the community. The values which bis conscience
exhibit cannot move too far from the values of the scientific oommunity
2
as a whole. They must lie within a certain range or be rejected.
(Every new theory in one sense can be considered as a new value either to
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be accepted or rejected by the community.) ■» By following the traditions 
and standards of science the scientist is acting on individual initiative 
and submitting to the obligations of the community but this does not 
constitute two freedoms. By acting on his own initiative in choosing 
his research and eventually producing his discovery he is accepting the 
obligations of the community. The exercise of individual initiative is 
not a separate freedom but part of the submission to impersonal obligations,
as only by acting on individual initiative can one fulfill one's obligations 
to apprehend and reveal reality. An obligation which it is necessary 
to accept if one is to remain a member of the community.
A utilitarian freedom may exist before one enters the scientific community, 
as it could be argued one is free to choose one's career but as soon as 
one enters the community one accepts the obligations that go with the 
Lutheran type of freedom. Under a similar argument to Polanyifs 
argument for freedom in science we could say that before a true submission 
to the ideals of science could take place one must be free in the sense 
of being free from external restraints and pressures to make the choice.
In other words utilitarian freedom provides the base for Lutheran freedom.
However, as true in this sense seems to refer to the strength of the .* --
conviction behind the submission it would appear that the argument is that 
freedom from external restraint is necessary in a choice before a strong 
conviction about the choice or commitment to the choice can arise, and
if
this doss not seem to be the case. A person who has had no choice in 
choosing his religion can be still absolutely convinced of its truth 
and as fanatical in following its doctrines as one who has had a choice.
The authoritative element in the community is necessary in order to control 
the excesses in the speculation of individual scientists. This is really 
an additional check on his speculation as his conscience has already 
provided a check. In this sense the conscience has acted on behalf of 
the community by deciding on the truth of a new theory. The further 
check is necessary as the emotional element in the development of personal 
knowledge needs a further control than that provided by conscience, because 
a conscience by its very nature cannot be an impersonal conscience and 
provide a certain check on excesses. This is interesting for it is a 
recognition that in spite of Polanyi's terminology the individual scientist 
is not infallible, and therefore needs to work in a community with a
no need for a community at all but just for a group of people with an
interest in science who would expand science always along the right 
5
path.
Another reason for the importance of authority within the scientific 
community is the nature of science itself^ Science is a systematic 
body of knowledge which it is the task of the scientists to expand, and 
before they can expand it each scientist must accept and understand a large 
part of the system. In order to be in a position to provide an expansion 
a scientist must become an adept at scientific techniques, and accepted 
knowledge. He has to accept the authority of large areas of science as 
interpreted by his colleagues in the scientific community. They derive 
their own authority from the fact that they are recognised as master 
interpreters of science, and acting together with the discovering scientist 
feum the decision procedure of the community.
We can say then that before a scientist can attempt to expand the 
systematic ideas of science he must accept a large part of accepted 
scientific belief. He must, for instance, believe in the regularity of 
reality, and also because science is a developing system of ideas, a system 
which is continaually being built on, he must accept a large part of it 
as given. He cannot re-create all science again from first principles. 
This then is the authority of accepted belief.
He must also in order to be a scientist, and we have stated that to be 
a scientist he must be recognised as such by other scientists, be a member 
of the community of scientists and accept the results of their decision 
procedure, which in this case is the spontaneous development of an opinion 
about a new theory. This is important for it means that to be a scientist 
at all he must accept the decision procedure of the community. If he does 
not he runs the danger of being forced out of the community not only 
because to be a member of a community really entails an acceptance of the 
communityfs decision procedure but because he courts with the danger of 
being considered a crank or a charlatan, that is no longer a scientist.
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As individual scientists are not infallible, and there is no infallible 
test of the truth or falsehood of their theories it is necessary for their 
beliefs to develop under the authority of the scientific community# Yet 
as we have seen progress in science can only come through individual 
initiative, so the authoritative element, and the necessity for individual 
initiative can create situations of dispute between an individual, scientist 
and the community, and occasionally these disputes can develop into 
conflict situations.
A scientist expands science by developing intimations of future ditcoveries 
into full discoveries. In other words already within the systematic 
ideas of science there is the potentiality for future discovery. A 
scientist when producing a new theory has to show how it fits into thtipe 
systematic ideas. His theory will be rejected if he cannot show how i.t 
fits in, and this would arise if he could not show to the satisfaction of 
his colleagues the development of the intimations, or that the intimations 
do really exist. This could be because his theory in any case will never 
fit into the systematic ideas of science (this we cannot know), or that at 
the present time it does not appear to fit in. The dispute arises 
because of the discovering scientists commitment to his theory. He is 
certain that it does fit in and that he has produced enough evidence to 
indicate that it does. A rejection generally will lead to an attempt to 
provide more evidence, that is more links with the accepted systematic 
ideas of science. It can lead to a conflict situation where the discover­
ing scientist will act as if his theory has been accepted, for instance, 
he will teach his theory, and continue to develop it. He will be in 
effect setting up a rival community to that of the community of scientists. 
This conflict situation is more liable to arise if a scientist concentrates 
so much on his one particular theory and does not produce others to
g
confirm his membership of the community. His failure to produce other
theories means that in any case he is gradually slipping out of the 
community as he loses his authority. The question arises as to why this 
situation of conflict does not arise more often.
It does not arise more often because a rejected theory is concerned with
only a small area of science, and the discovering scientist is still
prepared to accept *ne main body of science. In the case of Velikovsky,
for instance, his theories challenged the whole structure of science so he
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had to set up a rival community* But also because membership of the 
community is necessary in order to be recognised as a scientist. At the 
same time the scientist recognises that the authoritative control of 
science is necessary for the development of science, and that his colleagues 
are as much obliged to declare that which they consider to be the truth 
as he is.
This interlocking system of obligations is for Polanyi a major factor 
in ensuring the communityfs continued existence, for it is the system 
of obligations which holds the community together. As a scientist who 
has arrived at a discovery has passed through a passionate immersion in 
his research, and has been committed to each stage of M r discovery, he 
arrives at the position of being absolutely committed to the theory he 
puts before the community for their acceptance. His commitment forces 
him to declare truthfully that which be has found out about external 
reality. The norm of morality is to declare a correct knowledge of reality 
(right reason). That is a feeling which he is certain is indicating a 
correct knowledge of reality, but as we have seen it is possible that he 
has made a mistake. He may have used an incorrect interpretative framework 
and this he cannot know. Nevertheless he is bound to declare that his 
theory is valid. His conscience, which is bound to the truth, obliges 
him to declare that which he believes is true even if it is an erroneous 
conscience.
This view of morality which Polanyi expresses is, and has to be an extreme 
personal conception of the moral law. It has to be because it is not 
possible to estimate from the outside the morality of an individual 
scientist. His morality depends on whether or not he has revealed 
truthfully the knowledge he has gained about external reality, and this 
we cannot know. The obligation in this instance is not to his vision 
of reality or his theory but to reality itself. He would be breaking 
this obligation to reality if he lied about the vision he had received or 
if he put it before the community before he had confirmed to the best of 
his ability that it was the truth. The obligation of the individual 
scientist then is to reality and it is this obligation which forces him 
to declare the truth as he sees it.
Two other obligations exist which are subsidiary to the primary obligation 
to reality: an obligation to himself as a scientist, and an obligation
to other scientists. To himself as he would be denying his own task if 
he did other than declare what he thought was true to the community, and 
to the other members of the community who, because of the process of 
discovery, rely very much on his honesty. Taken together these two subsid­
iary obligations can be considered as an obligation to work in the community, 
and accept its decisions. They are subsidiary to the primary obligation 
as they are derived from it. An individual enters the scientific community 
and thereby accepts an obligation to reality, if he later acts against 
this obligation he is contradicting his original agreement and, in a sense,
g
acting irrationally. The task he has chosen is to apprehend and reveal
reality, if he does not do this he is denying his original choice and
thereby giving up his career as a scientist. His obligation to himself
as a scientist then obliges him to declare that which he believes to be 
9true. His obligation to reality also leads to his obligation to other 
scientists, and thence the community itself for the structure of the 
community is necessary for reality to be revealed. It is the medium of
revelation, and provides a check on new theories which attempt to become 
part of the revelation. Theories have to be accepted by the community 
to become part of revealed reality,science, so the scientists obligation 
to reality obliges him to accept the community!s existence and authority 
Without the scientists obligation to the community science could not 
exist as a systematic body of ideas controlled by the joint authority 
of mature scientists.
Chapter Three
Foundations of Academic Freedom op. cit.
A similar notion to the Harvard school of social theorists#
As a new theory is derived from reality it has value in itself#
But without accepting such a notion of reality we can say that 
a theory has the value of factual existence. In other words 
for the _jne being we give a theory the value of factual existence. 
For a further treatment of this see chapter 6.
J#S# Mill in On liberty, Everyman Edition, p. 99» writes of 
freedom to discuss allowing ”a vivid conception and a living 
belief”. There is no evidence that this is so, in certain 
instances it may in others it may not. It depends very much 
on the personality of the person in question. The same conclusion 
applies to Polanyi*s scientist# Whether or not he will develop 
a commitment to a choice he did not make will depend on his 
personality#
Polanyi can correctly call his body of scientists a community 
or a *Republic* as they have a common decision procedure. If 
they had not they would merely be a group of people who call 
themselves scientists#
However if we accept the notion that scientists are fallible 
but that there is an impersonal test of validity what then?
Strictly speaking we cannot really call them a community and 
indeed there would be no need for the existence of a community#
In fact there cannot be impersonal tests as such for such a test 
will have to be made by a fallible person or persons, and they 
will decide whether or not they consider the test is conclusive#
As the test is developed and used by fallible human beings then 
we cannot be certain that the test they produce is infallible#
We have to rely on their estimation of the tests effectiveness 
in testing the validity of a theory# As they can either disagree 
or agree on this a decision procedure is necessary to come to 
a conclusion, even if it is no more than a waiting for the 
emergence of a compromise.
Polanyi brings out this point in his paper ”The Potential 
Theory of Adsorption”, op# cit#
See De Graziafs The Velikovsky Affair, London, 19661
Hobbes uses a similar argument in the Leviathan, As one has 
rationally worked out the reasons why one should enter society 
and have done so it would be irrational to rebel against the 
ruler, a contradiction*
Also an obligation to himself because of Polanyi*s notion 
of active Centres in the evolutionary process + See chapter 5*
A Critique of the Republic
Polanyi has argued that it is the task of the scientist to try and 
understand a reality beyond our senses* As this is so, and it is impossible 
to provide criteria that will give certainty to this understanding, the 
scientific communi t y  has to roly on the emergence of a consensus in order 
to judge the validity of a theory. This notion of a consensus basing 
its decision on present knowledge is a reasonable method .for judging a 
theory!s validity, as one always attempts to check a new piece of information 
against information one already possesses* One tries to fit the new 
information into the framework of knowledge which one already has, and 
if it does not fit into it one is naturally sceptical about its validity.
Yet Polanyi does not entirely rely on the notion of consensus to maintain 
the credibility of the community* He provides three connected theories in 
order to complement the notion of consensus* They are a theory about 
the commitment of the scientist, a theory of obligations, and a theory 
about the unity of the community^
Within his epistemology he introduces a notion of commitment to one*s 
beliefs, and to the truth* Knowledge he claims does to a large extent 
arise from this commitment, and this therefore means that the lay image 
of discovery arising through the pure objectivity of the scientist who 
exhibits cold impersonal detachment is incorrect* The scientist exhibits 
a heuristic passion and it is only by an emotional attachment to his 
research, when science becomes virtually the scientist%  life, that he 
can achieve knowledge* This emotional immersion in research and the 
resultant commitment to each stage of discovery means that the scientist 
becomes so attached to his theory that he is bound to declare truthfully 
what he has discovered.
This leads us to Polanyi*s theory of obligations. The scientist is obliged 
to declare truthfully what he has discovered. His conscience, and actually 
his task, force him to do this. Polanyi goes so far as to claim that
this feeling of certainty, or vision as he sometimes calls it, is certain 
to reveal a correct aspect of reality if the correct interpretative 
framework has been used. Even' if the scientist has not used the correct 
interpretative framework he is bound to declare what his conscience 
dictates. We have seen that scientific morality for Polanyi depends 
on whether or not the scientist has revealed what his conscience dictates, 
and that his obligation to do this is threefold: to himself, to other
scientist (to the community), and to reality itself, and that the first 
two obligations are derived from the third.
This recognition of an obligation to reality leads us to Polanyi*s third
complementary theory. The scientific community is a community which
is bound together by faith, and the mutual task of apprehending and
revealing reality. It seems that the model Polanyi produces could be
applied equally well to a theological community. For instance both
Polanyi *s scientist and the theologian are concerned with the task of
apprehending and revealing a reality beyond our senses, and like Polanyi*s
scientist the theologian is emotionally bound up with his work. ^
Polanyi1 s ethics also seem very similar to the ethics of a Lutheran who
is bound by his conscience, and more strictly similar to the ethics of
William of Ockham who argued that we can never know whether or not we have
perceived Godrs will but that we must follow that which we believe is
his will. As there is no definite means of knowing whether we have
arrived at the truth we must follow that which we believe to be the truth.
This is really the only answer to the problem of knowledge when we move
to the world beyond our senses, and is precisely why a philosopher such 
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as Karl Popper, for instance, would argue that in this case we could not 
call it knowledge but only opinion, and it is therefore urgently necessary 
that we have some method of confirmation.
bt>
Of course the kind of knowledge that Ockham and Polanyi refer to is a 
subjective knowledge, even though we make a universal claim for it (We 
claim that it is objective). And being subjective or personal it 
certainly leaves the field open to schisms both in science and theology. 
Ockham in his orthodox mood would counter the tendency by arguing that 
we should rely or authority or specifically on the revealed scriptures 
which the Universal Church had accepted. For historical reasons Ockham 
was bound £>t) put great stress on authority. Polanyi makes the same 
move and states that personal knowledge is checked by the scientific 
Community with their present knowledge, really inter-personal knowledge 
(Personal knowledge which has been accepted as objective or universal 
knowledge) and therefore the decision they make is justifiable, although 
providing no certainty. Yet his main stress is on the originality and 
personal knowledge of the individual scientist because it is through him 
that science has to develop. We have seen that within this explanation 
there is room for a considerable amount of dispute between the individual 
and the scientific community. Generally this is controlled by the 
community's recognition that originality is necessary for progress, by 
the community being bound together by a mutual faith, and by the discovering 
scientists own recognition that his colleagues also have an obligation 
to the truth (reality), and that the test of acceptance is the only way 
to continue the development of a unified science. In other words he 
will accept the decision but continue to hold that his theory is correct, 
and work within the community while trying to find additional evidence 
that will confirm his theory.
We have seen that the method of consensus is a reasonable method for 
judging a theory's validity when there are no impersonal testing criteria 
which can give certainty. The evidence a scientist produces in support 
of his theory has also to be reasonable but what is accepted as reasonable 
evidence also depends on the community's estimate of what is reasonable.
The consensus of opinion as to what is reasonable can change. For
instance, the evidence in favour of extra-sensory perception is copious
but is not considered reasonable enough. The combined weakness of
theory and weakness of evidence prevents extra-sensory perception
from being classed as part of scientific knowledge. In the case of
psycho-analytic' theory we have a powerful theory which almost succeeds
in achieving a place for psycho-analysis in scientific theory. It
fails because the supporting evidence is not reasonable enough. E.S.P.
then is well away from being scientifically acceptable but psycho-analysis
is a doctrine in a community on the borders of established science.
However, it is possible that the consensus as to what is reasonable will
change and a theory become acceptable because the supporting evidence
becomes acceptable. The evidence, for instance, of Galileo's telescope
was suspect but eventually became acceptable. It may be that this
idea that the reasonableness of evidence in science depends on the
consensus as to what is reasonable has to be laboured. In the case of
what is reasonable evidence in law the argument that it depends on present
day opinions as to what is reasonable is more easily.seen. For instance
much of the evidence accepted as reasonable evidence at witchcraft
trials would now be considered unreasonable, finger prints once considered
unacceptable as evidence are now powerful evidence. To say then that
a consensus is a reasonable method of testing a theory's validity, and
that such and such evidence is reasonable depends on what we believe
is reasonable and on what we believe other people will accept as
reasonable. Yet there are certain procedures which would be considered
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reasonable and certain criteria by which we may judge reasonableness.
For instance, to what extent is a theory internally consistent? Does 
an argument receive support from the factual evidence or does it seem 
to contradict it? If it contradicts it then this is a good reason
for supposing that it is incorrect. Is a generalisation derived from 
an acceptable number of instances? For instance, it would be unreason­
able to say all swans are white after seeing one swan but not so 
unreasonable to say all swans are white after seeing a hundred swans, 
and even less unreasonable to say that most swans are white after seeing 
a hundred swans It would be reasonable to say that I have seen only 
a hundred swans so I cannot really say all swans are white. But would 
it be reasonable to say that I have only seen 8 million swans and all 
are white but nevertheless I cannot really say all swans are white?
It would probably be unreasonable but correct and the caution very wise. 
Yet a scientist who repeated the same experiment 8 million times and 
always got the same result but nevertheless felt that he should continue 
doing the experiment in case one day he got a different result would 
not be considered unreasonable but mad • It would also be reasonable 
to base one's decision on one's previous experience no matter how small 
if one was with a group where no one but oneself had any experience.
It would be reasonable for the scientific community to base its decision 
on a new theory according to its previous experience in the field of 
the theory, as well as the factual evidence and the argument actually 
produced by the discovering scientist. The scientific community besides 
the individual scientist is the only group that can make a decision.
But why does it have to make a decision, for cannot it just be said that 
unfortunately the knowledge held by the community is not adequate enough 
to make a judgment for no one is a conplete expert in the particular 
field of the theory? It has to make a decision in order to decide 
whether the theory should be taught, whether further research should be 
financed, and because it is the body which scientists accept as their 
decision making body. The decision can take a number of forms, for 
instance, an acceptance, an outright rejection, or a suspension of 
judgment, and in this case funds would probably be made available for 
more research.
What then can we say about the notion of reasonable evidence in 
experimentation, when we can make a reasonable decision that is correct, 
a reasonable decision that is incorrect, a reasonable decision by refusing 
to make a decision, we can be unreasonable but correct in making our 
unreasonable decision, we can be unreasonable and incorrect in not 
making a decision? The analysis firmly brings out Hume's point about 
the weakness of the inductive method but it also indicates that the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a decision need have no necessary 
connection with the correctness of a decision. As I have pointed out 
this is why Popper attempts to develop a hypothetico-deductive method 
and why Polanyi relies firmly on faith. We can say then that a judgment 
of a new theory based on the generally held beliefs of the scientific 
community is a reasonable method, a justifiable method, for making 
a judgement but even so Can be in error.
This then is Polanyi's picture of the community of pure scientists.
He has developed theories about the nature and understanding of reality, 
and as can be expected these theories have largely determined his 
nitions about the structure of the scientific community. Polanyi in 
fact provides a complete philosophy of science. He produces a theory 
about reality: an ontology. He explains how the scientist achieves
this knowledge by what he calls the process of indwelling of tacit 
knowledge: and epistemology. He explains how this knowledge can be
tested despite the fact that it is beyond appearances. It is tested 
by the consensus of opinion within the scientific community. However 
this approach necessitates an addition if it is to provide a reasonable 
explanation of the scientific community as it is. If it is not possible 
to verify or falsify a theory by some methodological test the way seems 
open to Charlatans and to people who are prepared to introduce theories 
which will be acceptable to the consensus merely in order to further their 
own career. Polanyi is able to protect himself against this conclusion
by introducing an examination of the internal ethics of the scientific 
community. He provides a theory of obligation: a deontology. He
also provides an explanation of how science progresses by the process 
of individual initiative controlled by authority.
In the real world the scientific community exhibits an internal power 
structure which seems to challenge the consensus image which Polanyi 
formulates. However, a philosophical theory is not bound by the 
facts but is intended to provide an explanation of them. The question 
is whether the explanation is adequate, and whether it heightens our 
understanding of the work and structure of the community. Can the 
explanation maintain its integrity when it is challenged by the actual 
workings of the scientific community?
In order to answer this question I intend to provide a brief and 
restricted analysis of the scientific community considering points that 
are most likely to discredit Polanyi !s system, and seeing how the system 
is able to cope with the challenge.
There would seem to be foui* main factors which are important in the 
scientific community's internal power structure: the existence of an
establishment; limited financial resources; the method of recognising 
the validity of new theories; and the natural competition which exists 
between people with similar skills.
For the purpose of this analysis we define members of the community of
pure scientists as independent scientists who have become authorities
in their own area of science. We also accept Polanyi's insistence that
If
all members have authority but we disagree with his claim that they
have equal authority. We argue that they have unequal authority,
and that the structure of the community favours the older and more
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established scientists.
Within Polanyi's community one would expect the older members of the 
community to move out from positions of authority as their flair for
original research declines, and as the chores of being administrators 
effects their position of being masters in particular areas of science.
Cne would expect them to remain venerated but honorary members of the 
community. This appears to be true of the real older statesmen but 
it would seem that there is a period of time between their most 
productive period and their virtual retirement, when they are able to 
retain their authority because of their control of the institutionalised 
positions of authority.
Cn the whole the older scientists have more authority than the younger
scientists because, by the very nature of things, they are more likely
to be entrenched in positions of authority and power.^ The fact of
becoming established creates a tendency towards the older scientists
being in positions of power although the tendency is relative to members
of the scientific community and not the outside community. The older
scientists are more likely to hold the posts that give control of the
purse strings. They often have more time to give to administration
as they are no longer attempting to carve out a career. One could
even say of some of the older scientists they they have more time to
give to administration as their flair for successful research has
declined as they have aged. Yet even if we admit that thef'£ exists
an establishment in the community which will control the institutionalised
posts of authority and power within the scientific community, and through
them control the purse strings, can we say that in the area of knowledge
there is also a tendency towards control by this establishment? I think
we can. The older scientists or the establishment will tend to favour,
indeed are almost bound to favour, the beliefs and theories which they 
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themselves hold.* The consensus of opinion will lie amongst the 
established older scientists. They are bound to defend the ideas which 
they themselves believe to be true. They can defend them by four methods
I 'L
by their own authority; by control of the purse strings; by control
of academic appointments; by control of publications.
The control of the limited funds available for research is probably
the establishment's main weapon in protecting and developing the
accepted beliefs of science. It is more likely to give major grants
to the establish* 1 scientists because these scientists have already
8proven their worth. The established scientists are able to bring
greater authority to their claim for money, and are often in a position
wnere they can bring extra-scientific pressure to bear on grants
committees, for example they may be a personal friend of a member of the
committee, they are more likely to be in a position where they can argue
their case on a personal basis. The scientific establishment will
tend to give to the younger, less established scientists only if they
believe that the area of research where they will be undertaking their
work will be fruitful. Likewise they will accept his theory as valid
only if it fits into accepted theory. This particular fact applies
equally well to the established scientist as the not so established but
an established scientist is more likely to have a controversial theory
accepted because of his greater authority and reputation, and because
9
he will be more adept at scientific politics and better placed to 
undertake them.
Disputes arise with the attempt of the community to judge the validity 
of theories. The controversy that rages amongst philosophers of 
science as to whether or not it is possible to verify or falsify a 
theory is really a reflection of these disputes, and even an extension 
of them. The verificationist argument strictly adhered to would really 
rule out the possibility of science's existence for scientific statements 
cannot be verified beyond all possible doubt. In practice it has been 
weakened and developed into a theory of confirmation. Karl Popper in 
order to avoid the difficulties created by the doctrines of the verification- 
ists but in wishing to retain the possibility of testing theories has
developed his own falsification concept. He finds that a theory of
verification even in its weaker form fails to provide an explanation of
the progress and development of science, while his method of falsification
can. In other words a theory of verification cannot provide an
explanation of the real world of science, and a philosophy of science
must do this if it is to be a philosophy of science and not pure 
10epistemology. Popper's explanation has become the dominant theoretical
explanation of the methodology and progress of science, and certainly
be is correct in thinking that his philosophy of science can provide a
theoretical explanation of scientific discovery and progress, for the
theory as a theory does work, and it would be possible for science to
progress in the way he suggests. Nevertheless there is a considerable
amount of historical and sociological evidence which suggests that his
doctrine of falsification is not able to provide an accurate explanation
of the real world of science, i.e. it is too far from the real world of
science and at best offers an improved methodology for science. Rather
than stating science progresses under the doctrine of falsification it
is a suggestion that it ought to progress under this doctrine.
Paul Feyerabend, for instance, produces some historical evidence which
suggests that science does not develop in the way Popper suggests.
He argues that Copemican theory was continually being falsified and yet
continued to be accepted and proved very fruitful. He states:
nA more detailed study of historical phenomena.....may create 
considerable difficulties for the view that the transition 
from the pre-Copernican cosmology to Galileo consisted in the 
replacement of a refuted theory by a more general conjecture 
which explains the refuting instances, makes new predictions, 
and is corroborated by the observations carried out to test 
the new predictions.... while pre-Copernican astronomy was in 
trouble (was confronted by a series of refuting instances, 
the Copernican theory was in even greater trouble as it was
contronted by even more drastic refuting instances); but
that being in harmony with still further inadequate theories
it gained strength; and was retained, the refutations being
made ineffective by ad hoc hypotheses and clever techniques 
11of persuasion."
Feyerabend is considering a situation where the paradigms or consensus 
breaks down, an^ its replacement is not absolutely established. The 
replacement theory manages to stay in the field by its agreement with 
other new theories which are themselves not established, and by clever 
use of propaganda. Individually the theories could not continue but 
as a package they provide a strong persuasive force. Feyerabend 
states:
"Galileors first publication of his telescopic findings, the 
Sidereus Nuncius (1610), insinuates that they prove the 
Copernican view. In the Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief 
World Systems the insinuation has become outright assertion.
But when we look at the situation a little more closely we find 
that Galileo is unable to support this assertion by independent 
evidence concerning the relationship of telescopic vision to 
the real world. All we are given is a new and strange source 
of perception which occasionally shows things the way Copernicus 
says they are and which on other occasions produces puzzling 
and obviously illusory images. Using late sixteenth century 
evidence and theories of cognition we would have to say, strictly 
speaking, that both the Copernican view and the idea that the 
telescope, taken separately, gives a better account of the 
real world than the naked eye, are refuted but that these two 
ideas, while undermined by the evidence, are able to support 
each other. It is this rather peculiar situation that Galileo
12exploits, using it to prevent the elimination of either idea. " 
Even within his own argument Popper has to admit that in certain cases 
scientific instruments may be too unsophisticated to allow a theory to 
be falsified. Popper suggests that a theory should be presented in 
such a form that as our knowledge progresses we can test it by the method 
of falsification. In the meantime we must evidently estimate it by
accepted opinion until a decision as to its actual worth is eventually 
made by the hoped for development in instrumental technology. In any 
case in the Popperian system the only estimate of a theory*s worth is 
its ability to stand up to refutation attempts which can only be made 
within the framework of present knowledge. Until it is actually refuted 
its acceptance scientific knowledge will still have to depend on the 
decision of the community. These sort of criticisms suggest that 
Popper*s doctrines in their strict form are not applicable to the 
methodology of the real scientific community. They provide suggestions 
for reforming it by a more strict critical apparatus but no more.
It would seem that Polanyi is correct in arguing that an estimate of 
a theory!s worth is made by a consensus of opinion within the scientific 
community. This is the finding of T.S. Kuhn, for instance, however 
Polanyi does not arrive at ths conclusion because of an historical 
examination of science, although it is true that he recognised it as 
so independently of his philosophy, but because the notion of consensus 
is contained in his philosophy. It is necessary for a consensus to 
control our knowledge of supra sensibilia as there are no impersonal 
outside tests to estimate a theory*s worth. It is not possible, for 
instance, to conclusively test our knowledge of supra sensibilia. by 
our knowledge of appearances. Yet, as we have seen in the development 
of Copernican theory, it is possible that a consensus cannot arise 
either because the established paradigms have broken down or because 
none exist. In any case it would seem that the term consensus is 
often no more than a euphemism for the result of political interplay 
and propaganda.
We have argued that there can be found in the scientific community 
a political structure which creates a certain amount of conflict between 
the older established scientists, and the younger, less established
scientists. However, far from being disadvantageous to the community 
this age conflict allows the community to have more flexibility than 
might otherwise be the case. It allows the community to continue to 
exist as one body. If we had a community where equal authority existed, 
as in Polanyi's model of the scientific community, there would be no 
room for age co.’ °lict. A younger scientist would be less likely to 
accept an adverse decision an regards the acceptance of his discovery.
The liklihood of an extreme reaction against the decision would be 
increased, and there would be a much greater tendency for the scientist 
who failed to agree with his colleagues to be forced out of the community. 
Whereas in a situation where a tendency towards a gerontocracy existed 
he would know that the passing of time would be more likely to favour 
his theory as the younger scientists, including himself, gained more 
authority. He would be likely to continue to work within the community 
whereas where no gerontocracy existed he may be forced out of the 
community.
As we have seen it also seems to be the case that an accepted theory may 
not be accepted as the same thing by the community as a whole. Quite 
possibly a theory will have different connotations in different areas 
of science, and furthermore an established theory may be altered by 
workers in the field (as has happened with Bohr's correspondence 
principle)^ It wuld appear then in modern science, as in the days 
of its early formation, there need not be a consensus of opinion as to 
the content of an established theory. Specialisation may have weakened 
the authoritative structure of the community as there is no longer an 
interlocking network of knowledge and therefore no consensus or at best 
less consensus. Much more reliance has to be put on argument and 
influence than on the community's real knowledge of a discovering scientist' 
speciality. His theory could be no longer judged by accepted belief.
Of course it could be argued that this very fact of the weakness of a
theoretical framework (the breakdown of paradigms) would give increased
power to the establishment. The argument being that if a theory is not
certain then more power must be given to the established masters of the
subject. Yet I doubt if this is tie case* A major factor in the power
of the established scientists is their position as guardians of
established th y by which they judge new theories but if it becomes
difficult to produce a consensus as to the content of an established
theory their power is weakened, although not destroyed as they still
have their own authority and experience in scientific politics. 
lA
Warren Hagstrom paints an even more startling picture of the scientific 
community where professors steal ideas from other departments, where 
provisionally formulated ideas are quickly expanded because of the 
pressure of publication from a career point of vieto, and where the 
ideas of Ph.D students are scooped by more experienced scientists 
who are able to work at a much faster rate than the students.
It would seem then that the evidence of the sociologists and historians 
seriously challenges the work of the philosophers of science. The 
work of Popper in its strict methodological form does not provide a 
true picture of the scientific community as it does not take into 
account the social relationships of its members. Yet in a weaker 
form as a doctrine of criticism it is really essential for the continuance 
of science. He effectively shows that scientific knowledge is 
tentative knowledge and therefore must always be open to criticism, 
and that the method of criticism can heighten confirmation. His is 
not in fact a rejection of authority as such but it is a rejection of 
the authority of the members of the scientific community. It is an 
acceptance of the authority of confirmed theories, an argument that only 
theories that can continue to meet criticism should be accepted, 
although I think it has really failed to demonstrate conclusively the
point at which a theory has failed to meet criticism. The Popperian
doctrine in this weaker form almost appears as essential to the continuance
of the scientific community. It prevents science from developing into
dogma as Aristotelian science did and of more importance at the present
time, when it does appear that the alternative doctrine of consensus
breaks down, it continues to provide or recommend the method of science
as the method of continual criticism. Even so the weakening of the
Popperian theory has its disadvantages, for instance, the notion that
a scientist need not be committed to his theory that he just has to
provide a hypothesis to which he may have no commitment creates great
difficulties when it appears it cannot be demonstrated that a hypothesis
can be conclusively falsified. Within Popper's formal theory there is,
of course, no need to take account of commitment to a hypothesis as
it is possible to conclusively falsify a theory but if, as much historical
and sociological evidence suggests, in the real world it is not possible
to conclusively falsify a theory then the mere hypothesis doctrine becomes
15suspect and perhaps even dangerous.
Michael Polanyi fs theories provide an answer as to why the mere hypothesis 
doctrine is of especial danger particularly if we take up the position 
that from a practical point of vieW a theory cannot be falsified.
Polanyi really takes up the position that scientific knowledge is tentative, 
although from a philosophical point of view he avoids this by arguing 
that the scientist is producing not a hypothesis but knowledge of an 
aspect of reality. He can use this phraseology by arguing that reality 
is inexhaustible, and that a theory which is no longer fruitful can be 
altered to give us a wider picture of reality. It is never falsified 
but is replaced by a better theory which expands our knowledge of reality. 
What Polanyi is stating is that the scientist has an absolute belief 
that he is describing an aspect of reality and that this belief can be
called knowledge. Even though he calls it knowledge he does admit that 
the real test for a theory is whether or not it does conform to reality 
and that this we cannot know but only believe. The scientist is really 
producing not knowledge but what we can call a committed hypothesis.
This from a psychological point of view is partly the reason for the 
power struggle. A struggle between someone who is committed to an idea 
and someone who criticises it. Under Popper's non-committed hypothesis 
doctrine no conflict would exist as one would net mind criticism. This 
appears to be less applicable to the real situation. However the 
differences between the Polanyi and Popper theory are partly semantic 
and for practical purposes Polanyi does seem to be saying with Popper 
that scientific knowledge is tentative.
Yet if scientific knowledge is tentative and cannot be tested then 
how can it be controlled? Polanyi, of course, introduces the notion 
of consensus. This may have been true for a short time in the history 
of science but it was certainly not always true and is not necessarily 
true today. As already stated the term consensus is often used as a 
euphemism for political interplay. However this does not mean that the 
Scientific community is therefore left in the hands of chaos because 
Polanyi as We have seen has produced two other doctrines that indicate 
chaos may not be the only alternative. A doctrine that suggests the 
scientific community is bound together by faith: the community as
analagous to a religious community. And a doctrine which indicates that 
the community is bound together by interlocking obligations.
The faith of the community is that reality does exist and that it is the 
task of the community to discover and reveal what they themselves believe 
to be truths about this reality. Each individual scientist has an 
obligation to apprehend and reveal truths about this reality: to himself
as he would otherwise denying his own task and faith, and to his colleagues
who- are bound with him. in this common task end faith. '
Likewise be ,<as'. his. ■ colleagues , ;nac the. obligation to ‘ 
judge theories according to his own - beliefs'. If he did 
not .judge' theories according to his . strongly held beliefs,■■■ 
and if he produced hypotheses where ho commitmeht•was 
entailed ±t would be far more difficult and perhaps 
impossible for the community to proceed with' its task.
' ‘The difficulty of testing theories or even arriving 
at a' consensus about them means that;-great reliance has 
to be put on the scientist's honesty, so. scientific 
morality,comes to the forefront of the existence of the 
community. Polanyi's claim that the scientist is covenanted 
to the Service of reality, and obliged to declare the 1 
truth as he sees it becomes the paramount factor"in 
the community ' s 'continued, existence . And. this far from- 1 
rules out the Popperian ■ doctrine, in . a; weaker. fono as. \ 
a continual criticism of all theories, f o r b y  keeping up 
a1 criticism, the scientist is helping to fulfil his 
obligation to the truth. Likewise Polanyi1 s. description 
'of•the community does not rule out the.political element 
which exists: the attempt to get allies, the use of 
propaganda, etc., these are expressions of the scientist's 
commitment to the. truth, and part of his attempt to 
uphold and. establish the ...hypothesis to which ."he is 
committed. The description also allows' in the attempts 
to steal theories, the attempts to.merely further 
one's career , as without the .possibility of lapses 
obligations cannot exist. Like all theories about -ethics 
a theory about the ethics of the scientific community 
must allow the possibility of a wrong or a right action.
If one is to act morally it must.be possible.to act 
immorally.
It would seem then that as a philosophical 
explanation of the community of pure scientists,
Polanyi's theory is adequate. The beauty of it is
that it i r  able to stand up to a powerful attack oil its consehStiS or jpim'ent J 
an attack which seems to demonstrate that a consensus sometimes may not 
exist. In spite of this demonstration the system is able to hold 
together because of Polanyifs other doctrines: the doctrine about the
mutual faith of the community, and the interlocking obligations that 
arise from this faith,
Michael Polanyi in criticising the falsification doctrine points out
that one falsifying instance cannot in practice falsify a theory as it
may only be an apparent falsification which is soon forgotten. However,
l6as Alan Musgrave has pointed out, Popper has long since given up his 
claim that one instance is enough and argues that a theory is falsified 
after its continual failure. It does seem that tins argument plays 
into the consensus theoristfs hands. The original doctrine was logically 
correct for if an existential statement is produced in a negative form 
then It can be falsified by one instance. It can, of course, be argued 
that the test tubes may have been dirty, that the experimentalist was 
incompetent, etc. but this does not alter the logic of the argument. .
If a compromise is made and it is stated that a theory cannot be falsified 
by one instance but only after a series of instances you are then forced 
to state at what point in the series is falsification achieved. The 
second instance, the third, the two hundredth, the mlllioneth or what?
Of course rachievedf in this case is really the wrong word to use as the 
word should be Accepted*. Under such an argument falsification is 
achieved when the consensus of scientists accepts that it is achieved.
Thus the consensus theorists obtain a victory.
The argument has been developed incorrectly. A hypothesis if produced
as a negative existential statement can be falsified by one instance,
17as long as the test tubes are not dirty, etc. ' It is the case that 
other people may not believe that the hypothesis is falsified, and nay
have to'-repeat the-e^ periaiifibnt until the dunderheads .accept that -.falsification 
has taken place but in fact it was falsified by one instance. This 
brings out two points: logically a negative existential statement can
be falsified by one instance but nevertheless the falsification still 
has to be accepted by the scientific community before we can say that 
the scientific community believes that such and such a hypothesis is
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falsified. For instance, in the case of Paul Kammerer!s midwife toad 
which developed horns on its hands for holding on to the female in water 
while mating this seemingly falsified the hypothesis that the environment 
cannot effect the hereditary stream. He showed the creature to 
biologists in Cambridge and around the world but nevertheless many still 
failed to give up the Weismann doctrine that the hereditary stream was 
inviolable, and this was in spite of Kammerer’s reputation as an expert 
experimentalist who was especially experienced in breeding reptiles 
and toad like creatures. These scientist were of course correct for 
Kammererfs experiments were later discredited but the example does 
demonstrate the danger of accepting one falsification. However, it 
does not alter the logic of the argument that one instance is enough.
In other words Popper is unable to life scienbe entirely out of the social 
relationships within the scientific community, as scientists are suspicious 
creatures and always ready to criticise the critics.
Polanyi argument against the falsification doctrine does not take the 
form I have just suggested for such an argument accepts the logic of 
the doctrine and admits that it can be used as a useful method but 
indicates that it cannot entirely remove science from the communal 
relations of the scientific community. In this sense the doctrine can 
only be considered as a proposed methodology and not as a description 
of how scientists operate. It is intended to be this even though some 
supporters of the theory believe that it is a description. Polanyi fs
existential statements. This is a clever criticism as he makes use of 
the doctrines descriptive inadequacies when its supporters move over 
from prescription to description. And also that theories cannot be 
falsified by empirical refutations as they are on a higher level than 
the facts. This, as I have suggested, seems to be a hang over from 
Polanyifs earlier doctrine of an external reality which we could only 
contact by (Spinozvan) intuition. Polanyifs present doctrine allows 
that theories must at first have been derived from the lowest level of 
reality, but if this is so then if a higher level theory seems inconsistent 
with the facts then surely this is good grounds for challenging it?
Of course this may be extremely difficult as the high level theory may 
be so generalised (or vague?) that its connection with the lower levels 
of reality may be almost impossible to see but if it is not then this 
would be an indication that it is not a scientific theory that is being 
proposed. As Lerzek Kolakowski argues:
"Setting up experiments to disprove a given hypothesis is
a fundamental feature of scientific morality. Ignoring it
is to encourage the all-too-human tendency to facile explanation,
19rash generalization."
Polanyi would seem to be correct in recognising that when absolute 
certainty is impossible some sort of consensus is necessary to provide a 
check on excesses. Yet he goes very near to the unacceptable claim that 
the scientific community accepts prevalent theory dogmatically, that 
experimental evidence is of little importance in the judgment of a new 
theory, and that the actions of the scientific community are far from 
being objective. However, a close examination of his writings shows 
that he does not entirely take up these positions: accepted theory is
important but the discovering scientist and the community will consider 
critical evidence. The community may be slow and circumspect in giving 
up a well thought of body of theory but is prepared to do so when there
is a considerable amount of evidence indicating that it should. If 
it was not prepared to do this there could be no progress in science. 
Likewise the scientific community does act in an objective fashion.
It does not give up a theory when a few experiments seem to disprove 
it, and it does take account of who the experimenter is and who made 
the original experiments but it will give up a theory when there is 
good reason why it should, and it will accept a new theory when there 
is good reason why it should (a considerable amount of critical and 
experimental evidence). It is Polanyifs restricted sense and use of 
the word Objective1 which makes it appear he is claiming that the 
scientific community is not acting objectively. His analysis of the 
community suggest that under a normal use of the word the scientific 
community does act objectively.
Polanyi recognises that men are fallible but his recognition of this 
fact has a peculiar effect on his theory. It leads him to virtually 
take up an untenable position: as men are not infallible they cannot
design infallible tests to test theories therefore theories cannot be 
tested. Polanyi*s attack is not on the possibility of developing a 
statement that can be tested, as a statement can be produced in such a 
form that from a logical point of view it can be tested. His argument 
is aimed at induction and like Popper he accepts Humefs destruction of 
induction. But although an infallible test cannot be made nevertheless 
tests can be provided that will give good reason for using or not using 
a theory. This in fact seems to be Musgrave's standpoint. A theory 
developed in the realms of logic cannot be applied exactly in the real 
world but can be used as a guide. (There is really no reason why he 
should not accept falsification as a methodology and the fact of consensus 
for the two are not mutually exclusive.) It is not the case that a 
theory cannot be tested but only that we cannot provide infallible 
experimental tests. Likewise with the argument that as pure objectivity
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is impossible for man then scientific decisions will not be objective. 
They can be objective but not purely objective for as Polanyi points 
out such a concept cannot be applied to man.
See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, op, cit., p. 26*
nHe the theologian looks at his object with passion, fear 
and love. This is not the eros of the philosopher or his 
passion for objective truth. The basic attitude of the 
theologian is commitment to the contents he expounds.
Detachment would be a denial of the very nature of this 
content
See The logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit.
Reason can be considered public in two senses: (a) its workings 
can be made accessible through the use of language; (b) as it 
is public it is open to tests which are applicable to the subject 
under consideration. For instance, utterances that did not 
satisfy the basic rules of language would be considered unreason- 
able so it would be necessary for a reasonable argument to at 
least satisfy such rules. An argument that met this consideration 
would still be unreasonable i£ it ignored accepted procedures for 
judging or testing something. For instance, an argument which 
indicated a person was judging the weight of some material by its 
size without taking into account its mass would be considered 
unreasonable.
Both de jure and de facto authority.
For example the mean average of the British Science Research 
Council in 1966 was 56.27, the mean average of Cambridge 
Professors of Science was 3 7 * 1
T.S*, Kuhn has pointed out that the whole training of a scientist 
tends to create the acceptance of authority and a reluctance to 
to deviate from the norm. T.S. Kuhn, ”The Essential Tension: 
Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research” in C.W. Taylor and 
F. Barron (Editors '), Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and
Development, New York, 1963.
It could be argued that the procedures of the Royal Society 
committee on Biological Research would have been accelerated 
but for the gerontocratic tendency in the structure of the 
scientific community, and molecular biology would have been 
established before I960-
So Toulmin, ’’She Complexity of Scientific Choice: A
Stocktaking, Minerva, Spring, 196^ believes that there is a 
tendency to gerontocracy in the scientific community* In 
conversation Polanyi has denied that this is so. Zuckerman 
and Merton in M* Riler et al Ageing and Society, 1972, suggest 
that the reverse is the case and that older scientists are at 
a disadvantage. Garfield in Nature, 19701 and Cole in 
American Journal of Sociology, 1971 and Zirkle, Journal of 
Heredity, 196^ with particular reference to the Mendel case, 
argue that delayed recognition of research is less common than 
is supposed. My own feeling is that as in all communities 
there is a tendency for the older members of the community to 
hold power but that this is as not as marked in the scientific 
community as other communities, and can only be upheld at all 
if we consider 50 years of age rather old in the scientific 
community.
For instance, Tswett’s introduction of ahromotographic techniques
in 1906 was only recognised in the 1920s. it was impossible
for an unknown Russian botanist to get the funds necessary to
establish his techniques or challenge the authority of the
established chemists.
Thomas Huxley once stated:
’’You have no notion of the intrigues that go on in this 
blessed world of science.....merit alone is very little 
good; it must be backed by tact and knowledge of the world 
to do very much.”
(Cited in footnote in W. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community, 
London, 1965, p. 104.)
A complete philosophy of science must include a concept about 
reality: an ontology, a theory about how an understanding of
this reality is gained: an epistemology, and a theory about
how this knowledge is checked but it must also provide an 
explanation of how science has developed because science is 
a dynamic study. -
P. Feyerabend, ”In Defence of Classical Physics”, Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, No. 1. May 1970, p. Sb 
"bid.
P. Feyerabend, Problems of Microphysics in Frontiers of Science 
and Philosophy, R. Colodny (Editor), Pittsburgh, 1962 
Hagstrorn, The Scientific Community, op. cit.
It would be formally possible to falsify a theory in a 
hypothetico-deductive model but I am arguing that in reality 
science is not practiced in this way.
A.E. Musgrave, * Falsification and It!s Critics1, paper presented 
at IVth International Congress for Logic, Methodology and 
Philosophy of Science in Bucharest, Roumania, 1971*
A theory may also be based on auxiliary hypotheses which are 
themselves false, an experiment which indicated a prediction 
was incorrect would not indicate which auxiliary hypothesis was 
false. (See P. Duhem, The /dm and Structure of Physical Theory 
trans. P.P. Weiner, Princeton, 193^ (cited in Musgrave, op. cit.) 
A. Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad, London, 1971•
L. Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, London, 1972, p. 93
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Argument for Freedom in Science
Polanyi in producing his argument for freedom in science justifies 
his claim for freedom by reference to his ontology and epistemology but 
he gives further strength to his justification by introducting a special 
theory of evolution. This theory is a vitalist theory, and it is his 
claim that the study of evolution merges into epistemology.
His theory of evolution is certainly opposed to that accepted 
by modern science. This theory, the neo-Darwinian theory, postulates 
that parents can pass on to their child only that which they themselves 
have inherited. This genetic endownment is passed down the generations 
and is unaffected by anything that may happen to its carriers. This 
theory of the "continuity and inalterability of the germ track” was first 
put forward by August Weismann in 1885. Evolution is then repetitive but 
there can be progress. This progress can come about owing to microscopic 
random mutations. (Mutations are spontaneous changes in the molecular 
structure of the chromosomes and are random as they are unrelated to 
anything that goes on in the animal*s environment.) Generally these 
mutations produce harmful effects but very occasionally there occur tiny 
mutations which are beneficial to the organism, and these are preserved 
by the operation of natural selection. Mendel had shown that if a useful 
mutation occured it was not whittled away by successive blendings, as 
FLeeming Jenkin had postulated in a review of The Origin of the Species, 
in 1867, but was preserved by natural selection. In other words the fa«t 
that a gene did not blend therefore enabled a favourable mutation to be 
passed on undiluted to the next generation.'*’ In the 1930s this 
neo-Darwinian theory received further confirmation by the discovery by 
Crick and Watson of the chemical structure of DNA, the nucleic acid in 
the chromosomes which carried the hereditary information. Crick argued
that "information can flow from nucleic acids to proteins but cannot 
flow from protein to nucleic acid", and therefore supported Weismann*s 
thesis that nothing that happens in the life time of a carrier can alter 
che genetic endownment. (Crick was arguing that information can pass 
only from DNA to ENA (The asdSgAger substance) to protein and not the 
other way.)
This theory was and is opposed by adaptionist theorists who
base their arguments on the theories of J.B. lamarck put forward in 
2
lS09 The Lamarckians argue that acquired characteristics, meaning
improvements in habits, bodily structure, etc*, which the parents acquire
through their attempts to cope with the environment, can be xoassed on to
the children. Or more strictly that essential characteristics which
have been acquired after coping with continual conflicts with the
environment can over a period of several generations be inherited. In
other words evolution is cumulative and information can pass from the
body to the hereditary channel.
The lamarckians have over the years met with little success in
producing experimental evidence to support their thesis, and that which
3
has been produced has been discredited.
Even so, recently neo-Darwinism has met with some new difficulties
which challenge its present dogma, although it has previously been able
to meet challenges of equal danger. The Times Science Eeport,
26th June, 3-970 concluded:
"It is too early to say what consequences may follow from the 
demonstration that DNA can be copied from ENA, but at least the 
central dogma now seems to be an oversimplification". (Cited 
in Koestler, op. cit.)
This made reference to three separate cancer research teams (H. Termin,
Wisconsin, D. Baltimore, M.I.T., and S. Spiegleman, Columbia) who had
indicated that certain viruses which cause cancer in animals, once they
if
had invaded the host cell, could produce their own DNA*
A* Koestler writes:
"Within roughly the same period, other important papers were
5published in Nature which some biologists consider to be the
end of neo-Darwinism in its present form*.....The arguments
show that random mutation and natural selection alone could
not have kept evolution going without some additional principle
being involved, are derived from biochemistry and modern
£
information theory*"
Michael Polanyi*s theory differs from both the orthodox! theory
and the Lamarckian theory and seems more akin to the vitalist theories
7 8of Henri Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin* He assumes a force running
through the whole of the evolutionary process which at each stage of the 
evolutionary oroqes.s .strives . for a higher stage of achievement
..X,V :• . I • • •  ........ ‘ •* ~ ' 9" *
until at last an unthinkable consummation is reacher .
The argument develops in the following way. Life has a
predestined end and at each stage of evolution there is a force, an active
centre in existence which strives to get nearer to this end, and is
therefore instrumental in lifting the organism up to the next stage of
evolution. (Bergson called this force the elan vital) The culmination
of the evolutionary process in physical terms is when man finally arises
from a dumb animal*
He attacks the orthodox theory in the following way he states:
"I deny that any entirely accidental advantages can ever add 
up to the ©volution of a new set of operational principles, 
as it is not in their nature to do so*,r^
This criticism has certainly received support from F.B. Salisbury in 
Nature (1969):
"Modern biology is faced with two ideas which seem to me to 
be quite incompatible with each other. One is the concept of 
evolution by natural selection of adaptive genes that are 
originally produced by random mutations. The other is the 
concept of the gene as part of a molecule of DNA, each gene 
being unique (specific) in order of arrangement of its nucleotides.
If life really depends on each gene being as unique as it 
appears to be, then it is too unique to come into being by 
change mutations* There will be nothing for natural selection 
to act on."
Polanyi is attacking the weak part of the orthodox theory that minute 
random mutations can lead to advantages when much evidence suggest that 
mutations usually will be deleterious to the organism, and that as this 
is so the time lag is too short to produce complex species in their 
present form*
He argues that the theory can be corrected by assuming an 
ordering principle* He states:
"The action of the ordering principle underlying such a 
persistent creative trend is necessarily overlooked or denied 
by the theory of natural selection. Its recognition would, 
indeed, reduce mutation and selection to their proper status 
of merely releasing and sustaining the action of evolutionary 
principles by which all major evolutionary achievements are 
defined." ^
It has to be admitted that Polanyi is right in assuming that the 
present random mutation natural selection theory is not absolutely 
satisfactory. However, it is not intended to be a law but is a developing 
theory which has progressively led to further discoveries and has received 
added confirmation from Darwin to Weismann to Mendel to Crick. Polanyi*s 
suggestion of an ordering principle is a hypothesis which may some day 
provide an alternative which may overthrow or fit in with the orthodox 
theory. Yet it has received no experimental confirmation of its existence* 
He is really stating that the time lag for evolution is too small so we 
should assume some ordering principle which can speed up the process. 
However, we are no better off if we do assume such a principle, indeed, 
we are worse off as we would be virtually throwing away a long line of 
successful theorising and replacing it by a theory for which there is no 
experimental evidence. like the theory of Lamarck the theory at this
level is a common sense theory which we would expect to be vindicated 
but as yet no vindication has come about* The natural selection nutation 
theory is the only theory that provides an explanation of evolution and 
has received confirmation. Indeed Polanyi!s assumption of an ordering 
principle can hardly be considered a scientific hypothesis in its present 
form except in so far as it can be considered a plea to attempt to isolate 
the ordering principle, a principle for which there is no scientific 
evidencer In other words he is asking biologists to follow a line of 
research which they generally believe to be unfruitful.
However, Polanyifs theory of evolution goes much further than 
the postulation of a controlling principle for it is a process of continuous 
achievement towards an unthinkable consumation. Whereas the postulation 
of a controlling principle can only be considered a scientific proposal 
when formulated in a different way, the concept of evolution as a progression 
towards an unthinkable consummation can never be considered as a scientific 
proposal for as Polanyi says the concept of a consummation (with reality 
or God?) is unthinkable. It certainly cannot be tested and even within 
a consensus theory it is not the sort of theory the scientific community 
would need to have a consensus about,
Polanyi has produced then an extremely unorthodox theory of 
evolution but what is the function of the theory within his philosophy?
It has three functions: (l) to give added support to his epistemology,
(2) to support his claim that man will search for the truth, (3) to 
give added strength to his claim for freedom in science,
Polanyi attempts to give biological support to his theory of 
knowledge by arguing that epistemology is really an expansion of biology.
He states:
"As we proceed to survey the ascending stages of life, our 
subject matter will tend to include more and more of the very 
faculties on which we rely for our .understanding it*,,,.
we shall find ourselves accrediting living beings with
a wide range of faculties, similar to those which we have
claimed for ourselves in the foregoing enquiry , into the
nature and justification of knowledgej we shall see that
biology is an expansion of the theory of knowledge into a
theory of all kinds of biotic achievements, among which
13acquisition of knowledge is one0n 
He then argues that there are two principles at work in animals: 
namely, the use of machine like operations, and the inventive power 
of aniir ’ life- He proceeds to examine these inventive powers of 
animal life:
,fWe start from the fact that no material process governed by
the laws of matter as known today can conceivable account
for the presence of consciousness in material bodies• •*••
A big step towards the generalization of the powers of thought
downwards in the direction of morphogenetic originality is
made by acknowledging the originative powers of Unconscious
thought- The unconscious exercise of originality is usually
still prompted by a conscious effort and a judgment of a
higher order, as in the case of heuristic efforts which
induce discovery during a subsequent period of latency* An
effort will usually be also at work in causing the reorganisation
of available means for a predetermined end*
Ultimately, by dropping also the element of effort, the
capacity for coherent and resourceful action can be generalised
Ikto a process of growth*ff 
Polanyi considers that this growth must be understood as an. achievement*
He states:
"The morphogenetic principle discovered by Driesch ^  thus
reveals itself as the primodial member of an ascending series
of homologous processes, which cannot be understood except
as the resourceful achievement of a comprehensive rightness,
and everyone of which dissolves altogether in the light of
16any more impersonal examination.M
He, therefore considers that he has shown biology to be a commitment 
to achievement for some ends:
"••••••biology has been revealed as an appreciation of commitment...
commitment may be then graded by steps of increasing consciousness;
namely from primordial, vegetative commitment of a centre of
being, function and growth, to primitive commitment of the
active-perceptive centre, and hence further again, to responsible
17commitments of the consciously deliberating person*"
By expanding biology to what he calls ultra-biology Polanyi
is able to allow responsible commitment to be included in his biology.
This makes it possible for him to argue that biology and epistemology
come to the same thing, that his theory of knowledge like biology is a
study of the function of commitment. The ultra-biologist then studies
how man achieves knowledge. He states:
"Biology then comes to include the accrediting of our own 
intellectual powers.and the confirmation of our commitments 
within the framework of our calling. It acknowledges, in 
particular, our capacity for continually discovering new 
interpretations of experience which reveal a deeper understand­
ing of reality, and takes us eventually to the point where the
whole panorama of science unfolds for a second time within
18a biology of man immersed in thought,"
Whereas biology can be considered a study of commitment evolution
can be seen as a series of achievements in the course of the emergence
of the human race. He states:
"In the course of evolution this series (of ascending biotic
levels which can be thought of as successively rising achievements)
should present itself as a series of successive existential
achievements. It should show how in the course of anthropogenesis
the descending lines of our ancestors have taken on by stages
the full capacities of personhood and have inherited eventually
19all the hazardous aspirations of humanity,"
His theory of evolution is begining to explain the aim of all these
existential achievements. He continues:
"When man participates in this life his body ceases to be
merely an instrument of self-indulgence and becomes a condition
of his calling.....While the first rise of living individuals
overcame the meaningless of the universe by establishing in
it centres of subjective interest, the rise of human thought
in its turn overcame these subjective interests by its universal
intent. The first revolution was incomplete, for a self centred
life ending in death has little meaning. The second revolution
aspires to eternal meaning, but owing to the finitude of man*s
condition it too remains blatantly incomplete. Yet the
precarious foothold gained by man in the realm of ideas lends
sufficient meaning to his brief existence; the inherent
stability of man seems to me adequately supported and certified
by his submission to ideals which I believe to be universal.....
If this be vitalism, then vitalism is mere common sense, which
can be ignored only by a truculently biggotted mechanistic
outlook......Evolution can be understood only as a feat of
20emergence."
Polanyi therefore sees the evolutionary process as moving to some end;
of active centres driving man onwards. He continues:
"At all levels of life it is these centres which take the risks 
of living and believing. And it is still such centres which, 
at the highest stage of development, activate those men who 
seek the truth and declare it to all comers - at all costs..... 
the emergent noosphere is wholly determined as that which we 
believe to be true and right; it is the external pole of our 
commitments, the service of which is our freedom. It defines 
a free society as a fellowship fostering truth and respecting 
the right."
F o r Polanyi the end of all this process of achievement is clear:
"All these centres - those which led up to our own existence 
and the far more numerous others which produced different lines 
of which many are extinct - may be seen engaged in the same 
endeavour towards ultimate liberation. We may envisage then 
a cosmic field which called forth all these centres by offering 
a short-lived, limited, hazardous opportunity for making some
progress of their own to an unthinkable consummation* And
that is also I believe, how a Christian is placed when
' 22worshipping God* M
Polanyi is attempting to show how his concept of biology can 
be expanded into a study of man’s attempt to increase his knowledge*
That the study of biology foreshadows the dbudy of man immersed in thought 
but in doing this he shows that his epistemology is a psychological 
explanation of why man tries to achieve knowledge, and why he becomes 
commit* d to his beliefs* It is part of man’s biological or psychological 
make up to strive for achievement and to become psychologically committed 
to the explanation arrived at Polanyi’s theory of commitment within that 
which he calls his epistemology of course cannot provide a justification 
of knowledge, although it provides an explanation as to why knowledge is 
claimed*
He also seems to be arguing that the 1active centres* which 
he refeis to in his theory of evolution become post noogenesis instrumental 
in bringing about intuitions or in his later works in organising tacit 
knowledge to bring about new knowledge. It is intuition which now 
undertakes the task of leading man to further achievement.
Also he indicates that man should search for the truth, and his
theory of evolution provides an explanation as to why this should be so
for evolution itself is a movement towards the ultimate truth. Man then
if he does not seek the truth is foresaking his evolutionary task. In
Polanyi1 s terminology we can say that he is failing to follow his obligation
23to the ’active centres’.
The problem for Polanyi is that neither an ’active centre1 nor an 
’ordering principle* have been discovered. However, he also uses big 
concept of evolution to support his claim for freedom in science. His 
argument is that the method of discovery by the process of indwelling and 
use of tacit knowledge within the framework of our commitments, and driven
on by the ’active centres* makes it necessary for a mature scientist to be
given complete freedom to choose and carry out his own research. An
attempt to prevent this would virtually be an attempt to prevent the process
of evolution. He then widens his argument outwards, quite legitimately
if we accept his theory of evolution, to include not only a claim for
freedom in science but for civic freedom as well. He writes:
’’The whole ontology of commitment and of a free society 
dedicated to the cultivation of thought by responsible commitments 
of its members can in fact be built up, in this manner, as 
a generalisation of biology followed by reflection on this
2kgeneralised biology.”
Man should be allowed freedom in order to give the active centres the
opportunity to reach out for the next stage of achievement. The active
centres, in a sense, become our rational self, although the concept of
rationality is widened out to include not only explicit and tacit knowledge
but the emotional element contained in our commitment to search for the
truth - heuristic passion -.
His theory of evolution can be used then to give support to his
claim for freedom in science but his claim is still strong without resort
to such a theory. A scientist should be allowed freedom to pursue his
own research because interference will destroy the personal relationship
25between the scientist and reality, and only a scientist who has chosen 
26his own research, and is therefore committed to it, can hope to contact
reality. He must be so committed to his research that he is willing
to immerse himself in it, for only by this immersion or indwelling can he
hope to progress towards discovery.
Polanyi argues that interference in science has usually no concern
for science itself. It is undertaken either for utilitarian ^  or 
28political reasons* For instance, it is hoped that some economic benefit 
can accrue by guiding science along more fruitful paths, or some theory
that appears particularly favourable to an ideology may receive governmerfcal 
support. As the aim of science is to increase our knowledge of reality 
utilitarian or political interference can only alter its aim and therefore 
destroy it.
The previous argument, if we accept the assumption that the aim 
of science is to gain knowledge, then allows Polanyi to introduce his 
conclusive argument. A free science is the most efficient science. We 
have seen that if we interfere with science either for utilitarian or 
other ± ,jL*poses then we will destroy it for by definition a science 
orientated towards utility or used for political purposes can no longer 
be science. The only estimate of the efficiency of the scientific 
community is how efficient it is in expanding the systematic ideas of 
science but it is Polanyifs argument that there is only one method of 
expanding these ideas and this is by the initiatives of individual 
scientists under the authority of an independent scientific community.
Polanyi has therefore produced a number of arguments for 
freedom in science which are dovetailed into each other. The gaining of 
knowledge becomes an extension of the evolutionary process, and the 
scientific community is able to work because of its faith in the existence 
of reality and its determination to reveal it. Interference in science 
is condemned not only because it destroys the possibility of knowledge 
but because it will destroy the development of the nature of man.
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Other Communities
Two questions arise at this point: is it possible to expand
the sort of analysis Polanyi has made of the scientific community to
other communities that are engaged in intellectual activity, and is it
then possible to expand the analysis into the wider political community?
Polanyi believes that the answer is in the affirmative to both these
question. In The Logic of liberty'1' he sketches out how his ideas can be
2applied to the judicial community, and in his Study of Man how they
can be applied to the task of the historian. In both these works, and
in Personal Knowledge he begins to sketch out a basis for an analysis
of the political community. He states:
nI shall now take it for granted that we accept personal 
knowledge as valid and shall proceed to develop the structure 
of such knowledge further in the direction which will lead us 
into the field of the humanities. This opens a great prospect.
For I hope thus to comprise within a single continuously
variable conception of knowing, both the process of acquiring
such knowledge as is comprised by natural sciences and the
knowledge of man himself as the seat of all knowledge; and X
hope that this conception will expand even further to a comprehension
of man as the source of moral judgement and of all other cultural
judgments by which man participates in the life of society11
There are a number of reasons why Polanyi feels able to claim
that his examination of the acquisition of knowledge in the scientific
community provides a prototype model for the examination of other communities.
His concepts of the scientists task and the method of gaining knowledge
is applicable to other communities, and the communities also exhibit a
similar structure of joint authority valuing and to some extent controlled
by their traditions. The knowledge of these communities, like that of
the scientific community, is also contained in the inter-personal knowledge
of their members.
Polanyi believes that the scientist is attempting to understand 
ultimate reality but this is also the task of other intellectual 
communities. The scientific community is the ideal example to show 
this activity because it seems more obvious that it is consciously trying 
to reveal the truth'. This can best be realised when equal authority 
exists between members, and where individual members are allowed freedom 
under the control of traditional knowledge. In this way it is possible 
to build up a knowledge about reality on the base of the past member^ 
knowledge. Such a concept is analogous to the process of evolution 
where, so Polanyi claims, life is moving towards an ultimate consummation 
with reality by building up on past achievements and failures. (Rxilures 
are important as they lead to a recognition of error and therefore the 
correction of it. Life then is not a continuous movement towards 
consummation but a zig zag path where many false starts are undertaken - 
a peculiar notion which must mean that the * active centres* have at least 
an unconscious recognition of the whole of evolution.) This analogy may 
seem irrelevant but it is not to Polanyi as he believes that scientists 
are now the main initiators in the process of evolution. The analogy in 
fact almost ceases to be an analogy as the scientists by their efforts are 
continuing the process of evolution - pushing it on to further achievement. 
From such an argument we can say that other intellectual communities are 
also engaged in this task of understanding ultimate reality, and are also 
helping to further the evolution of man. The wider political community 
is also engaged in the same task or if it is not it should be (again a 
blurring of the distinction between description and prescription). Yet, 
as on the whole members of the wider political community are not expert 
enough to directly engage in the same task themselves, they should provide 
the conditions of freedom necessary for success in such a task, and 
provide the necessary funds. They should also be prepared to submit
themselves to the superior minds of the experts in the accomplishment of 
the task. Polanyi states, "The point is reached here at which the 
observer*s appraisal of biological achievement turns into his submission 
to the leadership of superior minds."
Polanyi does make some attempt to distinguish between the activity 
of the scientist, theologian, metaphysician, etc. by reference to their 
methods but his claim that they are all concerned with understanding 
ultimate reality makes a demarcation between the different disciplines 
almost impossible to realise. Science becomes metaphysics, becomes 
theology, becomes almost any activity that moves beyond physical and 
chemical data. This tendency to merge disciplines is further aggravated 
by his denial of scientific testability.
He is able to give further credence to his use of the scientific 
community as the prototype community by his associated claim that the 
scientist is searching for the truth. (The Truth is ultimate reality).
This seems acceptable in an examination of the scientific community but 
it is really Polanyi fs claim that it is only more obvious in the scientific 
community and that other communities will or should exhibit the same 
characteristic. The reason for this is that man himself has such an 
obligation to the truth, an obligation to the active centre within him.
Two further arguments are then used to show why the analysis of 
the scientific community can be used to study other communities. Knowledge 
can only be gained by an individual who becomes obsessed with his work and 
indwells within it, and can only progess under the control of the tradition 
of a community, the inter-personal knowledge contained within a community. 
For in a situation where impersonal tests are useless consensus can be 
the only check on wild excesses.
Rather than using the scientific community as a prototype model 
it could well be that Polanyi should have reversed his argument. Perhaps 
he should not have attempted to demonstrate how other communities are 
similar to the scientific community but how it is similar to other communit­
ies. How it exhibits characteristics which can be found in other 
communities even though it is attempting to be objective and looks at 
reality in a special way. Polanyi as a former member of the scientific 
community probably knows more about the workings of it than of other 
communities but this cannot be a justification for its use as prototype.
The major reason he uses it as a prototype is that it exhibits to a greater 
degree than other communities the characteristics he is most concerned 
with in developing his theory of evolution: the search for the truth,
the urge for achievement by individual initiative, and its control by 
inter-personal knowledge or tradition.
Scientific activity then can be seen as the cuMiaation of the 
process of evolution, other intellectual activities as further examples 
which are not quite so clear, and the free society as the necessary 
condition for these communities to undertake their task most effectively*
The Community of Historians 
Polanyi argues in The Study of Man:
"(I'fy position) denies any discontinuity between the study of nature
and the study of man. It claims that all knowledge rests on 
understanding, and that in this sense knowledge is of the same 
kind at all levels of existence. But this position admits, at 
the same time, that as the subject of our understanding ascends 
to higher levels of existence, it reveals ever new comprehensive 
features, the study of which requires ever new powers of under­
standing. I shall readily acknowledge, accordingly, that 
historians must::exercise a special kind of understanding. B£Tt' 1 ' •' 
shall argue also that all 'cho .distinctive •characteristics * 
the historians Method emerge-by continuous stages-*from the 
progressive modification of the methods used within science.
He is arguing here that as the scientist advances from the study of
inanimate matter to that of living matter, first the lower forms of life
and then the study of intelligence in the higher animals, higher forms
of comprehension come into play until the highest is reached with the
study of iaan himself . His claim is that the study of the natural science
and the study of the humanities is a continuous process, and that they
do not form two distinct branches of understanding.
The process of moving from a study of science to the study of
the humanities is reminiscent of the process of indwelling. Comprehension
becomes increasingly intense within science until the threshold of the
humanities is reached but the process does not end here for comprehension
then becomes even more intense and complex. Polanyi attempts to illustrate
this process. He states:
"Look first at the theories of physics. They deal with the 
ultimate particulars of nature and establish the existence of 
patterns, formed by them in space and time. Passionate 
intimations of this harmonious order are the guides of discovery 
in physics, and the beauty of a physical theory is the mark of 
its scientific value. This beauty is enjoyed by dwelling in 
the theory and observing its confirmation by the facts; the 
physicist dwells with pleasure in the patterns of inanimate 
nature while he turns away coldly from disorderly, meaningless 
collocations of particles."^
He goes on to argue that at the next level of understanding, which he
calls the "vegetative level", the structural elements of understanding
are greatly enriched. On this level he includes not only living vegetative
entities but machines and tools. On this level the researcher*s
participation becomes more intensified as he finds "new, more striking,
forms of excellence and failure."? He writes:
"We recognized that to know a machine is to enter into its 
purpose and acknowledge the rationality of its operations and 
that to know an organism is to acknowledge the existence of an 
individual and appreciate its correct growth, form and function, 
these features being judged to be healthy or abnormal by 
standards which we consider apposite to an individual as a
g
member of its species."
We then move on to the next level and participation is enforced
to an even greater degree. This is the level where we study the deliberate
activity of animals. The organism will be no longer attemptong to adjust
itself to its environment but will be attempting to control it. The
organism therefore begins to make mistakes, and the possibility arises
of the organism being either correct or*incorrect in its judgments but
nevertheless remaining a perfectly normal healthy organism. We therefore
have a new development to consider as well as the previous alternatives
of health and disease which Would be our concern at the vegetative level.
Polanyi argues that this phenomena of deliberative activity creates a clear
distinction between the vegetative level and this new higher level.
Whereas the observation of the vegetative level takes place on two
logical levels the observation of a deliberatively active animal will
involve three logical levels. He gives the following example to
illustrate this point:
"When I say »the stone is rolling* this involves two logical
levels, (l) one for me and ray statement about the stone, and
(2) another for the stone itself. Usually we think of ourselves
on the higher level, talking down to the stone on a lower level.
But if I say *the sentence "the stone is rolling" is true*, I
need an additional, third level to accommodate the three things
brought together by this utterance. There will be (l) a topmost
level for myself and my utterance, (2) an intermediate level for
the sentence of which I am saying that it is true, and (3) a
q
bottom level, once more, for the stone."
Polanyi is arguing here that the statement *the stone is rolling is 
true* brings in an element of conscious judgement by the person who is 
making the statement. He is trying to illustrate the point that to the 
observer the organism on the vegetative level makes no conscious judgments 
but on an animate level, as the organism takes deliberative action, there 
arises the possibility of the animal making an error, and this necessitates 
the capacity to make judgments on the part of the animal. The observer 
comes to realize that the animal has developed an interpretative framework 
by which it will attempt to judge things.
Polanyi argues that an animal who has developed an interpretative 
framework can make two sorts of mistakes. He gives the example of a 
trout who snaps at the angler fs fly. In this case the trout is making an 
error based on a correct interpretative framework. In the case of young 
geese, who accept a human being as their mother, and identify other humans 
as part of the flock the geese judge their experience correctly but are 
using a wrong interpretative framework. Both these errors can be 
distinguished from a pathological absence of judgment, for instance in 
rats with part of their brain removed. There is also the possibility of 
a correct judgment in a correct interpretative framework giving us four 
possibilities;
(1) an incorrect judgment in a correct interpretative framework.
(2) a correct judgment in an incorrect interpretative framework.
(3) no interpretative framework and no judgment.
( k ) a correct judgment in a correct interpretative framework.
There is in fact another possibility which Polanyi does not consider, and 
that is an incorrect judgment in an incorrect interpretative framework.
He argues that these possibilities which can be observed in the activities 
of animals prefigure the sort of judgments a historian can make. For 
instance a Marxist will look at a historical situation from a particular
point of view. Included in his notion will be a belief that a class 
sturggle will be in evidence, and that the state will be used as an 
instrument of the ruling class to maintain its power. When an actual 
situation is examined evidence will be found which will tend to confirm the 
framework. Conflict will be interpreted as class conflict, and within the 
legislation evidence will be found to confirm the hypothesis that 
legislation will be in the interests of the ruling class. Yet contrary 
evidence need not destroy the interpretative framework, although it will 
tend to make it more sophisticated and flexible. Thus Marx when examining 
the situation of Louis Philippe, ^  King of the French, finds that his 
rule does not support the whole of the bourgeoisie as only the financial 
aristocracy rule. This would appear to be contradictory to his main 
thesis but it is coped with by calling the ruling financiers a faction 
of the ruling class, and not by a declaration that they represent a 
separate class. A statement that the non-ruling class belonged to the 
proletariate would have been from a Marxist point of view a mistake of 
category 1, an incorrect judgment in a correct interpretative framework. 
Marxls own analysis would be in category *f, a correct judgment in a correct 
interpretative framework. Frara a Marxist view point a statement that the 
financial aristocracy was a faction of the bourgeoisie made by a conservative 
historian would be in category 2, a correct judgment in an incorrect 
interpretative framework. On the other hand to a conservative historian 
a, statement made by a Marxist that the non-ruling bourgeoisie were members 
of the proletariate would be a mistake in category 3, an incorrect judgment 
in an incorrect interpretative framework.
Three distinctions can be made between the case of the historian 
and the case of the geese. The historian can choose his interpretative 
framework geese cannot. As he can choose his framework then quite clearly
it will be in conscious conflict with other interpretative frameworks, 
that of the geese will not be. As the historian has chosen his own 
framework it will be much easier for him to give it up as he knows that 
it consists of a set of beliefs he has consciously accepted, and believes
it is the best framework to use to provide an interpretation of historical
actions.. When contradictory evidence appears the historian will usually 
try and make his interpretative framework more sophisticated and flexible 
but at some point he can give it up. It would be far more difficult for 
humanised geese to give up their framework as their commitment to it has 
become almost innate.
The prefiguration then seems to exist but there are essential
differences. The major one is that the historian consciously makes a
judgment in deciding to use an interpretative framework and therefore 
consciously commits himself to a particular framework. The strength of 
the commitment may well depend on the evidence available for alternatives. 
This suggests that Polanyi*s belief that a historian will be absolutely 
committed to his interpretative framework,and then to his explanation or 
theory within the framework is certainly open to question.
An interpretative framework then is a group of systematic 
beliefs which one accepts and then uses to interpret other data. In the 
case considered Marxist theory is accepted and then applied to an actual 
historical situation. The resultant explanation will be contained within 
the Marxian framework, Marxian terminology will be used and conflict 
interpreted along the lines of Marxian theory. Only in very rare instances 
can the facts of the historical situation actually begin to challenge the 
framework.
There seems to be a close analogy between Polanyi*s interpretative
11
framework and Lakatos* "hard core" hypotheses, although Polanyi*s inter­
pretative framework would seem to be the step before the development of
such hypotheses, for instance, it would include for the scientist a 
concept about the uniformity of nature. . Polanyi in fact fails to consider 
the interesting interplay between important theories and the interpretative 
framework. Can for instance hard core hypotheses become part of the 
interpretative framework, and therefore become even more inviolable.
This happened with Marxian theory. The failure of the predictions of the 
downfall of capitalism became such a challenge to the interpretative 
framework that Lenin*s theory of imperialism had to become part of the 
framework thereby making it more flexible and able to cope with developments 
in history.
Yet there is another prefiguration of the work of the
historian and also of the scientist. This lies in the recognition of
intellectual passions in the lower animals. Their harrassment at being
unable to solve a problem, and their delight in a correct solution.
He points out that, *tye have here the incipient transcendence of self-
centred individuality by a personhood striving to achieve intellectual
12
excellence for its own sake.”
The study of animals then begins to foreshadow the study of man*s 
deliberative activities. And a study of these activities will show that 
the methods used in the natural sciences and in the study of history are 
part of the same process which can, as we have seen, be recognised at a 
lower animal level. That the study of history and the natural sciences 
are not two distinct forms of knowledge can be demonstrated by the following 
example which Polanyi gives: the study of the career of Napoleon contrasted
with the method of a natural scientist.
Napoleon*s career consisted of a series of actions whereas the 
study of scientific phenomena, for instance gravitation, comprises events. 
Napoleonfs actions involved questions of judgment, responsibility and 
motives. This fact has led to the issuing of praise or blame on the part 
of the historian. In the case of the physicist the possibility of praise 
or blame cannot arise, because as'there are no deliberative actions but 
merely events the question of moral responsibility is meaningless. The 
distinction can be widened still more by considering that in order to really 
appreciate Napoleonfs motives we must attempt to relive his career and 
his thoughts, and the conslusion we come to will depend on what sort of 
framework we use in doing this. Pieter Geyl, in his Napoleon For and ' _ 
Against, argued that in practice the appreciation of Napoleon depended on 
the political view of the historian, and this varied in time and place.
In this way the writing of history became itself part of the process of 
history. This fact certainly seems to distinguish history from the 
natural sciences.
However, Polanyi argues that these differences do not conclusively 
demonstrate a distinction. For instance, the distinction between 
actions recorded by history and the events which are stiidied by the natural 
sciences vanishes if we accept that animal psychology is part of the 
natural sciences, for the actions of animals will be studied. Another 
argument refers to the observer for both the historian and the scientist 
make value judgments. The historians, as we have seen, make moral 
judgments, and will also make judgments about possible interpretations 
deciding on whether or not a particular interpretation is consistent 
with other interpretations of actions in other closely related aspects 
of the subject. For instance, he may make a choice between different 
alternatives on the basis of their aesthetic qualities. The scientist, 
although not making moral value judgments will make similar sort of 
judgments. As Polanyi states:
"Each appreciates the particular comprehensive entities which 
form its own subject matter, and the corresponding standards 
of excellence form an ascending series continuously progressing 
towards a moral valuation of human actions.’^
The scientist will also attempt to understand the subject matter of 
research by the process of indwelling, which is closely akin to the 
historianfs attempt to study historical actions by reliving the life of 
the person he is studying.
Polanyi is using two complementary arguments in an attempt to 
demonstrate that the study of history and the natural sciences are not 
distinct. The first is to show that the method of gaining knowledge on 
the part of the historian and the scientist are the same. It is certainly
true that there are differences, for instance, the quantitative approach 
of the scientist is not followed to such an extent by the historian but 
the essential similarity lies in the indwelling of both. And Polanyi 
argues that without indwelling there can be no knowledge. A correct 
interpretation may be arrived at accidently but this interpretation would 
not be knowledge only a mere opinion as the observer would have no commitment 
to it. Indwelling produces psychological certainty.in one*s interpretation, 
and therefore a claim that onefs opinion is universally valid; that it 
is knowledge. The second argument is to show that the subject matter of 
research will exhibit similarities. 'For instance, as the natural scientist 
moves from looking at inanimate matter to the study of animate matter he 
will begin to examine characteristics which in a more developed form are 
the characteristics the historian examines, for example, deliberative 
actions, the use of judgment.
There is still another argument within Polanyi!s general framework 
for the historian and the scientists in making their judgments will rely 
on the standards and values of their respective communities.
Polanyi sees the process of understanding as a continuous process
from the study of inanimate matter to the study of history, which needs'
l^ fgreater connoisseurship and greater identification with the subject 
matter of the study, as it moves through the natural sciences into the 
humanities. The final development in this process is man eventually 
turning attention on himself by the study of his own history and thought.
He has used a closely analogous argument to his theory of evolution 
in order to indicate that the study of history and the natural sciences 
are part of the same task. And that the study of history needs a higher 
level of understanding than the study of inanimate matter in the same 
way that a human is at a higher stage of evolution than inanimate matter.
As the human organism is more complex than that of the amoeba so the 
study of man is more complex than the study of the amoeba. Even so both 
can be identified for certain active forces in the lower organisms become 
intellectual activity in man. Biology becomes ultra-biology in 
epistemology.
His theory of evolution can therefore be brought in to support 
his claim that the study of the natural sciences and the humanities is 
part of a continuous process. However, there is really no need to look 
to a theory of evolution for support in this matter for the argument can 
stand on its own. All Polanyi has to show is that like all intellectual 
activity the fruitful study of history necessitates the immersion or 
indwelling of the historian in the subject matter of his research. And 
that like the scientist the historian will approach his task with a certain 
interpretative framework, and will then judge the subject matter in 
accordance with this framework.
A historian can be :;Lti . correct in his judgment according to 
his framework. This would mean the judgment he made was consistent with 
other judgments he had made within his framework. If his judgment 
was incorrect we would expect it to be inconsistent with the other judgments 
made. According to the previous analysis of the possible alternatives 
available to a person making a judgment the former would be alternative 
(*f) a correct judgment made in a correct interpretative framework or 
alternative (2) a correct judgment made in an incorrect alternative (1) 
an incorrect judgment in a correct interpretative framework or alternative 
(5) an incorrect judgment in an incorrect interpretative framework.
The problem arises as to whether the interpretative framework 
used ±S. correct but, as we have seen in our earlier analysis, the 
historian will use an interpretative framework that is appropriate to his
school. If he did so, and he could not exist in his school if he did 
not, his judgment, or claim to personal knowledge, will be judged by the 
inter-personal knowledge of the community of historians of which he is 
a member. In other words it will be judged by the consensus of opinion 
which exists within his own school of history.
We can therefore say that his method of achieving knowledge through
the process of indwelling, and the method of accrediting that knowledge
by the consensus of opinion within his own intellectual community is the
same as, the scientist. Bu£ Polanyi also has a further claim, and this
refers to the actual subject matter of the research. It is a claim that
there is only one reality, and that this reality is made up of different
levels: inanimate matter, vegetative matter, animal life, human life,
and man immersed in thought which includes the study of history, the
study of law, literature, and so on. There is, in fact, another level
and this is man attempting to understand transcendental reality or, from
15a theological point of view, God.
The conclusion is therefore that the historian and the scientist 
are engaged in the same task of revealing and understanding reality but 
at a different level, and that the subject matter of their research is 
the same but at a different level. Each will work within his own community 
which will have its own standards and traditions and study his chosen 
area of reality. However, as can be seen from the terminology I have 
used, there is a difference for whereas we can probably talk about the 
scientific ommunity we cannot talk in the same way about the community of 
historians. We have to talk about communities of historians or rather 
schools of historians. Even so it does seem possible to argue that 
within these different schools certain skills have been produced Which 
have proved effective in gaining historical knowledge, and that a body of 
knowledge has developed which can be used to judge innovations. In other
words innovations will have to fit into the inter-personal knowledge of 
a school.
In this sense truth for a member of a historical school would 
consist in a correct interpretation of historical phenomena in accordance 
with his own interpretative framework. This is the personal knowledge 
of the historian or rather his claim to personal knowledge. This claim 
is accepted as personal knowledge if it fits in with the knowledge already- 
possessed by the school, i.e., by inter-personal knowledge. It then 
becomes true as far as the school is concerned.
From this analysis we are led to argue that each school will 
have its own interpretative framework to which the interpretative framework 
of each member will approximate. The original interpretative framework 
of the school will have arisen because different historians with similar 
interpretative frameworks will have come together and decided to accept 
each others mutual authority in determining the truth. The group would 
really have to develop its own decision procedure, that is accept each 
other *s mutual authority before we co’ild call it a school which could be 
differentiated from other schools. Indeed to the extent we can show 
that a school is not governed by the mutual authority of its members then 
to that extent we deny the existence of the school. New adherents to the 
school would have to fit in to the style of that school. In other words 
their own interpretative frameworks would have to approximate to the pre­
existing ideal derived from the original adherents.
Science, on the otherhand, seems to consist of an interlocking 
series of interpretative frameworks. The question therefore arises as 
to why there is not a corresponding breakdown into schools of science as 
there is in history, and also in theology. There seems to be three 
reasons for this: (l) The subject matter of the research necessitates
a more personal involvement, so whereas in science clashes between 
scientists will be confined to criticisms of methodology, really a criticism 
of a scientists competence, to attempts to indicate a failure of a 
theory to fit in with other theories, that is, an inconsistency of the 
theory with accepted knowledge, and mere career competiveness, another 
factor will enter in the case of history. This would be an attempt to 
challenge the historianfs interpretative framework - a challenge that 
would rarely happen in the case of science - for instance, a challenge 
tc an analysis made from a Marxist point of view. (2) Scientists do 
not develop mutually exclusive schools based on different moral interpretative 
frameworks, so although there are schools of thought in the sense that there 
is disagreement over specific points this does not effect their whole 
outlook on science. It is really this moral factor in the interpretation 
of history that creates the schools. It Would be extremely difficult for 
a Marxist historian to accept a Whig interpretation of history as the 
'truthT all he could do would be to accept it as a Whig interpretation of 
history* (This is a case where historians are themselves part of.the 
process of history) (3) The methodology tends to hold it together, for 
instance, the use of experimentation, statistical techniques, rules for the 
presentation of findings. We can say that there appears to be a general 
consensus as to the technical approach to the subject matter of research 
but this not the case with history.
Generally then with the qualifications I have given it does seem 
possible to apply some of the concepts in Polanyifs analysis of the 
scientific community tc the study of history. The analysis produces a 
rather formal and ideal version of the actual situation but it reamins a 
reasonable interpretation not too far from reality.
/I<|
The Judicial Community
In the case of the judicial community we have the profession
controlling a body of knowledge which has been built up and developed
over many generations: a body of knowledge which is a common possession*
In considering common law Polanyi states:
’’Consider a judge sitting in court and deciding a difficult case. 
While pondering his decision, he refers consciously to dozens 
of precedents and unconsciously to many more. Before him 
numberless other judges have sat and decided according to statute, 
precedent, equity and convenience^ as he himself will have to 
decide now; his mind, while he analyses the various aspects of 
the case, is in constant contact with theirs. And beyond the 
purely legal references, he senses the entire contemporary trend 
of opinions, the social medium as a whole. Not until he has 
established all these bearings of his case and responded to them 
in the light of his own professional conscience, will his 
decision acquire force of conviction and will he be ready to 
declare it.”^
The act of a judge then is a responsible act based on his knowledge of
the law and checked by his commitment to justice. The judicial decision
is arc: interpretation of existing law\hich at the same time as reinforcing
it modifies it in some respect. But it is more than this. Polanyi
argues that the operation of common law constitutes a system of adju3 tments
between succeeding judges and the general public. He states:
’’Such coherence and fitness as this system possesses at any time
is the direct embodiment of the wisdom which each consecutive
judicial decision is adjusted to all those made before and
17to any justified changes in public opinion.’’
It would seem therefore that there is at least one similarity 
between science and the law and this is that both possess a systematic 
body of ideas which gradually change their contents. Yet there is an 
obvious difference in the activity of the judge and the scientist. A judge
is given a case to decide whereas a scientist chooses his own problem 
of investigation. But, nevertheless, the scientist like the judge 
accepts a tremendous area of previously established knowledge. He also 
takes account of prevalent scientific speculations, and this can be 
considered analogous to a judge who refers to precedent and statute but 
at the same time interprets in the light of contemporary thought.
Polanyi calls this process of adjustment, which seems common to the 
activity of a judge and the scientist a process of consultation.
He states:
"The consistent growth of law and science derives from the 
consultative acts by which the dynamic systems of law and 
science are maintained.11 ^
Even so although there is this consultative element in both science and
justice the method of adjustment by which the scientific community •omes
to a decision cannot be considered entirely analogous to a judge making
his decision. His decision cannot be rejected or accepted by the consensus
of his peers for it remains a judicial decision whether they agree with
it or not. It is true that certain criticisms can be made of the decision
in the law journals and elsewhere but as such these cannot deny the
decision as the scientific community can deny a discovery. The decision
can, of course, be rejected by a higher court which will take into
account the judges reasons for making his decision, his conduct of the
trial, the precedents to which reference was made and so on.
Polanyi also argues that the scientific community is a
spontaneous order backed by persuasion. He states:
"This type of adjustment is exemplified by two opposing counsel 
trying to win over the jury to their side. When such a 
discussion goes on in wider circles, each participant adjusts 
his arguments to what has been said before and thus all divergent 
and mutually exclusive aspects of a case are in turn revealed, 
the public being eventually persuaded to accept one (or some)
cuiu i/U reject trie utners. m e  persons participtiting in 
the controversy by which the result is achieved, may be said 
to co-operate in a system of spontaneous order.....in a 
controversy that is both sincere and fair, the participants 
will primarily aim at presenting the truth, relying on it 
to prevail over error. Therefore, I suggest that co-ordination 
involved in a sincere and fair controversy should be classed 
separately as a system of spontaneous order based on
„ 19 persuasion."
This quotation indicates that Polanyi is attempting to make a direct
analogy between the administration of the law and of science. The analogy
to a certain extent is acceptable as ideally the participants in a trial
should act in the way he suggests but the comparison is between the
activity of one trial and that of the scientific community. It is not
between the activity of the judicial community as a whole and the
scientific community.
If we look at the term'V/spontaneous order* then it must mean
that activity develops from within that order without promptings from
outside. To say that the scientific community operates as a spontaneous
system means that it is self controlled in its activity. As Polanyi
points out we can only regard it as a spontaneous system when it follows
its task of revealing reality. It can be no longer regarded as spontaneous
if it follows utilitarian ends as these ends are prompted from outside
the community. If this is the case then can the judicial community be
considered as a spontaneously operating system when a judge takes into
account when making a decision, "the entire contemporary trend of opinions,
20the social medium as a whole"? In other words the decision of a judge
will be influenced not just by the case in hand and its relationship to 
the tradition of law and precedent but by an outside factor: the climate
of opinion in the social world outside the judicial community.
It can be argued that a spontaneously co-ordinating judicial
system would have to ignore such outside factors. Answers to legal 
problems could< only be arrived at by working out, and then applying the 
logical implications of legal rules and precedents. In this case the 
function of the courts would be to work out and apply along deductive 
lines of thought the principles contained in the law as it stood. The 
courts would be isolated from policy and the climate of opinion, and the 
sole duty of the judges would be to apply the principles contained in the 
law. It would be a far more easy task to substantiate a claim of 
spontaneous co-ordination for this type of neo-Austinian community but 
Polanyi seems nevertheless correct in arguing that a system of law does 
not operate in this way. It is fortunate that it does not as such a 
system of law would only work after it had already achieved a considerable 
degree of sophistication. The basic principles of law would have to be 
well established, and it would be necessary for deductions from them to 
be able to cope with legal problems that were likely to arise. It is 
probably impossible to formulate a code of law that can cope with all 
circumstances and this is why we need judges with interpretative powers. 
Even so it remains the case that a conceptual system of law can allow for 
the interpretative powers of judges within a deductive framework. The 
problem arises when it is necessary for a new principle to be introduced 
and this can happen even within a highly developed system of law. The 
necessity for the introduction of new principles arises not because of 
difficulties within the already existing system of law but because of 
developments outside the legal system. For instance, the development of 
trade unions necessitated the recognition that trade unions possessed 
legal rights.
In fact there is necessarily a continued reference to developments 
in society and movements of opinion. The most obvious example of this
is in the field of pornographic literature and its capacity to *deprave 
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and corrupt* • At different times and places literature at one time 
held to deprave and corrupt can no longer be considered to do so.
Public morality changes, and our estimate of people’s capacity to be 
depraved and corrupted changes also. Indeed the insertion of such vague 
phrases as the capacity to deprave and corrupt into legislation invites 
judges to take account of the moral climate of opinion. In a sense, of 
course, it can be argued that this must be bad law for the defendant will 
have little idea of whether or not the literature he sells will be classed
as pornographic. The Obscene Publications Act of 1959 introduced a new
defence based on the scientific or literary merit of the work, and which 
can be supported by expert evidence but the publisher of D.H. Lawrence’s 
novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover was acquitted and copies of Cleland’s •- 
Thnny Hill were burnt. Here we have a situation where a near arbitrary 
element is introduced into the law itself but on the otherhand it would 
be quite ridiculous to lay down absolutely certain rules to classify 
pornography, and this is recognised in the vagueness of the law which 
allows the court considerable leeway in taking account of the climate 
of opinion.
It is true that, as the legal positivists argue, laws are the 
rules enacted by the recognised decision procedure of the community 
but this does not take us very far. Laws are enacted for a number of 
reasons, for instance, to prevent conflict in the community, to maintain 
security, to achieve harmony but in the form they are produced they always 
need interpretation. A new law will be interpreted according to the 
general framework of the law but also in accordance with the situation 
it was intended to cope with, as well as the climate of opinion. As a
law it is not only part of the legal system but also an instrument to
enforce the control of the community’s decision procedure. Account is
therefore taken of its social effects, and it is applied with this in 
mind® Within the • -ery structure of sentencing thero is included the
possibility of taking account of the social climate for there are minimum
(
and maximum sentences. In a sense we can say that the possibility of
inequity is included in the structure of the law in order to make it more
flexible in coping with the prevalence of criminal activity.
It would appear then that the structure of certain laws makes
it necessary for judges to look to the climate of opinion before arriving
at a decision. It also appears that new developments in society may
necessitate the introduction of a new principle into the legal system.
In this latter case the judges will attempt to., fit the principle into the
body of existing law as well as taking account of the developments in
society that necessitated it. In the former case a judges decision will
be based on a fine balance between interpretations of the law and case
precedents as well as a consideration of the social climate. A failure
to arrive at a correct balance will give groundsfcr a successful appeal.
In a modern sophisticated system of law it is in fact unlikely
that a new principle as such will be introduced, and more likely that an
old principle will be adapted to include a class to which it previously
did not apply. A seemingly new principle would usually be a sub-principle
22derived from a higher principle already existing with a system .
However, from a theoretical point of view a new law cannot strictly be 
said to have been derived from the existing system of law but comes from 
the community's decision procedure. In this case it will be the legislature, 
and the legislature can legislate into law entirely new principles or 
reject old accepted ones. In practice parliamentary lawyers do attempt 
to make sure that new legislation is consistent with the old. But there 
is a definite problem here which can create a situation of dispute between
the legislature and the judiciary* The desire of the judges must be to
have a completely equitable systfcen where each part is consistent with the
others. When a new principle is introduced the judges will probably
attempt to fit it into the prevailing system even if they seem to be
interpreting away the wishes of the legislature. In effect they are
asking the legislature to think again whether or not they wish for such
an innovation, which the legal profession does not like, and which is
23
opposed to the prevailing legal system. They are therefore asking 
the legislature to be more explicit in expressing its wishes, and drawing 
its and the public*s attention to the judiciary!s opposition.
The judicial community is then the guardian of a system of ideas 
and case history which is continuously developed by the contemplation 
of and the extension of the notions held within it. Yet because it is 
closely related to the decision procedure of the community it is bound 
to take notice of the social climate, and is particularly vulnerable 
to the introduction of principles from the legislature which are contrary 
to the principles already contained within its own system of ideas.
As the judges do exist within their own community and are 
committed to the system of laws that exists, or as Polanyi would perhaps 
say ’revealed justice*, they are in a terrible dilemma if the decision 
procedure legislates principles into law which conflict with revealed 
justice. As the new law will have passed through the formal decision 
procedure it is law and cannot be rejected as law by the judges. We 
have seen that there is the possibility of interpreting it away but if 
this attempt is countered by the legislature again specifying its wishes 
the dilemma arises. If the judges are to maintain their commitment 
and obligation to justice only three alternatives are available:
(l) They can try and fit the new principle into the prevailing system of 
law but if the new principle is inconsistent with the other laws this
would be impossible • (2) They may attempt by reference to some abstract
concept of justice attempt to include the new principle into the system 
even though it would not immediately fit into the present system of law#
This would be analogous to accepting a theory that was too far ahead of 
the system of science as valid in the hope that it would be eventually 
shown to be so as science developed# This 3s a doubtful manoeuvre for, 
although an individual judge could do this and claim he was following 
his obligation to justice (i.e. his personal knowledge of justice), this 
would not be possible for the judicial community as a whole# If they 
did so they would be stating that the principle did fit into the present 
system of law, and was therefore consistent with it. In this case there 
would be no problem# (3) The judges could resign or perhaps remain 
as judges but refuse to implement the new principle. In this case they 
would be declaring that the law, although it had passed the necessary 
criteria for being considered law, i#e#, it had been duly enacted by the 
community's decision procedure, could not be accepted as law. And that 
to be a law it must not only be correctly enacted but itself must be just 
and consistent with the present system of law. In this case the judicial 
community would be claiming a certain autonomy from the rest of the 
community's decision procedure, and that part of its function was to 
protect the community as a whole from the excesses of the legislature for 
the sake of justice.
This analysis of judicial activity puts us in a position to answer 
our earlier question: ”Is the judicial community a spontaneously co-ordinat­
ing body if-it \takes account of social factors, and does it need to be a 
closed system to spontaneously co-ordinate?” The system of ideas of the 
judicial community is closed in the sense that it is concerned only with 
justice. The introduction of ideas which are not concerned with justice 
will tend to make inconsistent the system of ideas and destroy judicial
activity* However, the judicial community is not closed in the sense 
that it is isolated fnm contemporary happenings, as part of its function 
is to take note of happenings in the world outside the judicial community 
and apply their system of ideas to them. Laws introduced merely for the 
sake of political expediency and not fitting into the system of law are 
analogous to the interference with science for utilitarian reasons.
In other words they are an attempt to turn the judge away from his task 
in a similar way as the scientist is turned away from his search for the 
truth by utilitarian interference* The task of the judge is to interpret 
laws in accordance with the concept of justice inherent in the law as it 
has developed. In this case to force a judge to apply a law that is 
not in accordance with the existing system of law, i.e., to administrate 
a law which contains a principle which is inconsistent with the principles 
contained in the existing system of law, is destructive of his task*
As long as the legal "machine is controlled by the principles of justice 
laid down by the law and interpreted by the legal profession” It 
remains an independent spontaneously co-ordinating intellectual activity, 
and is analogous to the scientific community.
Yet is it possible to bring the analogy between the two communities 
even closer? For instance, is the scientist’s search for the truth 
analogous to the judge’s search for justice? It is part -of Polany’s 
argument that the scientist’s search for the truth is a search for the 
truth about an external reality, and that the system of ideas that make 
up science contains the scientist’s beliefs about the true contents of 
reality. Truth about external reality, as far as it is available, is 
contained within the system of ideas of science. In the case of justice, 
the truth about justice is contained within the system of law, interpretat­
ions and case history which make up the law. But can we consider reality
and justice separate to man which man only interprets and expresses in 
his two systems of ideas? The scientist is trying to say something 
about a reality that exists in fact, and the judges are trying to reveal 
and apply a principle which exists as an abstraction. For the scientist 
reality exists independently of himself, that is, it would still exist 
if he was not there, although his interpretation of it would not. For 
the judge justice would not exist if he, or more correctly the human 
race, did not exist as it is an abstraction of the human mind. Although 
he could argue that it is an abstraction of God independent to man, or 
an attribute of a reality separate to man. However, this will not make 
any difference to the operation of the two systems of ideas. The reason 
for this is that a spontaneous co-ordination operates because of the 
existence of inter-personal knowledge within each community. The truth 
about reality, for practical purposes, lies within the system of ideas 
of science, and the truth about justice lies within the system of ideas 
of the law. This is why innovations either in science or law are judged 
by the truth, as far as it is known, which is held within the system of 
ideas of the two disciplines, and why innovations have to be consistent 
with these ideas to be accepted.
A further similarity between the two communities lies in the 
scientist's and the judge's indwelling in their subject, and their 
commitment to the ideals and values of their discipline. It would also 
seem that as we have seen in our study of the scientific community notion 
of reasonableness can change, and are influenced very much by notions of 
reasonableness in the community as a whole. For instance, changes occur 
in what we accept as reasonable evidence so what would have been accepted 
as reasonable evidence at a witch trial would now be considered 
unreasonable.
However, these does seem to be a difference in the relationship 
of scientists with each other as compared with judges. Science contains 
a competitive element a striving for individual advance and advantage that 
is not so immediately apparent in the judicial community. A judge cannot 
advance his career by new initiatives in law but rather by demonstrating 
his interpretations continuity with the past. It is true that a scientist 
must do the same, as this is essential if his theory is to be accepted.
But at the same time he will put great stress on its innovatory element.
A judge is far more concerned with demonstrating the certainty of the law, 
its unchanging structure and stability. Science, although based on the 
past looks towards uhe future, and openly does so. Innovations are 
therefore stressed and applauded. The innovatory capacity of a scientist 
is also an important factor in the career structure of science. The 
good scientist achieves his prominence through his discoveries and his 
success in meeting criticisms. The judge does not achieve success through 
innovations in law but ideally through perceiving and classifying what 
the law states in each particular case. As this is so, with the scientist 
a competitive element is introduced into the process of discovery, with 
the judge it is confined usually to the clear expression of existing law.
The judge is a reluctant legislator whereas the scientist is an enthusiastic 
innovator.
In making our analysis of the judicial community we have 
artificially created a similarity with the scientific community by consider­
ing that the judicial community's membership is confined to the judges, 
when in practice lawyers also form a part of such a community. There is 
no such division of powers in the scientific community. However, lawyers 
are really ancillary to the work of judges. They clarify the arguments 
for the judge, and their function is to help him arrive at a just ^ decision.
For this reason the inclusion of lawyers in the judicial community 
cannot fundamentally alter the analysis.
In spite of the differences we have considered if we idealize 
the judicial community, and isolate it from other areas of the community’s 
decision procedure it is certainly possible to apply the sort of analysis 
Polanyi makes of the scientific community to the judicial community.
The Moral Community
We have seen that Polanyi’s analysis of the scientific community 
is applicable with certain modifications to schools of history and the 
judicial community but the problem arises as to how it can be applied 
to a more diffuse community, a community which is not engaged in a 
distinct intellectual activity. An example of such a community is the 
’moral community’.
The following analysis, however, does not attempt to fit together 
the ideal and the actual in the way that we could say Polanyi*s concept 
of the scientific community does. It takes the concept of inter-personal 
knowledge and applies it to a moral community. In this way the following 
analysis looks at a moral community from a particular viewpoint: that is
knowledge as inter-personal knowledge.
The reason why I use this approach is that we are not considering
a non-intellectual community, and it would be difficult to claim that in
practice such a community as a moral community has a distinct decision
procedure acceptable to its own members. That a member of such a
community not only has a commitment to his belief as to what is a moral
action or principle but to the moral community as such, under the belief
that moral knowledge can only develop under the control of communal or
inter-personal knowledge. Indeed a whole tradition has been built up
that moral knowledge is really a personal knowledge which does not need
25to achieve the agreement of others to be considered moral. ^ Such a 
tradition achieved its peak in the work of Kant and his formulation of the 
categorical imperative, and a priori principle found out by pure reason. 
Kant gives further strength to his notion of a moral act by his concept 
of the ’good will1. If we believe our act is universally valid and 
therefore in accordance with the categorical imperative it remains moral 
whatever its consequences.
In the sphere of morality Polanyi also takes up a Kantian 
position. We are fulfilling our obligation to reality if we act in 
accordance to our belief as to what is true. We therefore stick to our 
belief as to what is true whatever the community may say about its truth.
In other words we act for the sake of our duty to reality. Polanyi does 
not expand his concept of inter-personal knowledge outwards into the moral 
sphere. We cannot as in the case of science, say that we have three 
’truths’ - truth in accordance with reality, truth in accordance with our 
belief, and truth if accepted by the community - . A moral truth is then 
what we believe'.is a moral truth.
The contents of such a tradition can be challenged on the grounds 
that, although the principle formulated by Kant can be accepted as a 
basis for action, its application is far more difficult. It is analogous 
to stating that a rational hypothesis about appearances to be a scientific 
law must be universally valid, and then attempting to derive a science 
from such a principle. This, in fact, is Kant’s own approach to science.
We look for principles that are, of necessity, universally valid and then 
begin to build up our knowledge of appearances. Michael Polanyi would 
accept the belief that in science we are searching for universal laws but 
the difficulty of doing this in practice leads to a science developing under 
the control of inter-personal knowledge.
In the following analysis I apply the concept of inter-personal 
knowledge to the moral community while recognising that it is not an 
approach Polanyi has made in practice, although it is in accordance with 
hs more general philosophical position.
I propose to approach such an analysis of this community by again 
looking at, in a slightly different manner, Polany’s concept of reality 
and the method of gaining knowledge, and in the process examine the 
distinction between moral knowledge and scientific knowledge.
Polanyi assumes that the task of all intellectual activity is to obtain 
the trutho It is a se'ar-Ofr for a hidden reality, as we can only 
discover something that is already there and waiting to be discovered.
But what is this reality? It appears to be everything around us, 
everything we know but also a reality we do not know but potentially can 
know. He states:
"One can discover only something that was already there, ready
to be discovered. The invention of machines and the like
does produce something that was not there before; but actually,
it is only the knowledge of the invention that is new, its
26possibility was there before."
Our knowledge of reality does not only lie within chemical 
and physical interpretation but goes beyond to a higher level of inter­
pretation. This does not apply only to the natural sciences but to all 
forms of understanding: "A discovery, a work of art, or a noble act,
enrich the mind of all humanity. Man hitherto self centred, enters
27thereby on a participation in timeless and ubiquitous things."
Reality for Polanyi seems to include all existent things and 
values and all potentially existing things and values. It would appear 
that this reality also has a distinct structure for it is made up of
different levels of existence, and that our understanding of this reality
repeats,the structure of reality. That is our movement from one level 
of reality to another in our understanding progressively reveals the 
actual structure of reality. This can be seen in Polanyifs analysis 
of evolution and his argument that biology becomes ultra-biology in 
epistemology but can also be seen when he refers to the discovery of
a reality whose "possibility was there before".
As we have seen he argues that we move beyond the world that is 
immediately apparent to us by the process of indwelling. In the case of 
the scientist we would be moving beyond mere physical and chemical
appearances of phenomena in order to find a controlling factor. He would 
provide an interpretation of the phenomena, and this interpretation would 
be expected to reflect reality. It would provide a description of the 
controlling factor, and the scientist would become committed to his 
interpretation that it provided a correct description of reality. This 
interpretation would not be controlled by the phenomena, the lowest level, 
but guided by them and purport to be an explanation of the controlling 
factor which controlled them. A new interpretation would then arise 
guided by the original interpretation but attempting to provide an 
explanation of the factor which controlled the second level of reality 
which the original interpretation had revealed, and so on. Polanyi, in 
fact, believes that reality is inexhaustible so the process could go on 
indefinitely.
At the beginning of the process we could consider the reality 
that we had not yet understood as a world of unformulated possibilities, 
possibilities that could become factual, that is, recognised as actually 
existing. It could be argued that this notion of unformulated possibilities, 
or hidden reality as Polanyi prefers to call it, is a heuristic device 
used in order to increase our knowledge of the actual world. To a certain 
extend this is so for it is an argument that there is a reality to be 
revealed, and therefore there is sense in searching for it. It contains 
the notion that it cannot be deduced but discovered by a heuristic act, 
and Polanyi1 s term ’hidden reality* also suggests that it can be revealed 
when we find it. However, there does seem to be a difference between my 
term ’unformulated possibilities* and Polanyi*s term *hidden reality*.
His term suggests it will become part of the actual world, and indeed 
already is but it remains hidden, where my term suggests a set of 
possibilities that might become part of the actual world. It could be said
that within the unformulated possibilities there lies hidden reality.
However, my own phrase seems to stress to a greater degree the necessity
for choice, and also contains the idea that the possibilities we are
concerned with are essentially theories that may be given the value of
factual existence but cannot ever become concrete reality themselves as
they are beyond the world of appearances. In a sense my phrase refers
to our attempt to know reality Polanyi*s to reality itself. However,
Polanyi would nevertheless say a discovery reveals reality whereas I would
29be inclined to say that it provides an interpretation of reality. 
Possibilities then are interpretations about the world of appearances and 
hope to provide explanations of the controlling elements behind the world.
The world of possibilia then consists of possibilia that will 
never become formulated, formulated possibilia that will never be accepted 
as part of the actual world, that is they will never be given the value of 
factual existence, and possibilia that will', be considered as part of the 
actual world, that is they will be given the value of factual existence.
As far as the scientific community goes we would say that in the last case 
the possibilia, or hypothesis, becomes part of scientific knowledge, and 
will be recognised as representing part of the real world.
It is important to recognise that at this stage the possibilia
does not exist as a concrete entity because it is only a theory about the
real world and in any case could also represent a higher level of reality
than the world of appearances. It is a statement about the controlling
elements behind the phenomenal world. Karl Popper calls it tentative 
knowledge but we could really say that for the time being it had been given 
the value of factual existence. The use of such a phraseology makes it 
easier to appreciate the connection between scientific and moral possibilia.
are accepted by a moral community, amd similarly scientific values, 
or theories, are given the value of factual existence when they 
are accepted by the scientific community. Both are discovered 
by a responsible individual being led to a choice in the world of 
possibilia. The scientist puts his theory forward to the 
scientific community by proposing certain additions or modificat­
ions to present theory. His action lies in putting forward to 
the scientific community his theory and claiming that it is 
correct, although the community decides whether or not it will be 
accepted as part of scientific knowledge. A moral agent in 
acting on a moral value he believes is correct and therefore 
should be accepted by the moral community, is really’ asking the 
community to judge it. The community then decides whether or not 
it will accept the value exhibited in the action as part of the
moral code of the community.
Such an analysis may seem destructive of the distinction
between normative and scientific laws, In fact it is not but
what it does attempt to point out is the resemblance between the
gaining of knowledge in the material, or scientific, sphere, and
the gaining of knowledge in the moral sphere. Both forms of
knowledge are achieved by attempting to understand our experience.
Moral understanding is an attempt, from a special point of view,
to understand personal and social experiences by developing
interpretations about them. It formulates norms of conduct,
which if accepted by a group of people become part of the moral
values of that community. We could say that they are given the 
value of factual existence within that community. This does not
and cannot mean that they exist as tangible facts but they do 
exist as generally accepted notions of conduct within that
community. In the case of science the scientist formulates an
interpretation about facts. The interpretation is then put
accepted it becomes part of the scientific knowledge of the 
community. It is given the value of factual existence. Like­
wise this does not mean the theory is a tangible fact, for it 
cannot be. It does mean that for the time being it exists as 
a statement about the real world, a statement of our beliefs
as to how the real world works.
What then are th differences between moral law and
scientific law. Firstly we can say that the object of our 
attention is different. In the case of moralty we examine our 
internal experience and our relationship with other people from 
the moral point of view. In the case of science we look at our 
experience of the material world from a quantitative view.
Secondly the methodology is different. In the case of science 
we use a specialised methodology, we conduct experiments, formu­
late theories, and put them to the scientific community for 
acceptance. In the case of morality we formulate a concept of 
the moral law by considering an actions effect on other people.
We consider what our attitude would be if other people fellowed 
such a precept - the creation of the Kantian categorical imperat­
ive is an obvious example of a method for arriving at a moral
law - we then put it forward as a moral law and see whether the 
community will accept it as such.
There are apparently two other differences: (1) A scientific 
theory is predictive a moral rule is not. (2) A scientific 
theory is stating what the material world is a moral rule is 
stating what the social world ought to be like. But in fact 
these differences are not as obvious as they at first seem. A 
scientific theory is not always predictive as it can just be 
stating what is the case or rather what should be the case if the 
perfect situation existed. Where it is predictive it is stating 
that if certain conditions exist then such and such a happening 
will take place. It is attempting to provide an explanation 
about cause and effect in a quantitative way. It is really
stating that it all the conditions were pertect such
will happen. Generally we can say that under
perfect experimental conditions it will happen, or in the world of pure
theory it will happen but in the real world it should happen* The use
of probability alters the argument slightly, as it is a recognition of
incomplete predictability in the real world which has forced itself into
recognition in the theoretical world, because the scientist is trying
to explain the real world* We could also argue that in a social situation
where a moral rule is thought to apply a certain action ought to take
place, and in a perfectly moral world (a Kantian intelligible world) it
will happen* Only in the real world does ought apply. The distinction
between the application of ’is’ to facts and ’ought1 to moral actions
begins to break down. Although it can still be held that there is a
distinction between ought to happen and should happen: what when we state
such and such an action ought to happen we refer to the action of a
rational agent with a responsible choice but when we state that such and
such an event should take place in science we do not refer to an agent
with a responsible choice.
So far we are left with three clear distinctions: our intention,
the methodology, and the difference between a moral action and scientific 
event. There are two others, one refers to the nature of scientific 
theory as compared with a moral rule, the other refers to a difference 
between scientific and moral communities.
We have seen that a scientific theory is intended to represent
reality. In our analysis we have indicated that a theory often represents
a higher stage of reality which has control over a lower stage but whose
limits in its turn are limited by the lower stage. This controlling
element is independent of ourselves as it is part of reality and our theory
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merely represents it. A moral principle is derived by examining our
relationship to other people, and is then willed into existence by us.
The existence of morality then is entirely dependent on our own existence,
and so is scientific theory but the controlling factor which our theory 
attempts to explain exists independently to us. Once a moral principle 
is willed into existence it can control our actions only so long a.s we will 
it to control our actions - unless we fail to apply it correctly or an 
outside factor prevents our action - • In the case of the controlling 
element in reality the control will happen whatever we will.
It is worth stressing again that our scientific theory only 
represents the controlling element in reality, and as long as the theory 
appears to represent it adequately we give the theory the value of factual 
existence. We treat it as if it is a fact, or, in Polanyi1s terminology, 
revealed reality. This then is a fundamental difference between a moral 
law and a scientific law. As long as we will a moral law to control our 
actions it can but we cannot will a scientific law to control nature, and 
we cannot will a controlling element in nature to control nature as it 
is beyond our willing.
A difference also arises between the sort of community which 
controls science and the communities that control morality. Whereas 
scientific theory (science) exists in a tightly knit community morality 
does not. Scientific knowledge is really knowledge which has been 
accepted by the community of scientists as knowledge. A community which 
is made up of peers or near peers. The moral community is not of the 
same sort, and indeed it can be argued that there is no community of moral 
agents as such but a number of such communities*
It could be argued that a theological community is a moral
community but this would not be correct as it is not a community soley
concerned with establishing morality. A theological community like the
scientific .community would have a moral element in it, for instance,
there would be an obligation to reveal the truth about God, but its task
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would be far wider.
ledge it can be argued that, although we need to speak of 
communities of moral agents rather than the moral community, the 
internal structure of those communities will be similar to that 
of the scientific community.
A moral rule to be a moral rule would have to be accepted by 
more than oneself, and a claim to moral knowledge would have to 
be judged by at least one's own particular community. As in 
the scientific community a claim to universal knowledge can only 
be accepted if it is recognised by other people. Moral knowledge 
like scientific knowledge, cannot be purely subjective knowledge 
but must be public knowledge, or, rather, inter-personal know­
ledge. In Polanyifs terminology we would say that it was a 
knowledge that had reached the status of personal knowledge by 
being accepted by other people as universal knowledge. The 
attempt to universalise one's proposed action is there but there 
can be no certainty that one has successfully universalised until
other people agree that one has.
When we claim that a moral rule or action is right we are
claiming that it is also right for others. If our claim to have
committed a moral act is not accepted by others despite our
supporting reasons for the action then the action cannot be said
to be morally justifiable. It is not justifiable because either
we have failed to relate our action correctly to an accepted
principle of morality, or the principle we have followed is not
acceptable as a moral principle to others. Its claim to
universal validity is accepted by no one but ourselves. In such
a case we may not give up our claim to morality, indeed our
commitment to the principle will make it unlikely that we will
give it up lightly, but we may attempt to provide further
reasons why the principle we followed or the action we undertook 
was morally justifiable, and persuade other people to accept
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acting morally in undertaking the action or fallowing the principle, we 
will only be clisLiming the principle we are following is a moral principle.
To a certain extent we will be bound by the traditional morality 
of our own community and, indeed, will have internalised the moral norms 
of our own sub-community. Our moral code will therefore be similar 
to other members of our own sub-community but will probably not be exactly
the same as we may have interpreted norms differently, we may have
internalised norms from other sub-communities, we may have internalised 
certain norms which conflict with our own sub-community norms, and we 
may have added norms of our own. Our moral code will therefore be similar
to other members of our own sub-community but nevertheless our own*
And because it is our own we have accepted it and on reflection, if we so 
willed, rejected certain parts of it* We are therefore responsible for 
it and responsible to it: it is our own personal morality, at least,
it is our claim that its contents can be called a morality.
There is an obvious difficulty in such an analysis for, as we 
have seen there is no moral community in the sense that there is a scientific 
community. There are a number of sub-communities which have different 
codes of morality. Under the argument I have used I have to argue that 
a moral rule is only a moral rule if it is accepted by a particular moral 
sub-community, as a moral rule to be a moral rule that is part of moral 
knowledge must be accepted by somebody other than the claimant. As there 
is not a moral community as such but loose sub-communities with no clearly 
defined limits we claim it is a moral rule if one other persons accept it.
We may claim universal validity for it but it does not have to be universally 
accepted to reach the status of a moral rule. I cannot then have a 
personal morality unless it is accepted by others but only a claim to a 
personal morality.
morality must be accepted by more than one person. Let us
examine a theoretical situation.
A person claims the action he proposes is moral. That in
the particular circumstances he is operating in he is obeying 
a moral rule which he claims has universal validity, and there­
fore should be applied in all circumstances that are the same. 
His action will be judged by the moral sub-community of which 
he is a member for its consistency, for instance, whether or not 
it is consistent with the principle he claims he is following. 
For its applicability, that is whether or not the principle he 
is applying is the right one to apply in the circumstances.
For its justifiability, whether or not the principle is itself 
justified in terms of the moral code of the sub-community. If 
all these requirements are met satisfactorily then the action 
will be accepted as a moral action. If a requirement is not 
met then different possibilities emerge. If he fails to meet 
the requirement of consistency, that is his proposed action is :u 
not consistent with the principle he claims to be following, 
then either his claim is fraudulent or mistaken. If he under­
took the action and his claim was fraudulent he would be acting 
immorally but if his claim was mistaken he would not be acting 
immorally. However, neither would his action be moral but 
perhaps he could be persuaded to see that he was mistaken, and 
that the action was not in accordance with the principle he 
claimed he was following. If the requirement of applicability 
was not met it would mean that the principle either had no 
application to the circumstances, or that the principle used 
was not ranked in accordance with a heirarchy of principles that 
was acceptable to the sub-community - that, although 
it could be .considered in examining the
circumstances,other principles overruled it-. The proposed 
course of action in this case could not be immoral because 
in applying the requirement of applicability the assumption 
is already being made that such a principle is acceptable 
to the community. It could not,however, be moral. Again as 
a member of the sub-community it should be possible to pers­
uade him of his mistake. The final requirement.of justifiab­
ility requires the principle, as a principle to be acceptable 
to the sub-community. A justification would, consist of showing 
that the principle was part of the moral knowledge of the 
sub-community,or that it should be accepted as part of the 
moral knowledge of the sub-community. A complete justification 
would show that the principle used was acceptable to the sub­
community, that it was the right one to apply in the circum­
stances, and that the proposed action was consist'eht with the 
principle.
In practice the situation is far more complicated. A sub- 
community may be very small, and it may be inter-locked with 
other sub-communities. A moral sub-community may have a core 
of morality in common with other sub-communities but certain 
principles which are peculiar to itself. The case may arise 
where a person may belong to more than one sub-community, and 
at times the principles of these sub-communities may conflict. . 
In such a case, according to our analysis, we would have to 
say that an action based on such conflicting principles would 
be immoral for one such sub-community but moral for another, 
from a more general point of vie\^ we would say his action 
was moral if it was acceptable to one of the sub-communities 
to which he belonged.
It does seem possible that to a certain extent, we can 
overcome such complications by bringing the sub-communities 
together. Society as a whole will be made up of a seiies 
of sub-communities, and we can expect there to be a large 
number of commonly held moral principles: a sort of equilibrium 
range of principles.- The peripheral principles held by 
different sub- communities but not held, by all will be 
continually put forward for common acceptance , as a 
moral principle always has a claim to universal
validity0 And, as in the intellectual communities we have considered,
there will be a body of knowledge by which to judge these claims: a body
of commonly held values and principles with which innovations will have 
to show consistency*
However, it is not possible to take the comparison vjith intellectual 
communities much further* If we take the moral community to include all 
sub-communities, and develop a notion of an equilibrium core of values and 
principles then we have included the whole of society. In this case, 
unlike intellectual communities, its membership is not restricted to 
people with certain formal attainments. Everybody will be a member of 
such a moral community. Nevertheless it can be argued that it is a 
community for it has a certain informal decision procedure by way of a 
loose consensus, and it has sanctions at its command as it can criticise, 
and even ostracise. What It cannot do is to force members outside its 
own limits for it contains everyone. It is perhaps possible for a person 
to be shoved out of the smaller sub-comrau:J.ties but he cannot be shoved 
out of the wider community. Even so the essential similarity with the 
other communities we have considered is the commitment of the knower to 
his belief, and that moral knowledge is decided on by the inter-personal 
knowledge of the community or sub-communities, and that it is not a 
purely personal belief. In fact this argument is even stronger than with 
the scientific community, for instance, with science we can argue that 
knowledge can be knowledge if it is in accordance with reality whatever the 
scientific community may say - this is true but we have no means of knowing 
that it is knowledge, and what we do know suggests that it is not - we 
cannot do the same with morality. The reason for this is that we bring 
moral principles into existence, and, although we can argue that the 
criterion of there validity is their universiflability, we must also admit
that there must be some test of their universifiability* There are only 
two alternatives at this point* Either we state that our own decision 
decides on the universal validity of a principle, that our belief therefore 
provides a sufficient degree of certainty, or that the agreement of our 
fellow beings is necessary to provide a sufficient degree of certainty*
It is the argument of the theory of inter-personal knowledge that the 
consensus of a community provides a greater degree of certainty than the 
belief of an individual member, and therefore provides a greater justificat­
ion for a claim to knowledge than an individual belief no matter how certain*
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A Justification of Inter-Personal Knowledge
In examining the claim of personal knowledge to be classed as
knowledge we come up against a fundamental difficulty. Personal knowledge
occurs after the process of indwelling, and is a belief for which we
claim universal validity. Yet can this be called knowledge? In a case
where a claim to personal knowledge is rejected by the scientific community
to claim that we still have knowledge in spite of this rejection by the
33acknowledged authorities is hard to justify. Yet it is possible to 
argue that if in fact the claim we put forward was a correct interpretation 
of reality - we revealed correctly an aspect of reality - and this was 
rejected by the community then all along we could say we had knowledge.
This is so but it must be remembered that we can never be absolutely certain 
that what we believe is a correct statement about reality. In practice 
the theory*s accexotance by the community is used as a criterion of truth, 
and as our knowledge cannot be certain then this is a more reasonable 
criterion than the decision of one man. It would be introducing an arbitrary 
element to give an individual the power to decide what is knowledge.
However, such an analysis can be challenged on the grounds that 
not only the decision of an individual will be arbitrary but so would the 
decision of the scientific community. The arguments could be developed 
by pointing out that a theory that at one time could be accexoted as knowledge 
at another time could be considered as false. This applies not only to 
a theory itself but to the methodology, and procedures of science. The 
acceptance cf theories and methodology can change over a period of time.
They are therefore unstable and are always liable to be rejected by the 
scientific community. As this is the case any appeal to the consensus 
of opinion within the scientific community, and the acceptance of the
authority of mature . scientists', tb judge- a theory Vs /validity,, 
must be considered on arbitrary practice. •
An attempt can be made to meet these objections or four 
grounds. Xd).'There is no other more reasonable ■ method of 
deciding' on the validity of a theory. There, are only two poss­
ible' alternatives' for judging a theory: either the, individual 
judges his own theory and declares that it is scientific 
knowledge, or the theory id judged by the authorities on the 
subject, and they will judge it by reference to' the system 1: 
of ideas which have already been accepted by the community. '•
The first alternative • would be so . arbitrary that we ■ can consi der 
it as a non-starter,, and even if we agreed that the'second 
alternative was arbitrary, it would be far less arbitral y .• 
than, leaving the decision to the individual scientist. (2) lb 
does. seem to be the case that no single theory in the system/';- 
of science is certain of maintaining its - position .-within the , 
system. But this does not mean that every item of knowledge ,>. 
within the system is likely to lose its place. There is a 
fairly stable body of knowledge that remarie stable, and 
although it is the case that certain items of. knowledge may ■ 
lose their place the majority of them -will net. for instance, 
it is unlikely that a securely established theory will lose 
its place, and it will only lose its place after a series 
of failures and not by one dramatic refutation, liven then ‘.it 
is likely to remain for restricted use. A -theory gradually 
slides out cf the system of science and is not suddenly 
hurled out. (y) The decision of ..the community, is nob really 
arbitrary as it is port of a task which has continued over 
the centuries with a good deal of continuity in method. There 
is also continuity in theory, hew theories are developed from •. 
the old sometimes by drawing out intimations which alrady 
exist within.the system of ideas . A theory is rarely 
blatantly false but only inadequate , and the discovery of 
an inadequacy often leads the way to new discoveries in attempts
to resolve the inadequacy. In other words we can say that 
the system is on the whole stable, and is not subject to 
constant change in all its aspects because every item of ' ■ 
knowledge does not change at the same time. ^4) The 
process of judging a theory by communal knowledge cannot 
be considered arbitrary as.it is quite rational to judge 
a claim to knowledge by knowledge we already nossess, and 
indeed we cannot do anything1: else.
These four grounds to justify the non arbitrary nature 
of a decision of the scientific community do seem to 
succeed in their task. However, they have failed to indicate 
that whereas the decision of the scientific community is 
non arbitrary the decision of the individual is ‘arbitrary.
This in fact cannot be shown for as it .is quite rati one] 
for the scientific community to judge a claim to knowledge 
by knowledge they already possess so it is : rational for an 
individual to do the same. An individual in judging the 
truth, of his own theory will compare it with knowledge he 
already possesses as a member of the scientific ..community.
And a large part of this knowledge will in.any case be 
acceptable to the community. However, we ale dealing with '¥•
a claim to universiflability, and it is the recognition k
of human fallibility in dealing with such a claim that is 
a major reason for the formation of the scientific community. . 
It is a belief that a claim is more likely to be universili able 
or the truth if other people accept it. This is so although 
acceptance cannot give us certainty in its truth, although 
it may be able to provide us with a greater feeling of 
confidence in its truth. The argument gets very near to 
the statement that majority agreement is a criterion of 
truth.. Polanyi avoids this by the use of such words as 
'consensus' and 'general will' but even so we cannot really 
say that a general feeling of agreement is a criterion of 
truth, ‘.-/hat we can say is that in practice general agreement 
is used as a criterion to decide whether or not a theory 
should be given the status of truth.
We have failed then to prove the non arbitrary nature of the 
decision of the scientific community as compared with the arbitrary nature 
of an individual decision* Both can be considered rational decisions, 
although the balance of the argument seems to favour a communal decision 
as we are dealing with a fallible human being fs universal claim,, ; We have 
arrived at the point where it must be admitted that as we cannot have a 
direct revelation of the truth the claim of both personal and inter­
personal knowledge to achieve the truth has a certain degree of justificat­
ion, as both can provide reasonable claims* Yet it can still be argued 
that in the case of science the decision of the scientific community is 
far more reasonable, such an argument refers back to the structure and 
nature of the community. If we have originally agreed that scientific 
knowledge can only develop within the scientific community controlled by 
the joint authority of its members, and have become a member of that 
community then it is irrational - a contradiction - to argue that an 
individual member can decide on the truth of a discovery* He cannot 
decide himself that his theory should be taken into the body of science*
This does not mean a scientist has to give up his claim to knowledge 
if it is rejected by the community. A favourable decision by the community 
is necessary for a theory to be counted as part of knowledge, for it to 
be given the status of knowledge for the time being, but it is not a 
sufficient indication of knowledge. We have seen that the knowledge of 
the community is tentative and may change, and as this is the case an 
adverse decision may be reversed, so therefore a scientist is justified in 
pressing his own claim to knowledge by producing more evidence and persuading 
others of its truth.
As other intellectual communities possess a system of ideas, judge 
claims of knowledge by reference to their system, and admit the claim of
their community to accredit knowledge then the same arguments can be used 
with reference to them. The argument is not so apparent when we apply 
it to a non intellectual community, for instance, the moral community.
However, the argument for inter-personal knowledge is again slightly 
stronger than an argument for personal knowledge as we are still dealing 
with a universal claim. Thisisparticularly so when we consider the 
complications of practical morality. Yet we cannot say that it is 
irrational to claim an action is moral in spite of everyone else*s 
rejection of it, as we have accepted the authority of a moral community.
We certainly have not explicitly accepted such authority, although there is 
a good deal of experantial evidence which suggests that we do tacitly 
accept membership of a moral community, and do take note of its reactions
to our claims to morality. At any rate in our analysis of the moral
community and sub-communities we have attempted to show how the concept 
of inter-personal knowledge can be applied to them. And indeed if we 
strictly applied the concept of personal knowledge without balancing it 
against a concept of inter-personal knowledge we could not really write of 
the existence of a community.
We have argued that the moral community has an equilibrium range of 
morality, that is a hard core of commonly held beliefs and values or moral 
knowledge that can change over a period of time but is fairly stable 
However, in a period of rapidly changing morality, where the outer layers 
of the core are in a state of flux, the decisions will certainly be more 
arbitrary than the intellectual communities we have examined. As the core
gets smaller the possibility of a consensus or common opinion arising gets
less, and there is an increased liklihood of the proliferation of moral 
sub-communities. Yet as this can also happen in certain intellectual 
communities, for instance, in the field of theology this does not make the 
moral community unique. I have explained this sort ofhappeni&grdln ibie chu
>SI
with■ reference to-' the arialy^s I have used:
"Polanyi’s model of a community bound together by faith can
quite well be used as a model of ohurch history: the unitary
church, the breakaway movement, further breakaway movements,
and even breakaways from the break aways. Yet, as church
history continues and doctrine is revised and altered, there
again appears the possibility than an earlier breakaway movement
can be accepted once more into the main movement, since the
doctrine of the breakaway movement may now be acceptable to the 
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mother church.”
However, as the structure of the moral community is and moral sub­
communities are informal it is theoretically much easier for a new 
consensus to arise when a period of rapid change ends, whereas in the 
case of the church there are further problems:
"Although a breakaway church may have a doctrine which has
become acceptable to the mother church, it may well have formed
a structure and hierarchy of its own. It may well be
psychologically opposed to the mother church because of the
traumatic experience of the original breakaway and the attempts
36to bring it to heel” .
37In the case of the moral community this would not be so for the original
conflict would not have been institutionalised into the communityfs
structure.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Political Community
Our final problem is to see how Polanyi's system of thought can be 
used to provide a reasonable interpretation of the wider political 
community. Quite clearly there are certain essential differences between 
the structure of the scientific community and the political community, 
although there are also similarities.
The scientific community has a restricted membership as it 
restricted to those people who have passed through a master/apprenticeship 
relationship, and have eventually gained their own contact with reality.
These mature scientists share authority within the community, and taken 
together form the decision procedure of the community. In the wider 
political sphere there is no restriction on membership as virtually 
everyone within a particular geographical area is a member of that community. 
Not everyone shares authority and not everyone participates in the 
decision procedure. It is true that in certain cases it is possible for
a person to be thrown out of the political community, for they can be 
banished or exiled, but on the whole a political community is stuck with 
the members it has got. It cannot get rid of a person who continually 
disobeys the rules, and it cannot get rid of the intellectually inferior.
This is not the case with the scientific community for as we have seen it 
can get rid of a person who continually disobeys the rules merely by no 
longer recognising them as mature scientists. As their membership and 
authority within the community is based on this recognition a withdraw! 
of it destroys their authority, and prevents them from influencing the 
decisions of the community.
Polanyi approaches the political community in the same way as he 
has approached other communities by using the concept of personal knowledge 
controlled by inter-personal knowledge. A person can be free to choose 
the action he wishes but his choice will be restricted by traditional 
concepts of freedom of choice.
In developing his argument he makes the assumption that man will 
search for the truth. Indeed that man has an obligation to search for 
the truth. He derives this assumption from his evolutionary theory that 
man has within himself an 'active force1 which is striving for achievement, 
and an eventual consummation with reality. Yet our experience tells us 
that man often is not concerned with the truth, and may be far more 
concerned with searching for a life of pleasure or idleness. All that 
Polanyi can argue is that if such an active force or an active centre 
exists then man should have a tendency to search for the truth. A further 
complication arises as we can never be certain that we have gained the 
truth but only believe that we have, and this belief may not be shared by 
others. We have seen that in the intellectual sphere communities are 
developed in the hope that communal beliefs will prove more certain than 
individual beliefs, and that in the non intellectual sphere communities can 
be said to exist also, and that individual beliefs will be judged in both 
cases by inter-personal knowledge. However, the paths to the truth are 
numerous and not certain so much leeway has to be given to individual 
initiative. In this way a large degree of freedom is necessary as it 
increases the liklihood that the truth will be obtained but it must be 
controlled freedom or anarchy will reign. It is therefore restricted by 
the inter-personal knowledge of the community.
This again brings us to the problem we met in the previous chapter as 
to why communal knowledge should provide a greater degree of certainty than
personal knowledge if the truth cannot be known. We have seen that if
we generally agree on certain things we develop a stronger feeling of its
certainty. We have more confidence in it. The development of communal
knowledge as a structure we can build on also can provide us with a feeling
of progress, combined with continuity. The wish for certainty can be
ameliorated by the seemingly certain structure of stable ideas contained
in the tradition, and can be used as a base to reach out into the unknown.
Speculation is controlled by tradition and in this way we cpn-seemingly
prevent our knowledge from becoming arbitrary and chaotic. The conclusion
must be that communal knowledge will tend to provide a greater degree of
psychological certainty and therefore that which we call knowledge will
usually progress under its control.
For Polanyi then a free society will be one which fosters a search
for the truth, and that recognises that an individual has an obligation
to do so. He states:
"The free society - of which a free scientific community naturally 
forms a part - can be defended only by expressly recognising the 
characteristic beliefs which are held in common by such a society 
and professing that these beliefs are true. The principal belief - 
or should I rather say the main truth - underlying a free society, 
is that man is amenable to reason and susceptible to the claims of 
his conscience. By reason are meant hex*e such things as the 
ordinary practice of objectivity in establishing facts and fairness 
in passing judgments in individual cases. The citizens of a free 
society believe that by such methods they will be able to resolve 
jointly - to the sufficient satisfaction of all - whatever dissension 
may exist among them today or may arise in the future. They see 
an inexhaustible scope for the better adjustment of social 
institutions and are resolved to achieve this peacefully by agreement."
It can be seen that Polanyi is using a number of traditional liberal
arguments to support his claim to freedom and strengthening them by his
evolutionary theory* His liberal argument, develops as follows. Man,..who
is a rational agent, has an obligation to himself to search for the truth,
and if we fail to allow him to do so by not giving him freedom we are
failing to treat him as a rational agent and are not recognising the
2claims of his conscience to control him in this search. At this point 
Polanyi moves away from strict liberalism for if we are not to have 
intellectual anarchy man must work within a community. He should be free 
to pursue the truth in his own way but if his claim to the truth is to be 
accepted as such by others the community must make an affirmative decision* 
This does not mean an individual then has to give up his claim to the truth 
as this would be telling him to disobey his own conscience but that he 
should accept the community’s right to make the decision. In the community 
as a whole we can say that rational man should undertake reasonable actions 
but if an action is to be reasonable it must appear to be reasonable to 
to others. In a free society man will undertake free reasonable actions 
©ntrolled by a traditional concept as to what constitutes a reasonable 
action.
However, we have seen that experience tells us that not all man are 
bound by their conscience, are reasonable, or search for the truth.
There may be a communal inclination to do so (really a species inclination 
to do so) but not everyone will have such an inclination. But such people 
cannot be forced out of a political community and it may be that the normal 
pressures of tradition are not successful in achieving compliance. In such 
a case the tradition of inter-personal knowledge will have to•be backed by 
the law and ultimately by force. Again this does not mean a person who 
is following his conscience will be forced to disobey his conscience. He 
can continue to follow the usual methods of dissent as long as he does not 
go outside the wide framework of the law. V/e can say then that the law will
3reflect the tradition, shared values, or what we call the inter-personal
knowledge of the community«
Polanyi in writing of the free society states:
"The ideal of a free society is in the first place to be a good 
society; a body of men who respect the truth, desire justice and 
love their fellows* It is only because these aspirations coincide 
with the claims of our own conscience, that the institutions which 
secure their pursuit are recognised by us as safeguards of our freedom* 
It is misleading to describe a society thus constituted, which is an 
instrument of our consciences, as established for the sake of our 
individual selves; for it protects our consciences from our own greed, 
ambition, etc* Morally, men have to live by what they sacrifice 
to their conscience; therefore the citizen of a free society, much 
of whose moral life is organised through his civic contacts, largely 
depends on society for his moral existence* Fis social responsibilit­
ies give him occasion to a moral life from which men not living in 
freedom are debarred* That is why the free society is a true end
in itself, which may rightly demand the service of its members in
Zj.
upholding its institutions and defending them*"
As in such a society the laws and institutions will reflect the consciences
of its members, their shared values, there can be no conflict between the
state and the individual for the, "the institutions which secure their
pursuit are recognised by us as safeguards of our freedom*" The law of
such a society bring to our attention obligations which we have forgotten,
"it protects our consciences from our own greed." The laws as they are
derived from our consciences supplement its attempt to control any failure
5
to recognise our obligations.
The free society then becomes the just and moral society where excesses 
in individual initiative are controlled by the operation of the communityfs 
conscience through the law and through the process of socialisation* The
g
law becomes not opposed to monfs morality, as some liberals suggest, 
but derived from it, and acts to remind us of, and to stimulate our
obligations. Polanyi is in fact putting forward the argument for 
constitutional freedom with the proviso that the law and the institutions 
should mirror the shared values of the community.
He is also introducing a specific theory of political obligation
with the statement, "It is only because these aspirations coincide with
the claims of our own conscience, that the institutions which secure
their pursuit are recognised by us as safeguards of our freedom." The
ideal society for Polanyi is where individuals and intellectual communities
recognise their task of searching for the truth, and where the political
institutions reflect this intention, and allow its free pursuit under the
control of communal traditions. Yet only rarely does such a society
exist. It is ideal because it coincides with the claim of our own
consciences at the peak of their development. In other words the
institutional structure will reflect communal shared values, and if it
7
does not reflect these values then we have no political obligation to 
support it. However even if the ideal is not achieved we may still have 
an obligation to support the political institutions if they reflect the 
shared values of the community. The obligation arises because the 
political system by mirroring the shared values achieves extrinsic value 
because on the whole it values the things we value. It allows us to
pursue the 1truths1 we believe in.
g
This also tells us when a political obligation can lapse. If laws 
are constantly being passed which we find repugnant. Laws that are 
opposed to our values then this can gradually build up until we realise 
that the political system is no longer providing the conditions necessary 
for the survival of our values. As its value was derived from allowing 
and mirroring the values we valued if it fails to do so then it can no
longer have any value for us. Ue therefore du not have a duuy to submit
/(>!
ourselves to it or obey it.
*
We can say that ah individual no longer has a political obligation
to a system when it no longer values the things he values0 This would
be an analogous situation to a scientist who found the scientific community
not only rejected M s  theory but rejected other tMngs he cherished, for
instance, his methodology, or the pursuit of the truth replacing it,
perhaps by the pursuit of utility0
Grounds for rebellion would arise not when an individual citizen but
the vast majority of citizens feit that the political system no longer
nurtured, or even provided a threat to the existence of there values.
Rebellion would be justified if the government blatantly rejected the
9shared values ot inter-personal knowledge of the community«
Similarly to my analysis of the moral community Polanyi believes that,
although it may not be possible for a community!s tradition - the communal
way of life - to become systematised in the way we find with intellectual
communities, it is possible for that tradition to show coherence. It
should therefore be possible to use it as a basis to judge a government
which rejects th® tradition, He states:
"A country in which questions of conscience are generally regarded 
as.real, and where people are on the whole prepared to admit them 
as legitimate motives and even to put up with considerable 
inconvenience or hardsMp caused by others acting on such motives - 
such a country is a free country.
These contacts with transcedent obligations may reach Mgh 
levels of creativity. They may inspire prophetic announcements 
or other great innovations. In some fields - as in science, in 
scholarship or the administration of the law - this will contribute 
to the development of an intellectual system. In this case we 
can observe a process of definite self-co-ordination. But all 
contacts with spiritual reality have a measure of coherence.
A free people among whom many are on the alert for calls on their
i VL
conscience, will show a spontaneous coherence of this kind. They
may feel that it comes from being rooted in the same national
tradition; but this tradition may well be merely a national variant
of a universal human tradition., For a similar coherence will be
found between different nations when each follows a. national
tradition of this type. They will form a community of free people,,
They may argue and quarrel yet will always settle each new difficulty
10in the end firmly rooted in the same transcendent ground.'1
It would seem then that it should be possible to use a tradition to
criticise governmental action and even to justify rebellion if a government
continually fails to act in accordance with the tradition. However,
such an act of rebellion can only be a very rare occurence. We have
seen that law is derived to a large extent from the core values or
fundamental traditions of the community. It has been developed
systematically within its own sub-community but even.so remains in contact 
«
with communal traditions. It is possible that as the tradition alters
i
the law itself will not alter to. the same degree. In-this way there -does 
arise the j)ossibility of conflict between the shared values of the community 
and the law. t If we use Polanyi. fs phraseology we can say that the law may 
not coincide with the conscience of the community - the communal General 
Will. More probable, however, is the situation I have considered when 
examining the judicial community where laws do not coincide with the 
existent system of law. As we have seen the reason why this can be so 
is that a law to be a law has to pass through the formal decision procedure, 
and if it does so it is a law even if it does not coincide with the 
existent system of law. The judiciary following its obligations should 
fight against such laws, and would be in a far better position to see the 
’illegality* of the laws than the general public. Yet if the judiciary 
did forsake its obligations or was overruled then it would be up to the 
public to reject the ’illegal1 laws, and the government that instigated
them on the grounds that they were not only inconsistent with what had 
been previously accepted as law but were opposed to the shared values 
of the community. They were inconsistent with the inter-personal 
knowledge of the judicial community and the inter-personal knowledge of 
the community as a whole. It would be difficult to justify such an 
action for the shared values of the community are not systematised although 
they are coherent. Nevertheless reference would have to be made to 
them to prove the ’illegality*of the new laws. ^
/G^
A Traditional Society
Polanyi is proposing a liberal society where the excesses of 
individual initiative are controlled by tradition and the law. An 
attempt, for instance, to extend the area of individual freedom will be 
controlled by the social pressures within one’s own sub-community, the 
community as a whole, and ultimately by the law. Initiatives can be 
allowed but only as far as they are able to gain acceptance. Polanyi 
states:
"Can we face the face that, no matter how liberal a free society may 
be, it is also profoundly conservative?
For this is the fact, The recognition granted in a free society
to the independent growth of science, art and morality, involves
a dedication of society to the fostering of a specific tradition
of thought transmitted and cultivated by a particular group of
authoritative specialists, perpetuating themselves by co-option.
To uphold the independence of thought implemented by such a society
is to subscribe to a kind of orthodoxy which, though it specifies
no fixed articles of faith, is virtually unassailable within the
limits imposed on the process of innovation by the cultural leadership
of a free society...... we must also face the fact that this
orthodoxy, and the cultural authorities which we respect, are backed
by the coercive powers of the state and financed by the beneficaries
12of office and property.”
Polanyi uses the word "tradition" as a word to cover not only 
specific systems of thought but less specific, for instance, the tradition 
of the moral community, and the political mode of behaviour in a community 
as well as the scientific or legal tradition. From a theoretical x^ oint 
of view it does seem possible to place the different modes of thought into 
communities or sub-communities exhibiting inter-personal knowledge and 
operating under the control of their members. The members of the 
different communities judge initiatives by the knowledge they already
possess, i.e., by traditional knowledge. Society tinder such an analysis 
becomes controlled by tradition, meaning the traditions of these 
communities. Although we can break down this concept of tradition into 
the traditions of the different sub-communities in the wider community 
this would not be entirely faithful to Polanyi’s philosophy for as we 
have seen tradition has a certain coherence. In fact it is possible to 
distinguish between three meanings of the word tradition: (l) The
tradition of a sub-community, for instance, the tradition of the community 
of scientists meaning not only science but the methods of science and the 
obligations of the scientists. (2) The joining together of all the 
traditions of the sub-communities into the communal tradition. (3) The 
core tradition of all the sub-communities, that is the tradition they have 
in common. Under Polanyi’s concept of the ideal society this would include 
the transcendental obligations to reality (the truth), the operation of 
individual initiative under the control of authority, the judgment of 
initiatives by inter-personal knowledge. Indeed it is the commonly held 
core values which gives coherence to the tradition.
Two questions seem important in considering the concept of a traditional 
society combined with the notion of a free society: Is it possible to
create a free society before the tradition of that society has sufficiently 
matured? And is it possible that a society that is not free can nevertheless 
be following tradition if we accept Polanyi’s notion of man searching for 
the truth?
Polanyi argues that it is not possible to create a free society unless
the tradition is one which allows the existence of such a society. In
writing of the French Revolution he states:
"In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries British 
public life developed a political art and a political doctrine. The 
art which embodied the exercise of public liberties was naturally
unspecifiable, the doctrines of political liberty spread from 
England in the eighteenth century to France and thence throughout 
the world, while the unspecifiable art of exercising public liberty, 
being communicable only by tradition, was not transmitted with it.
When the French Revolutionaries acted on this doctrine, which was 
meaningless without a knowledge of its application in practice,
13Burke opposed them by a traditionalist concept of a free societya"
Polanyi is arguing here that, although it may be possible to withdraw
certain elements within a tradition to make an ideology, the ideology
cannot be effectively applied in practice because "the unspecifiable art
of exercising public liberty, being communicable only by tradition was
not transmitted with it." He is using two arguments; the first is that
we cannot includs within an ideology the tacit part of a tradition as
this can only be understood by experience within a tradition. The second
is that it is really an impossible task to place an alien tradition or
knowledge into a community which already possesses its own inter-personal
knowledge. It is impossible because the new knowledge will not be
consistent with the old and will therefore be unacceptable. If a community
is to be a free community it will have to wait until its own tradition
allows the possibility of freedom.
The answer to the second question is now apparent. A society that
is not free may nevertheless still be following its own tradition, and
any attempt to create a free society is bound to fail unless it consists of
a gradual attempt to move such a society along the paths of freedom. It
must also be admitted that it is theoretically possible for a tradition to
move away from that of a free society. As for Polanyi a free society is
a society where man is best able to pursue the truth this would apparently
be a situation where man had forsaken his commitment to and search for the
truth, and had forsaken his evolutionary task. But as he points out,
"The widely extended network of mutual trust, on which the factual consensus
lA
of a free society depends is fragile." Although conversely it could be
margued that as we can never be absolutely certain that we have achieved 
the truth our belief in the capacity of freedom to provide the necessary 
conditions for its search may be mistaken.
There are obvious difficulties in such an analysis as the communities 
considered are not mutually exclusive* A member of an intellectual 
community will also be a member of a moral community and a political one, 
although probably not a member of another intellectual community. For 
this reason it is possible to envisage clashes between different traditions. 
For instance, a clash between the tradition of the scientific community 
and the political community. The search for the truth undertaken by the 
scientific community may clash with contents of a political ideology 
supported by the political community. The necessity for freedom in
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the pursuit of the truth may also challenge the structure of the state.
It may also be the case that the contents of the traditions of the different 
sub-communities are so much in conflict that very few core values emerge 
or that certain core values are overruled by powerfully supported 
peripheral values. In such a case it is extremely difficult for a 
communal tradition (under the third meaning of the word) to arise and 
we can say that there can be no coherence in the tradition and that there 
can be no community.
Polanyi avoids these possibilities in his ideal society by assuming 
that the political institutions will be derived from and support the same 
values as the intellectual communities, which will themselves be derived 
from the shared values of the members of the community as a whole. He 
also assumes that in any society there will be an inherent tendency for 
the structure of the state to mirror the shared values of the community 
as a whole. A revolution can never bring into being a new set of values 
but can only return the state to a position where it reflects the existing
shared values of the community. Revolutions if they are to be at all 
successful must aim at a return to the tradition which had been forsaken 
by the overthrown government.
The Community of Politicians
In this section when I refer to the community of politicians I mean
not only the elected politicians but public servants in general. People
whose work is specifically to serve the public interest.
An expansion of Polanyi’s theories into the sphere of politics brings
our a similarity between his work and the work of Michael Oakeshott,
although in many respects the similarity is only superficial for Polanyi’s
ontology and epistemology is very different from that of Oakeshott. Like
Oakeshott he denies the possibility of transplanting a tradition from one
society into another because at best the tradition transplanted can only
be an abridgement of the real tradition. It cannot, for instance, include
the experience of operating within the tradition. This leads us to
another similarity for a politician must be experienced in a particular
tradition in the same way, "that only a man who is already a scientist can
l6formulate a scientific hypothesis". Polanyi also seems to agree with
Oakeshott that politics is "the activity of attending to the general
arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice has brought 
17together". This means for Polanyi that politics provides the required 
framework for the operation of a free society.
Yet following our adaption of Polanyi’s concept of communities or 
sub-communities operating under the control of inter-personal knowledge 
we are led to argue that a community of politicians will exist with their 
own professional ethic and activity. The tradition that they will be 
specifically concerned with is that of their own sub-community but in the 
ideal situation this tradition will reflect the shared values or political 
traditions of the community as a whole. As it cannot be claimed that the 
community of politicians is concerned with an area of scholarship, as it
is not a strictly intellectual activity, its tradition will not be 
systeraatised, although it will be coherent. One of its functions will be
to see that the public institutions it controls and the political activity
\
it engages in reflects the changing traditions of the whole community.
Like Oakeshottian politicians they will be concerned with pursuing
intimations within their own sub-communal and communal traditions but their
task will be far more active than this. They should attempt at certain
times to lead the tradition, to reach out for new revelations of reality.
The reason Why this is the case is that the Polanyi politicians have an end
to aim for whereas the Okeshottian politicians have not. They sail
Ma boundless and bottomless sea; their is no harbour for shelter nor floor
18for anchorage, neither starting-place not appointed destination"• As
man for Polanyi is engaged in a process of evolution striving towards an
ultimate consummation then the task of the politicians must be to provide
the necessary conditions for the continuance of this striving within the
limits of the i>**evalent political tradition. But it must also be their
task to provide the community with a freer society in order that this
striving has a greater possibility of achievement.
Like the members of the other sub-communities we have considered the
politician is trying to understand an aspect of reality. He has an
obligation to the tradition of his own sub-community as well as a duty to
provide initiatives to indicate where the tradition should go. He has
then to use Polanyi’s terminology, an obligation to the reality that has
already been revealed as well as to the reality that has not yet been revealed.
This can be expressed in a more orthodox manner by saying that he has an
obligation to act in accordance with what he believes is in the public
interest. His claim will be checked not only the community of politicians
but by the wider political community which have a vested interest in the
19activities of politicians.
Although from a theoretical point of view the Polanyi type x>olitician 
has and end to aim for whereas the OakeshotiLan politician has not, in 
practice the distinction is not quite so clear. The paths to the final 
end are not known and are presumably numerous. The hope for the politician, 
as he pursues his intimations is that by following the tradition or at 
least by keeping within the bounds of the tradition he is keeping an ’even 
keel’ towards an unknown destination. The theoretical reason for the 
difference is not only grounded in Polanyi’s concept of the final end but 
that whereas Oakeshott argues that man can only continually turn back on 
his own thoughts and examine this activity, for Polanyi man is reaching 
out for a hidden reality. Whereas Oakeshott!s politician continually 
pursues intimations with a tradition - he can do nothing else - Polanyi’s 
politician will be active in providing initiatives beyond the tradition 
even though this activity will be controlled by the tradition. He has 
after all transcendent obligations.
Yet in considering the tasks of the politician can it be said that 
the sort of decision he makes can be compared with the scientist’s search 
for the truth? Can it be said that the politician is concerned with 
obtaining a politicial truth?
Politicial decisions like all decisions are choices amongst alternatives 
and it may be possible to call the best alternative a political truth.
Polanyi seems to accexot a similar argument when considering the scientific 
community. A scientist makes a choice between different possibilities, and 
is psychologically certain that the choice he makes is the truth. If the 
choice or decision is accepted by the scientific community it is considered 
the best available decision at that time. In other words for the time being 
it is given the status of truth. Of course their is a great difference in 
the development of a political decision, although it could be claimed, that
this difference is only one of degree. A politician may have little time
to indwell in a problem and so would not arrive at the feeling of certainty
which Polanyi claims is characteristic of the scientific discoverer, and
is essential for the theory of personal knowledge. This is partly in the
nature of political decision making where decisions are often made in a
short space of time and on inadequate data. Yet the politician is an
expert at making a decision quickly on inadequate data. He may be wrong
but because of his experience he is more likely to come to the right
decision than the inexperienced man.
Consider the case of a minister making a decision in the sphere of
industrial relations. He will go through the process of analysing and
examining different courses of action, as well as taking into account the
opinions of his colleagues and advisers. His decision, in a sense, may
not be his own, as the decision he would have liked to make on the merits 
20of the case may differ from the decision he does make when he takes into
account wider considerations. Nevertheless it will be a decision he has
arrived at after immersing himself in the problem of the case. His decision
will most probably be a compromise decision which arose out of the particular
circumstances he was operating in. After taking into account the attitude
of the employers, the unions, his colleagues and advisers, and of the
economic situation his decision will, hopefully, be the best one in the
circumstances. It is the decision his political expertise and indwelling
in the problem led him to but not one to which he is necessarily committed.
It is a decision made on the emergence of a compromise. He has made a
decision that he is not entirely keen on for the simple reason that a
decision has to be made, and he also has to take responsibility for it.
21An entirely different situation to a scientist making a discovery.
It is part of a politician’s task to look for a compromise solution,
a solution which all sides will accept in a dispute. His task is to try
22and lead the disputants to a compromise that will, as far as possible, 
further the public interest. Of course it is open to him to resign if 
he is forced into a position where he believes he cannot uphold that 
interest. A position where he is forced to make a decision which goes 
against his political conscience. A decision which if made would break 
his obligation to serve the public interest.
The decision then can only extremely euphemistically be called a 
political ’truth* but is a practical attempt to serve the public interest. 
And by the public interest in this sense we mean to uphold certain principle 
and values, for instance, those of justice and fair play which are inherent 
in the tradition of the political community, and at the same time prevent 
the development of conflict situations which would harm the community.
Yet although it appears the politicians task is a practical activity 
where decisions can only euphemistically be called the truth this is only 
part of his task. He has the function, in what we can call the 
constitutional sphere, to recognise and expand the principles and values 
inherent in the tradition, and in this sphere his task is similar to the 
task of the members of the other communities we have considered. The 
constitutional sphere is the theoretical sphere or sphere of pure politics, 
and it is here that we can give inter-personal knowledge the status of 
truth, and say that the politician is concerned with the apprehension of 
political truths. In its two-fold activity the community a _■ t is not 
only concerned with the development of principles but the application of 
them* The politicians task then can be characterised as the apprehension 
and expansion of the principles inherent in the political tradition, and 
the application of these principles to the field of everyday politics.
Although we can claim that this analysis is consistent with Polanyi!s 
general position it can be questioned whether we can in fact write of a 
community of politicians, or consider that in such a community a situation 
of inter-personal knowledge exists for if it does exist then there must be 
a coherent and fairly stable body of ideas which can be used to judge 
innovations.
It does seem that in the case of Britain we can talk of a common
political tradition* This is seen for instance, by the consensus expressed
in the Beveridge report where there was general agreement that governments
should take action to prevent poverty and unemployment• Polanyi argues
when examining the possibility of consensus:
"It might be argued that the passing of new laws is rarely unanimous,
and also that in society at large civic values are not universally
shared in the way in which scientific values or eren artistic values
are. But the difference is only superficial: the clash of contending
opinions is perhaps more marked in civic matters, but even so it is
restricted to contemporary affairs. Pew of the innumerable social
reforms car'ried out in Britain during the past lfjO years would be
23repudiated today by an important minority."
It is the commitment to the core values or traditions of a society that
prevents it*s destruction when contemporary clashes of immediate policy
seem unsurmountable. In Polanyirs ideal society so long as their remains
the commitment to the values of a free society then a failure to achieve
unanimous agreement over a particular matter is unimportant. The
continuance of a free society is of much greater importance than the outcome
2kof single disputes.
Conversely, if it can be shown that there are no shared values or 
coherent political tradition, then a situation of inter-personal knowledge 
cannot exist, and there can be no community, even though there may exist 
a state of structures designating a geographical area as such a community.
IV
Politican Education
In examining the progress of a potential scientist to maturity who 
shared authority in the community of scientists we saw that he had to pass 
through a period of apprenticeship. Only after he had made his own contact 
with reality was he able to move beyond this apprenticeship and become an 
independent scientist. Ihe same argument can be used with reference to 
a politician. He needs to serve an apprenticeship before becoming a 
fully fledged politician. Ey watching his master and by following his 
example he unconsciously picks up the techniques of the art of politics, 
and techniques that may not be explicitly known by the master himself.
By submitting himself to an authority he eventually becomes competent enought 
■to become an authority himself. He can be taught rules of procedure, 
and methods of approaching problems but can only become sufficiently adept 
at the political art when he uses them in actual situations. In other 
words by experiencing real politics he can develop a tacit knowledge about 
politics, and only when he has developed this can he be considered a 
competent politician.
Polanyi argues that, "Education is latent knowledge of which we are
aware subsidiarily in our sense of intellectual power based on this 
25
knowledge". He means by this that if we are educated we will achieve 
a feeling of mastery over the subject with which we are concerned. He 
states:
"We are clearly aware of the extent and special character of our
knowledge, even though focally aware of hardly any of its innumerable
items. Of these particulars we are aware only in terms of our
26mastery of the subject of which they form a part".
He is arguing that we are aware of our mastery over the subject matter of 
our enquiry but we are unable to specify what this mastery entails as it
contains a large degree of knowledge of which we' are -onl^  subsidiarily-aware0
For instance, a master cricketer can say which stroke should be used and
describe the technicalities of the stroke, but he cannot soy when and how
to employ the stroke except in vague terms about the right ball, the right
height, and the right timing. When to use the stroke and how to use it
effectively can hopefully only be learned by studying the master in practice,
and by one fs personal experience.
In Polanyi1 s sense then to be educated means to have the ability to
control one!s subject. In the intellectual sphere it means to have
developed the conceptual power to recognise not only instances of things
we know but new instances of things we know and fit them into our framework
of knowledge. Polanyi states:
"(The) function of our conceptual framework is akin to that of our 
perceptive framework, which enables us to recognise ever* new things 
as satisfying to them. It appears likewise akin to the power of 
practical skills, ever keyed up to meet new situations. We may 
comprise this whole set up of faculties - our conceptions and skills, 
our perceptive framework and our drives - in one comprehensive power of 
anticipation". ^
He goes on to arguo that it is the mark of the educated mind to constantly
add to its conceptual framework by assimilating new experiences. He states:
"Thus our sense of possessing intellectual control over a range of
things, always combines an anticipation of meeting certain things of
this kind which will be novel in some unspecifiable respects, with
a reliance on ourselves to interpret them successfully by appropriately
28modifying our framework of anticipations".
The aim of political education then like all education is to build 
up a knowledge of the subject matter and to become adept at applying it 
in new situations. This knowledge of politics will be to a large extent 
a subsidiary or tacit knowledge of which the politician knows he possesses 
but which he cannot specify. This knowledge will provide a framework
for him to approach new problems, to attempt to understand and provide 
a solution for them.
The politician is immersed in the political tradition of his 
community and has built up his own concept of that tradition, as well as 
his own method or style of coping with problems. A political decision 
then is derived from a politicians conceptual framework as it arises 
because of his attempt to cope with a new problem by comprehending it 
through his conceptual framework. At the same time it arises out of the 
political tradition of inter-personal knowledge of the community of 
politicians® This is because the individual politicianfs conceptual 
framework has arisen because of his experience of and practice in that 
tradition. It will also be checked by other politicians within that 
tradition, and also, as we have seen, by the general public®
We have argued so far that a politican like the scientist will learn
his task first by imitating a master, or rather he will learn through
experiencing his work under the guidance of a master, until he is able to
29 ybecome an established politician on his own account. ' The politician
will be versed in the community of politicians style of politics and
political tradition, as well as that of the community as a whole. However
the political tradition of the society Polanyi is mainly concerned with
is that of a free society, and in a free society politicians are not
entirely entrusted with the preservation of that freedom as their failure
to follow their obligation to the values of a free society concerns not
only themselves but everyone within that society. Where immoral scientists
tend to destroy the scientific community immoral politicians destroy not
only people trust in the community of politicians but can destroy the
feedom of the whole community. It is for this reason that it can be
argued that all members of the wider community should be educated in the
30values of a free society.
Yet if we accept the notion of tacit learning then we can expect
that people by merely living in a free society will learn the values of
that society and their practical application. But a free society has
been achieved only after a certain stage of the communal tradition has
been reached. Society need not stay at the point where freedom was
achieved but can continue in other directions. Freedom is not a strong
plant and needs to be protected and nurtured. If we believe that freedom
is most conducive to the development of man in his intellectual and
evolutionary task, as Polanyi does, then it would seem necessary that
this should be spelled out. That the members of a free society should
31be systematically taught "the ways of thinking, speaking, and judging"
that are followed in a free society.
However, we have seen that the politician’s method of going about
things is a reflection of the political tradition in the community as a
whole. The politician’s values are derived from the milieu in which he
was brought up. The task of the politician is to provide, or rather
preserve, the framework of a free society by drawing out the intimations
within that tradition but also to attempt actively to expand it. In
other words part of his task is to put a free society on a firmer footing.
It does seem possible to do this by educating all members of the community
in the values of a free society but Polanyi continually argues against
indoctrination. Is it possible that we can educate the members of a
32society with such values without indoctrination?
Throughout his works Polanyi has argued that education in a free
society does not subordinate intellectual activity to the dictates of a 
central authority but allows it to develop under the control of the 
different disciplines. Within these disciplines there exists an obligation 
to serve the truth. Indeed the core tradition of all the sub-communities 
considered is this obligation to serve the truth and the political tradition 
will also contain such an obligation. The political framework in a free 
society will reflect such a tradition it will not create it. Polanyi 
states:
"From these institutions we can pass on to the ideal of popular
government by extending their principle to the cultivation of civic
thought..••♦••If therefore opinion concerning civic matters is allowed
to take shape by the same principles which effectively sustain the
freedom of individual thought, civic thought will also grow freely
and the power wielded by it will be the power of free thought. This
33is what would happen in an ideal free society."
In other words the constitution of a free society will reflect the shared 
values of the community, and the state will become instrumental in serving 
such values.
The role of the state in such a society therefore becomes clear. It 
is to provide the conditions necessary for the development of these values 
by preventing political indoctrination and by fostering the development 
of the numerous intellectual disciplines controlled by their own. authority.
In political education its role is negative as it is to prevent indoctrinat­
ion by the inculcation of ideologies, and in doing so to allow the imbibing 
of the prevailing tradition by experience. By fostering love of truth, 
respect of intellectual excellence, and by fostering the standards and 
values of the intellectual communities education will, be providing the pupils 
with the necessary learning for a free society, as for Polanyi an ideal 
free society will be a reflection of such values. On the other hand if 
politicians directly tried to inculcate these values by state action they 
would fail because they themselves would be making an abridgement of the 
tradition. They would be creating an ideology that would itself be a 
pale image of the living tradition of the community in its development.
This does not give an entirely passive role to the politician in the 
sphere of education for much activity would be needed if the required 
educational aims where' to be caintained. It is very easy for an educational 
system to be turned towards a concentration on vocations rather than maintain­
ing its concern for the truth. Material ends are far more concrete than 
transcendental ideals. But it is Polanyi’s claim that it is these
transcendental ideals that a free society must follow or it will destroy 
itself.
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NOTES CHAPTER /EVEN
Logic of Liberty, op. cit. p. 29*.
J.S. Mill also has this concept of"a free moral man who will search 
for the truth.
This is not always the case, for instance, a law which states we 
should drive on the left hand side of the road has no connection with 
morality but is nevertheless a necessary law*
Logic of Liberty, op. cit* p. 30®
J.D. Mabbott, The State and the Citizen, London, 1938 uses a similar 
argument.
For instance, T.H. Green, although his ideal society, like Polanyi*s, 
is a society where laws will reflect the consciences of its members.
I use the term ’political obligation’ rather than ’moral obligation’ 
partly because when we write of the institutional structure and the 
actions of politicians we are writing about the political sphere, 
and portly because the term ’shared values’ refers to rather more 
than moral values. It includes for instance, the traditional way 
of going about things in the political sphere.
See appendix for a further consideration of political obligation.
As far as the analogy with the scientific community goes this would 
be a situation where the vast body of scientists recognised that the 
scientific community had turned its back on the pursuit of the truth 
and was concerned with the pursuit of other values. In such a oase 
there would be no rebellion but the scientific community would cease 
to exist.
Logic of Liberty, op. cit. p. 46
J.3R. Lucas in The Principles of Politics, Oxford, 1966 uses the concept 
of coherent shared values as grounds for the use of a natural law 
argument.
Personal Knowledge, op. cit., pp 244-3*
Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 241.
/*»
13* Both Talcott Parsons in The Social System, London, 1952 and
R0K0 Merton, Social Theory and Social Action, part IV Glencoe,
Illinois, 1958 consider, the possibility of the values of science 
clashing with the values of the state.
16. M. Oakeshott, ’'Political Education”, in P. Laslett (Editor)
Philosophy,, Politics,, and Society, Oxford, 1967, P* 8°
17o Ibida, p. 2o
18• Ibido, p. 15o
19• Polanyi argues that we should submit to the superior minds of the 
intellectuals in their specialised sphere and thereby be lifted up 
with them to the next stage of evolution* However, unlike this case 
of intellectual communities the general populous has no reason to 
submit to the superior minds of the politicians as they are engaged 
in a specialised activity which nevertheless can be understood by 
most people, and their actions in any case have a direct effect on 
other people* They should therefore be cautiously watched if not 
suspiciously watched*,
20* A discussion on merits will involve the absence of threats and
inducements. Each party to a dispute will try and reach an agreement 
on what is morally the right division what policy is in the interests 
of all or will promote the most want satisfaction* See B. Barry, 
Political Argument, London, 1965, pa 87.
21* A scientist does not declare a discovery until he is committed to 
it for a scientific decision does not have to be made. Compromise 
has no place in scientific decision making*
22. As we are examining the sphere of practical politics the phrase
*as far as possible1 is legitimate as decisions are often compromises 
between different interest groups. Bernard Crick, In Defence of 
Politics, London, 1964 argues for the necessity of compromise in 
democratic politics but if compromises are to be obtained and 
principles retained then casuistry becomes of major importance.
See, for instance, Dorothy Unmet, Rules, Roles and Relations,
London, 1966, p. 30 who discusses the importance of casuistry in 
practical politics.
23* Personal Knowledge, op. cit., p. 223.
in
2k» Such a situation is analogous to a situation I considered when
examining the scientific community* A situation might arise where 
no consensus appeared but even if such an event did occur a commitment 
to the task of science, and the tradition of the scientific community 
could keep the system going. Such an analogy emphasises the point 
that whereas in the scientific community the method of spontaneous 
coordination is valued as a decision procedure because it is the 
most efficient method for allowing the scientist to undertake his 
task so the decision procedure of a free society is valued in the 
same way. It is valued because it is thought to be the most 
efficient method for man to follow his task, although the actual 
institutional structure of a free society will depend on the tradition 
from which it has arisen.
25. Personal Knowledge, 033* cit*, p. 103
26* Ibid., p* 103*
27* Ibid., p* 103.
28. Ibid., p. 1G3.
29* For instance, Heath, Maudling, Boyle originally working under the
guidance of K.A. Butler*
30. For instance, recently such an argument has been put forward by
N* Haines, "Situational Method: A proposal for Political Education
in Democracy", Educational Theory, vol. 19, Winter 1969, No. 1.
See also E.J* Brownhill, "Situational Method: an Experiment,"
Educational Theoryt Vol. 21, Summer 1971» No. 3.
31* N. Haines, The Ballot and the Draam: Footnotes to a Century of
Educational Democracy, Political Science Quarterly. Vol. LXXXIII,
No* k $ December, 1968*
36, By indoctrination I mean a conscious attempt to inculcate certain
values of a particular political or moral flavour without criticism. 
Indoctrination is tied up with the notion of active inculcation.
I do not think we can class the unconscious inculcation of political 
or moral values as indoctrination otherwise all education concerned 
with moral or political values could be classed as indoctrination 
and sometimes are.
33- Personal Knowledge, op. cit., p. 222.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion
Polanyifs philosophy has two basic characteristics: like all
educational theories it recognises the importance of experience in the 
learning process, but puts particular stress on the notion of tacit 
knowledge and argues that knowledge develops in a community. It is only 
by working within a subject or an area of practical skill that one can 
develop the necessary tacit knowledge for mastery over it. And it is 
only by working within a community that one can develop acceptable tests 
for testing knowledge. By the very nature of knowledge there must be 
a knowsr, and therefore all knowledge will contain a subjective element. 
Knowledge is always a subjective belief and can only approach the status 
of objectivity when the knower claims it has universal validity. Object­
ive knowledge in this sense is subjective knowledge which has universal 
validity. But how can we be certain that a claim to universiflability 
is correct? We can perhaps develop certain tests but these tests are 
themselves developed by people who claim that they are impersonal tests 
indicating the validity or not of theories. We need tests to indicate 
the infallibility of tests, and so on ad infinitum.^ A characteristic 
of the scientific community is not that it progresses under the control of 
impersonal tests but that it formulates much more formal criteria of 
acceptability than most other communities. It is Polanyifs major claim 
then that the scientific community like all other communities will progress 
under the control of inter-personal knowledge.
Indeed unless there is a body of generally shared beliefs we cannot 
really say that there is a community. Intellectual communities all have 
a systematic body of shared beliefs and this is a characteristic of such 
communities. Although non-intellectual communities may not have a body
/8 f
of systematic beliefs they must at least have a body of i hared beliefs 
which are coherent to achieve the status of being a comim nity. These 
beliefs 4 as in the case of the intellectual communities # w. .11 be used to 
keep a check on innovations.
It is apparent how the concept of tacit knowing and . Lnter-personal 
knowledge fit together for only by working within the tradition of a 
community, and acquiring the necessary tacit knowledge can one become a 
master practitioner. The concept of learning by experience strengthens 
the hold of tradition.
These two insights of Polanyi are insights that have bet n recognised 
by other conservative theorists. They seem to accept implicitly, at 
least, the notion of communal or inter-personal knowledge. jthey would 
also argue that there is a certain coherence in such knowledge and it • 
can therefore be used to judge innovations. The argument is simply 
that in the sphere of knowledge we can only judge innovations by knowledge 
we already possess, and to be acceptable a new proposal must somehow be 
consistent with such knowledge. Laws to be just laws then should reflect 
the communal tradition: our inter-personal knowledge of ethics and
social relations, and our traditional way of going about things. It is 
as ridiculous to lpgislate laws into effect that are far beyond the 
tradition as it is to attempt to plant a liberal society into an illiberal 
society. Burke fs attack on the French revolution took up this position. 
It is an argument that states that it is nonsensical to plant one 
tradition into another for.'f-it is successful it can only destroy the 
tradition of such a community. Such an inplantation cannot happen until 
the right stage in the development of inter-personal knowledge has been 
reached: a tradition grows it cannot be inculcated.
Alongside such a concept of communal knowledge is the belief that 
there is always an inherent tendency for the framework of the state to
reflect the traditions of society. Unless the state does so there will
be a condition of tension between state and society. Such an occurence
can create a revolutionary situation and a rebellion could take place
but the rebellion would not be one aimed at the introduction of new
values but aimed at a return to the tradition: an attempt to force the
state to reflect again the shared values of the community, Under such
an argument we cannot talk of revolution bringing about profound change.
It can only come about at the right time, in the right place, and in
?
accordance with the tradition—
The most vulnerable part of Polanyi*s philosophy, when applied to 
the political community, is his belief that man is searching for the 
truth, and aiming at a specific end. However, when we realise that for 
him in practice truth is expressed in the communal tradition and the 
movement towards the final end lies in such a tradition, the E>osition is 
far from outrageous. In practice it is stating no more than we are 
committed to things we believe in - we give them the status of truth, 
and attempt to create a society in accordance with these beliefs. In 
other words we will be committed to certain values and, as society is 
made up of individuals with such commitment, it will tend to reflect in 
its formal structure the shared values expressed in the commitment.
Society under such an analysis will be evolving and evolving towards 
something bettar. If we accept the notion that communal knowledge 
expresses the truth, and that a later stage in the development of that 
knowledge expresses a greater aspect of the truth then society must be 
progressing to something better. At least Polanyi assumes that a society 
that has a greater grasp of the truth is better than one which has less.
In this case truth is what we believe but if it is then surely our beliefs 
will be continually evolving and there will be no final end. It is at
this point that Polanyi's concept of external reality 
becomes of special importance and forces itself into his 
political philosophy. We have seen that for practical purpose 
truth has to be what we believe but this is not the real 
truth. The.real truth is that,which is in accordance with 
reality ana this we cannot know. All along the most we can 
hope for is an achievement of right belief - a belief which 
is in accordance with reality - but at the end of the process 
of evolution we do know. Gur beliefs do not coincide with 
reality they become reality. At the end of evolution there 
is a knowledge of the Platonic Forms. Yet within Polanyi's 
philosophy this notion of the final end and therefore of 
progress towards it has to-, be a matter of belief,. If we tarn. 
the notion of inter-personal knowledge on to this belief 
we can say that it is a belief which is not accepted by the 
scientific community. Indeed it is a notion they would not 
consider out it is a notion acceptable to a Christian 
theological community, and a proposal which they would 
certainly consider to be a theological one.
In the case of the concept of external reality we can 
say that there is a certain .'justification for the use of 
the term when talking about science. We can, for instance, 
argue that our attempt to formulate theories is an attempt 
to formulate theories which symbolically represent 
controlling factors behind the world of appearances., and 
that these controlling factors do exist independently to 
ourselves. It is far more difficult to justify the claim 
that we can talk of a reality independent to ourselves 
when we are considering morality and politics. A political 
truth or a moral truth can only be a belief which we hold.
Its e&istence depends on our existence. The only way we 
can avoid such a conclusion is to state that political-: 
and moral principles exist in nature or that they exist 
in the mind, of-God and it is our task to reveal them.5
Polanyi, in fact, uses the words Reality1 and * truth* as blanket 
words to cover scientific truth, historical truth, a correct moral . 
principle, justice and the public interest by doing this he is able to 
achieve a unity in knowledge that may well not exist. The unity that 
is there lies in manfs understanding of them, and not in their existential 
unity.
As a political philosophy his ideas enable a very precise form 
of conservative philosophy to appear. It is a philosophy of an evolving 
society where evolution is controlled by tradition, and the support of 
governments is dependent on their following tradition. I have argued 
that it is a joining together of liberal and conservative theories.
This is the case for liberal ideas have become an important part of our 
political tradition. More specifically it is a re-statement of British 
conservative philosophy: a Burkean concept of change.
Notes Chapter Eight
1* It is possible to produce a closed system that will give certainty, 
for instance, Popper’s hypothetico-deductive system,.
2. The reason for Hegel’s attack on revolutionary theorists was not
because of the danger of their success but because of their failure 
to see the stupidity of undertaking a task doomed to failure0 
Marx really agreed with the analysis. The revolutionaries were 
to be ’midwives of progress’, a significant term, and their ho£>e 
was to speed up the process of evolution in the same way as Hegel fs 
heroes* They could not change its direction.
3- Both approaches would be legitimate in examining Polanyi*s political 
ideas#
APPENDIX 
A Theory of Political*. Obligation
I.III1I TilWTl ii—Hil l i'~ir^ -»---- ' b.wu— n.wwr.— — • • " —  inn.i,
Polanyi has produced quite a specific theory of political obligation,
although he does not enter into the details of its operation, for this
reason I have included the following analysis in an appendix. It is, I
believe, consistent with Polanyifs general position, although the detailed
arguments are my own, for using the clues he has given it does seem possible
to formulate a more comprehensive theory»
A.P© d’Entreves' thinks that there are two basic models of political
2
obligation: a Benthamite model and a Rousseaunian one. Professor Hart
points out that two ideas can be considered central to a Benthamite model c
Firstly a man will have an obligation to conduct himself in a certain way
if in the event of him failing to do so a pain or loss of pleasure ensues®
Pain then becomes a constitutive part of obligation,. Secondly there are
a number of sources from which pain arises, and these sources will constitute
the different sanctions which are characteristic of different obligations.
For instance, if we have sanctions from a religious source we have a
religious obligation, if they come from a political source we have a
political obligation. Bentham argues in the Fragment of Government,
"Political duty is created by punishment: or at least by the will of
persons who have punishment in their hands, persons stated and certain ■-&
3
political superiors". Bentham is arguing here that the sovereign is a
political superior in so far as he controls power and is therefore the
source of political obligation.
In fact Bentham*s reasoning seems faulty* The word ’source- is
important here but the obligation of a* person to himself to avoid pain has
a previous existence. The obligation becomes a Political obligation when
the source of the threatened pain comes from a political superior„ This
is really a Hobbesian physical obligation: a prudential avoidance of
physical pain.
iqO
Rousseau puts an opposing view in the Social Contract© He
states, "Force is power and I fail to see what moral effect it can have©
To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will - at the most an
act of prudence. In what way can it be a duty? let us admit that
force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only
A
legitimate powers".
If Bentham1 s reasoning had not been faulty he could have virtually 
accepted Rousseau’s position. Bentham’s argument should in fact be 
that one has a duty to oneself to avoid pain not to one’s political 
superiors. The political superior’s simply recognise that one will 
try and avoid pain and so create sanctions in o r d e r to get compliance.
The mistake Berthara has made is to tie in the source of the threatened 
pain with duty to oneself incorrectly. It is not a political duty which 
is being created by the political superiors threat of force but it is 
that one’s duty to oneself is being triggered off by the threat of 
pain derived from a political source. The o n ly obligation that Bentham 
has in this case is to oneself. A government is not made legitimate 
because it possesses force or are we obliged to obey an illegitimate 
government except in Bentham *s sense© If it uses force we have a duty 
to ourselves to avoid it but no duty to the government arises.
If Bentham had formulate his theory in the way I have suggested then 
it would not 06 absolutely distinct from a Rousseaunian theory of 
political obligation. Rousseau uses the word ?obligation* ih.the 
correct manner for the word is a normative one meaning that something 
has value and therefore should be obeyed, protected or submitted to© 
Bentham if his analysis had not been faulty would have had this meaning in 
a restricted sense - oneself is of value and therefore should be 
protected
We can conclude then that the fact that a government has a political 
power and therfore force at its command is not a ground for arguing that 
one has a duty to submit to it* We only have a duty to submit to it 
if a particular value is given to the government, or unless we feel 
that the political system of which the government is a part is desirable * 
Force by itself does not create obligation*
Polanyi takes up a Rousseaunian stand in considering the concept 
of obligation but it is questionable whether or not we can really call 
the obligation he is referring to in the Logic of liberty when he states 
"these aspirations coincide with the claims of our own conscience" a 
political obligation* The quote suggests he means we have a moral 
obligation to obey a government which follows such aspirations. This is 
so but we also have a wider obligation because a political system can 
exhibit or allow more than just moral aspirations* Our shared values 
contain more than moral values as they contain values relating to modes 
of procedure and the traditional way of going about things* They include 
far more than the traditional moral values of the community, for instance, 
political values as well as values from other points of view, e*g* 
religious, aesthetic, prudential. A political obligation arises because 
the state also values these things.
Yet when does a political obligation arise in practice? We can say, 
for instance, that we have a moral obligation to obey the state if it on 
the whole values the morality we follow, that we have a religious obligation 
to obey it if it allows our religious practices but when do we have a 
political obligation? A political obligation is really an allegiance to 
a political system rather than an acceptance of every rule which the 
system contains. In analogy with the scientific community the scientist 
accepts the mode of procedure inherent in his community, and that all 
members are obliged to be truthful. This does not mean that he has to
accept every item of knowledge in the system of ideas, and there would 
be no progress if he did* It does mean that he will accept the decision 
of the community even if he disagrees with it, and cries within the 
community to get the decision altered* HLs obligation to obey the 
scientific community is because it values the things he values, and makes 
it possible for him to pursue the things he values in the way he wants*
In the case of the wider political community, if we had a political 
obligation to it, we would value its method of going about things, perhaps 
the institutional structure of the Queen in Parliament, or perhaps the 
method of compromise. We would value the system and not necessarily 
particular items in it or particular laws* We value a political system 
because it enables other things to exist which we value* Its value is 
derived from its ability to provide the conditions necessary for our way 
of life. That is, it allows us on the whole to value the things we want 
to value, and provides conditions to increase the liklihood of things 
we value existing.
We have accepted that to say that we have an obligation to something 
means that we value it and therefore it should be obeyed, protected or 
submitted to so a politic *1 obligation arises when we begin to value the 
political system. It can be seen to have arisen when, in spite of the 
fact that the specific action it undertakes is against an important item 
in our value systems, we still feel a duty to obey it. Thl.q means that 
we value the system itself rather than the individual items ifc enacts, and 
we value it on the whole because it provides the conditions necessary for 
our way of life. The obligation can really be seen to have arisen when 
we begin to give the system the benefit of the doubt when it seems opposed 
to our values. This means that the state has as far as we are concerned 
has begun to transcend the items within its own structure and has become 
for us an entity in itself which we value*
The analysis tells us also when a political obligation will lapse*
If laws are being constantly passed which we find repugnant and which 
are opposed to our own values then this can develop until we realise 
that the state is no longer providing the conditions necessary for the 
survival of our values* As its value was in the first place derived from 
its extrinsic worth in allowing the things we value, if it no longer 
has this extrinsic worth, it is no longer of value to us. We therefore 
no longer have a dutjtf to submit ourselves to it or an obligation to 
obey it©
In Polanyi’s case, as I have indicated in the main thesis, if the 
political system fails to provide the condition of freedom necessary 
for the pursuit of the truth then our x>olitical allegiance and obligation 
to it no longer exists. In other words if the political system moves 
too far away from the moral and political traditions of the community 
or if it fails to "coincide with the claims of our own conscience" we
no longer have an obligation to obey it.
I have expressed this notion of the political system failing to 
"coincide with the claims of our own conscience" as a failure to provide
the conditions necessary for our way of life. More generally we can say
that if a political system allows the continued existence of our way of 
life or if it, more specifically, furthers it then we have an obligation 
towards it as it values the things we value, and enables us to follow 
our obligations to these values. If it does not do either o£ these two 
things then it is difficult to see how an obligation can exist. .
At this point it is necessary to explain my use of the termw«y%-life.^ 
I mean by the phrase a set of value systems each of which belongs to a 
different point of view, for instance, moral, religious, aesthetic. If 
it is possible to know a person’s way of life it should be possible to 
tell two~ things. It should tell which system of values will be relevant
in a particular case, and which system will take precedence in a conflict* 
In order to illustrate this and the inter-play of different value systems 
consider the case of a Welsh nationalist who blows up a bridge, and the 
Judge who conducts the case.
Four value systems seem important here for the Welsh nationalist:
(l) The legal system, how far, for instance, does the nationalist 
value the legal system? (2) Political values, for instance, do 
political values overrule legal ones? (3) A moral value system, for 
instance, the immorality of blowing up other people’s property*
(*f) A prudential value system-: how far do political values overrule
prudential ones, and in this case the danger of punishment? It can
been seen that it would seem that his political value system takes
precedent over others.
In the case of the judge we are able to catch a glimpse of the 
communal way of life. Three value systems seem important: (1) The 
value of the integrity of the legal system, that rules must be applied 
and be obeyed. (2) The value of the communal moral system (according 
to Devlin a judge must uphold morality ). That it is not only illegal 
but immoral to blow up other people’s property. (3) The community’s 
political value system, and especially the value of compromise which is 
an important value within it.
legal justice must been seen to be done so the Welsh nationalist
after the evidence has been heard is found guilty, and given a sentence
within the range laid down by the law. The legal system is therefore 
satisfied as the judge has followed his obligation to apply the law. 
Morality has also been satisfied for the person who broke the moral code 
has been caught and punished. Bat at this point morality is of further 
importance. How immoral is the act of blowing up other people’s 
property? The conclusion may have some bearing on the sentence*
Political values also enter at this point, and in particular the value 
of prudence© Is the act isolated or is it part of a larger plot, will 
the Welsh nationalist be made a martyr and therefore further his cause 
if he receives a long sentence, will a long sentence lead to further 
acts of violence as a way of protest, or will it be a deterrent? A care­
ful weighing ip of these questions changes a possible sentence of 3 years 
to one of 6 months imprisonment© Legality and morality have been upheld 
but prudential considerations have qualified the sentence©
What has happened in this case is that within a communal way of life 
there is a hierarchy of value systems: some value systems in certain
instances are considered more important than others. Occasionally only 
one value system may come into play, for instance, in considering the 
beauty of a picture one’s aesthetic value system is used but sometimes 
more than one value system is relevant, and to know a person’s way of 
life will tell you which system will take precedence. Indeed if we 
really knew a person’s way of life we would not only know which value 
system would take precedence in a conflict but which value within a system 
would take precedence.
We are now in a position to see in greater detail when a political 
system will be valued. It will be valued if it allows us to follow our 
way of life or if it furthers our way of life. It may be that certain
governmental actions offend our moral values but we may accept them as 
they agree with our prudential system© On the otherhand they may agree 
with neither but we will still accept them if generally governmental 
actions agree with our way of life. Theoretically it seems that three
things can disturb this acceptance: (1) Actions are pursued which
threathen our way of life. (2) Actions are purused which are opposed 
to important values ^ within an important value system within our way of 
life. (3) Alternative political systems seem more attractive because
(a) Our own political value system on the whole allows the existence 
of our way of life but another will actually further it; (b) our own 
political system does not favour our way of life, another one allows the 
existence of it; (c) our own political system does not favour our way
of life another one will further it©
When one has a political obligation to a system one need not be 
concerned with every detail of legislation, or- political action* However, 
if legislation or political action continually goes against the contents 
of one’s way of life then one’s obligation begins to waver* In other 
words if governmental action indicates that the sot up no -danger allows 
or values the things one values then quite obviously the value that was 
inherent in the political system no longer exists* However, this cannot 
provide a justification for rebellion as in this case rebellion would be 
based on the subjective whim of one man, as well as being foolish from 
a practical point of view*
Under this analysis of the concept of the way of life if the 
government on the whole does not favour the communal way of life, communal 
values or inter-personal knowledge of the community, a general withdrawal 
of political obligation can take place* In such a case there would 
sufficient justification for a rebellion*
In practice in spite of a political system’s failure to take note 
of the communal shared values we might still decide it is the best of 
a bad bunch* We would be ranking it favourably with the others available 
even though we graded it against the ideal as of little value. In this 
case we may have a duty towards it ini,conflict with other systems* It 
could also be the case that although we think that the system is fairly 
bad we nevertheless recognise that there are certain change mechanisms 
within it that can lead to improvements and are prepared to give it our 
allegiance for that reason.
We can say then that an individual no longer has a political 
obligation to a system when it no longer values the things he values, 
except for the qualifications given© Grounds for rebellion can be found 
when not only an individual but the vast majority feel that the system 
no longer preserves or even threatens the existence of their values©
APPENDIX NOTES
A.P. d* Entreves, On the Nature of Political Obligation, 
Philosophy, October, 1968*
H*L0A. Hart, The Concept of Obligation, Rivista di FLlosofia, LVII, 
2, 1966
J. Bentham, Fragment on Government, Oxford, 19^8, p© 107p
Jo J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book 1, ch. .HI©
P. W© Taylor, Normative Discourse, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 19^1 
uses the term "way of life" in the same way as I have.
P. Devlin, "The Enforcement of Morals", Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 1959• Although he would claim that behaviour thought to 
be immoral and therefore opposed to the public conscience* could be 
considered to be against the public interest©
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Michael Polanyi and the Problem of 
Personal Knowledge 
R. J- B r o w n h i l l
Thomas A. Langford’s article, “ Michael Polanyi and the Task of 
Theology,”1 raised a number of important questions about the work of 
Michael Polanyi and the validity of a visionary method of arriving at 
the truth, or an understanding of absolute being. Yet, I believe that 
Polanyi has gone some way to grapple with the problems that Langford 
raised.
Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge,2 produces a 
model of a community bound together by faith, whose unity is further 
strengthened by the fact that all members of the community have the 
joint task of apprehending external reality and revealing to the rest of 
the community the knowledge they gain. In other words, the com­
munity is made up of people with the same belief and the same inten­
tion : all members of the community believe in the existence of external 
reality, and all intend to apprehend and reveal aspects of this reality. 
The community which Polanyi is explicitly concerned with is the 
scientific community: the “ Republic of Science.”3 However, Langford 
is quite correct in recognizing that the model produced can be 
applied to any community that is bound together by faith and a 
belief in transcendent being. Indeed it can be legitimately argued 
that the theologian and the scientist, in Polanyi’s context, are both 
concerned with the same task of apprehending and revealing a hidden 
reality.
Why is this? How can it be possibly said that a scientist and a 
theologian are involved in the same task? The answer depends on the 
definition of nature. Polanyi completely rejects the Kantian concept of 
nature as a Newtonian nature and defined by Kant as “ the conformity 
of appearances to law in space and time.” Kant gives us, in the first
1 Journal o f  Religion, L V I  ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  4 5 - 5 5 .
2 M .  P o l a n y i ,  Personal Knowledge ( L o n d o n ,  1 9 6 2 ) .
3  T i t l e  o f  a n  a r t i c l e  b y  P o l a n y i  i n  Minerva, V o l .  I  ( O c t o b e r ,  1 9 6 2 ) .
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place, space and time as forms of appearances; and then the world as 
the whole of appearances; and then nature as the conformity of appear­
ances to law. This is the nature Kant is talking about, and I believe that 
this is the nature that Michalson is talking about when he rejects 
Polanyi’s works as “ not history but the observation of nature in its 
separation from history.” 4 Michalson seems to believe that it is Kantian 
nature Polanyi is referring to. He states: “ Scientific knowledge is 
symbolic knowledge and involves forms of human understanding. 
Immanuel Kant long ago discerned this from the way Newton worked. 
Every startling observation of natural processes has begun in an artful 
intellectual model. . . . Scientists do not wait passively for objects to 
impress themselves. Symbols created by their active intellect initiate 
the exposure of nature.”5 Michalson continues: “ The self knowledge 
which Cassirer and Kant found implicit in every scientific cognition 
does not at all resemble the self knowledge extolled by Socrates’ oracle. 
The self which participates in structuring the world of nature is not the 
same self which demands that life be significant. Symbolic forms to be 
historically significant and thus to clarify . . . the faith and under­
standing of historical religions must originate in the question of the 
meaning of man and not simply in general forms of human apprecia­
tion.” 6 Yet it is precisely this Kantian concept of nature which Polanyi 
rejects, and the question of the meaning of man is precisely the problem 
Polanyi is grappling with. To state that Polanyi’s “ personal knowl­
edge” “ is disqualified because it does not begin in the personal 
question about the fundamental meaning of life” seems to me to be a 
complete misunderstanding of Polanyi’s aim and work.7
4  C a r l  M i c h a l s o n ,  The Rationality o f  Faith ( L o n d o n ,  1 9 6 4 ) ,  p .  2 7 .
5 Ibid., p .  3 7 .
6 Ibid., p. 38.
7  T h e  v i t a l i s t  t h e o r y  o f  e v o l u t i o n  w h i c h  P o l a n y i  p r o d u c e s  i n  Personal Knowledge 
a n d  e l s e w h e r e : t h e  m o v e m e n t  o f  a  s u p e r - m e c h a n i s t i c  e l e m e n t  t h r o u g h  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  
m a n ,  a n d  its d e v e l o p m e n t  i n t o  m a n ’s  i n t u i t i v e  f a c u l t i e s  w h e r e  e p i s t e m o l o g y  a n d  
b i o l o g y  b e c o m e  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  is c e r t a i n l y  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  
m a n  i n  h i s t o r y  a n d  i n  t h o u g h t .  A g a i n  M i c h a l s o n ’s s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  “ N a t u r e  is t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a  r e a l i t y  w h i c h  m a n  c a n n o t  e n t e r  p e r s o n a l l y  b e c a u s e  h e  h a s  a l r e a d y  h e l d  
it o f f  a t  a n  i m p e r s o n a l  d i s t a n c e ”  ( M i c h a l s o n ,  op. cit., p .  2 6 )  is a  v i e w  t h a t  is e n t i r e l y  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t o  P o l a n y i ’s p o s i t i o n .  T h e  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  d i s a g r e e m e n t  is t h a t  P o l a n y i ’s 
n a t u r e  is M i c h a l s o n ’s h i s t o r y .  M i c h a l s o n  f a i l s  t o  s e e  t h a t  f o r  a  s c i e n t i s t  l i k e  P o l a n y i  
n a t u r e  is n o t  “  d e h i s t o r i c i z e d  ”  b e c a u s e  “  m e a n i n g f u l  c o m m u n i o n  w i t h  t h e m  is i n t e r ­
r u p t e d  b y  m a k i n g  t h e m  o b j e c t s  o f  d e t a c h e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ”  I n  f a c t ,  j u s t  t h e  o p p o s i t e  
is t h e  c a s e .  T h e  s c i e n t i s t  g a i n s  a  m u c h  c l o s e r  c o m m u n i o n  w i t h  n a t u r e ;  a n d ,  f a r  f r o m  
b e i n g  a  d e t a c h e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  h i s  r e s e a r c h  is a n  i n t e n s e l y  e m o t i o n a l  a n d  p e r s o n a l  
c o m m i t m e n t .
Il6
Michael Polanyi and the Problem of Personal Knowledge
The nature that Polanyi states the scientist is trying to contact is not 
a mechanical nature but a Platonistic nature. In Kantian terminology, 
Polanyi’s scientist is trying to gain a knowledge of the reality of the 
thing in itself. He is concerned with the real meaning of things and not 
with their appearances.
Now Kant has attempted to demonstrate that we cannot have a 
knowledge of things in themselves, since all knowledge must originate 
in the experience of our senses,8 and a thing in itself is beyond the 
experience of our senses. Our knowledge according to Kant is knowl­
edge of appearances; and, in order to gain knowledge of things in 
themselves, we would need to have intellectual intuitions, which we 
cannot do because our intuitive capacity is confined to our senses. 
Science then does not and cannot give us a knowledge of the thing in 
itself but only an increasing knowledge of appearances. Kant does not 
deny that there is a super-sensible reality, but denies that we can have 
a knowledge of it. It is at this point, however, that Polanyi, following in 
the tradition of Liebniz, parts company with Kant and insists that we 
can, and in fact do, have an intuitive knowledge of super-sensible 
reality. He states:
To say that the discovery of objective truth in science consists in the 
apprehension of a rationality which commands our respect and arouses our 
contemplative admiration, that such discovery, while using the experience of 
our senses as clues, transcends this experience by embracing the vision of a 
reality beyond the impression of our senses, a vision which speaks for itself 
in guiding us to an even deeper understanding of reality— such an account 
of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside as out-dated 
Platonism: a piece of mystery-mongering unworthy of an enlightened age. 
Yet it is precisely on this conception of objectivity that I wish to insist in. 9
Polanyi states that in order to cross this gap between the experience of 
our senses and super-sensible reality we must make a logical jum p: 
“ the plunge by which we gain a foothold at another shore of reality.”10 
And the plunge is taken by our intuition.
However, this may be so, but is the reality which the scientist is 
attempting to apprehend the same reality as the theologian is trying to 
apprehend? Or, to repeat Langford’s question, “ Is a religious vision 
more comprehensive than a scientific vision?”
8  T h i s  is t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  Critique o f  Pure Reason. I n  t h e  e a r l i e r  Dissertation, K a n t  
a l l o w e d  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  t h i n g  i n  itself.
9  Personal Knowledge, p p .  5 - 6 .
1 0  Ibid., p .  1 2 3 .
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The answer to this is extremely difficult, for Polanyi does not entirely 
take up the Platonic solution of the two worlds, which, in Kant| for 
instance, are phenomenon and noumenon. He accepts that we gain 
knowledge of appearances, but he claims that we are only apprehending 
the lowest level of reality. In other words, the attempt of mechanistic 
science to break things down to physics and chemistry only gives us an 
understanding of the lowest level of reality and cannot in any sense 
give us a knowledge of ultimate reality. Polanyi states: “ What is most 
tangible has the least meaning and it is perverse to identify the tangible 
with the real. For to regard a meaningless substratum as the ultimate 
reality of all things, must lead to the conclusion that all things are 
meaningless. And we can avoid this conclusion only if we acknowledge 
instead that deepest reality is possessed by higher things that are least 
tangible.”11
Polanyi believes then that our knowledge of appearances signifies 
only the lowest level of reality and that we can progress to a knowledge 
of a higher level of reality—to super-sensible reality—only by the use 
of our intuitive faculties.12 The method of bringing our intuitive 
faculties, or the tacit coefficient of knowledge, into play in this respect 
is, so Polanyi claims, “by relying on our awareness of them [particulars] 
for attending to the coherent entity to which they contribute.” 13 He 
continues: “ We may say for example that we know the clues of per­
ception by dwelling in them, when we attend to that which they jointly 
indicate; and that we see the parts of the whole forming a whole by 
dwelling in the parts. We arrive thus at the conception of indwelling.” 14 
This then is Polanyi’s epistemology. We “ indwell,” or we immerse 
ourselves, in the clues of perception to gain a knowledge of the whole. 
This does not mean we concentrate on the particulars and that this 
gives us a knowledge of the whole, but it means we assimilate the 
particulars, we make them part of ourselves, and only then can we gain 
a knowledge of, the whole. For instance we cannot learn to drive a car 
merely by reading an instruction book. We must practice each operation
1 1 M .  P o l a n y i ,  “ T h e  M o d e r n  M i n d :  I t s  S t r u c t u r e s  a n d  P r o s p e c t s ”  ( l e c t u r e  
d e l i v e r e d  O c t o b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 6 4 ,  a t  B o w d o i n  C o l l e g e ,  B r u n s w i c k ,  M a i n e ) .
1 2  T h i s  is, o f  c o u r s e ,  K a n t ’s p o s i t i o n — w e  c a n  o n l y  g a i n  k n o w l e d g e  b y  i n t u i t i o n —  
b u t  h e  d e n i e s  w e  c a n  h a v e  i n t u i t i o n s  o f  s u p e r - s e n s i b l e  r e a l i t y .  P o l a n y i ’s i n t u i t i o n  is 
m o r e  l i k e  H e n r i  B e r g s o n ’s, a n d  i n d e e d  h i s  W r i t i n g s  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  B e r g s o n ’s  i n  o t h e r  
r e s p e c t s ,  e . g . ,  h i s  v i t a l i s t i c  n o t i o n s .
13 “ The Modern Mind” (see n. 11 above).
14 Ibid.
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until it becomes second nature to us, and only then can we say that we 
can drive a car.15
Yet this may demonstrate how we progress from the lowest level of 
reality to the next level; but how can we, when we have a knowledge 
of the whole, progress to a still higher level of reality? We can only do 
this by heightening our “ indwelling.” Polanyi produces the example of 
speech to demonstrate in an allegorical way the progress from one level 
to another. He states: “ The first level, lowest of all is the production of 
the voice; the second, the utterance of words; the third, the joining of 
words to sentences; the fourth, the working of the sentences into a 
style; the fifth and highest, the composition of the text.
The principle of each level operates under the control of a higher 
level.”16
Polanyi points out that each level is subject to dual control: by the 
laws that apply to its elements in themselves and by the laws that 
control the comprehensive entity formed by them. And this multiple 
control is made possible by the fact “ that the principle governing the 
isolated particulars of a lowest level leave indeterminate their boundary 
conditions for the control by a higher principle.”17 He indicates that, 
for instance, voice production leaves largely open the combination of 
sounds to words, which is controlled by a vocabulary; whereas a 
vocabulary leaves largely open the combination of words to form 
sentences, which is controlled by grammar; and the sequence continues. 
He states: “ Consequently, the operations of a higher level cannot be 
accounted for by the laws governing its particulars forming the next 
lower level, for example, you cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics, 
and you cannot derive grammar from a vocabulary.”18 This analogy 
may give us some idea of how we progress from one level of reality to 
another and why in fact we are able to progress in this way. At any rate, 
it would seem that Polanyi intends that his scientist should not be 
concerned merely with appearances but, like the theologian, should 
attempt to apprehend ultimate reality. However, as in Tillich’s depth 
of reason, for Polanyi reality is inexhaustible, and it does not seem 
possible that the scientist can apprehend the whole of reality.
1 5  A n  i d e a  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  M i c h a e l  O a k e s h o t t ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h e r ,  a b o u t  
t h e  e d u c a t i o n  o f  r u l e r s  ( s e e  t h e  c h a p t e r  o n  “ P o l i t i c a l  E d u c a t i o n ”  i n  P .  L a s l e t t  ( e d . ) ,  
Philosophy, Politics and Society ( O x f o r d ,  1 9 5 6 ) .
1 6  “ T h e  M o d e r n  M i n d . ”
1 7  Ibid.
i s  Ibid.
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This type of epistemology, which is symptomatic of Polanyi’s later 
works,19 seems to be an attempt to bridge the gap between the sensible 
world and the super-sensible world by the process of “ indwelling’’and 
by the gradual movement of the knower to a knowledge of a mainly 
hidden reality, rather than leaping over it. It appears to be an attempt 
to overcome the problem of the chorismos, the coming apart of the two 
worlds, which was so apparent in Science, Faith and S o c i e t y and also, 
to some extent, in Personal Knowledge. It is a problem that not only faced 
Plato but, for instance, still faced Liebniz in his attempt to unite 
Platonism and Aristotelianism. Liebniz clearly took up the two-world 
theory by his distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of 
grace and his attempt to reconcile them by the doctrine of the pre- 
established harmony; and Kant himself took up the distinction between 
the two worlds but failed to solve the problem.21 But Polanyi’s insistence 
that we move gradually from our knowledge of appearances to a 
knowledge of super-sensible reality by the process of “ indwelling” 
seems to be a direct attempt to overcome the problem of the chorismos. 
He sees the distinction and the problem, and attempts to provide a 
solution. Certainly there remains a gap to be crossed in the movement 
from one world to the other, but the necessity for “ the plunge” no 
longer exists. Rather than the Spinozian type of intuition,22 which 
Polanyi needed up to the time of Personal Knowledge in order to appre­
hend external reality, he now postulates the intuition of “ supersensi- 
bilia” as a workaday skill:23 the tacit coefficient of knowledge.
It may be asked whether in this case Polanyi is considering a visionary 
approach to the grasping of reality. I think he is, but his epistemology 
is now much more sophisticated and acceptable. He is not advocating 
the visionary method of Swedenborg,24 for instance. His vision is not a
1 9  T h e  w o r k  Personal Knowledge s e e m s  t o  b e  t h e  h i g h e s t  p o i n t  o f  h i s  p h i l o s o p h y ,  
w h e r e  t h e r e  is a n  o b v i o u s  a n d  w i d e  g a p  b e t w e e n  t h e  s e n s i b l e  a n d  s u p e r - s e n s i b l e  
w o r l d ;  b u t  a l r e a d y  i n  t h i s  w o r k  t h e r e  a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  h e  is m o v i n g  a w a y  f r o m  
t h i s  p o s i t i o n .
20 Science, Faith and Society ( L o n d o n ,  1 9 4 6 ) .  T h e  b o o k  h a s  b e e n  r e p u b l i s h e d  w i t h  a  
n e w  I n t r o d u c t i o n  ( C h i c a g o ,  1 9 6 4 ) ,  w h e r e i n  P o l a n y i  s u m m a r i z e s  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  
i n  h i s  i d e a s .
2 1  P a u l  T i l l i c h  i n  Systematic Theology, V o l .  I  ( L o n d o n ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  c l e a r l y  s a w  t h e  d a n g e r  
o f  t h e  t w o  w o r l d s  s p l i t t i n g  a p a r t  a n d  t h e  d o m i n a t i o n  o f  o u r  o w n  w o r l d  b y  a p p e a r a n c e s  
( t e c h n i c a l  k n o w l e d g e ) .
2 2  A n  i n t u i t i o n  w i t h  a n  i n t r i n s i c  q u a l i t y  o f  r i g h t n e s s  a b o u t  it.
2 3  S e e  M .  P o l a n y i ,  “ T h e  L o g i c  o f  T a c i t  I n f e r e n c e ”  ( a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o n g r e s s  f o r  t h e  P h i l o s o p h y  o f  S c i e n c e ,  A u g u s t  2 5 ,  1 9 6 4 ) .
2 4  S e e  E .  S w e d e n b o r g ,  Heaven and Hell ( L o n d o n ,  1 9 0 9 ) .
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vision in the sense that it is a picture of reality, for he uses the term in 
a metaphorical sense. I t is a vision in the sense that it is a very strong 
feeling of the imminence of reality. We first have a feeling that we are 
near to apprehending reality, and as we continue to “ indwell” in our 
research the feeling becomes stronger until we are absolutely certain 
that we are apprehending an aspect of reality, and this certainty 
“ deserves to be called a vision.”25
Now that we have some knowledge of Polanyi’s epistemology and his 
meaning of the terms “ vision” and “ reality,” we are in a position to 
answer another of Langford’s questions: “ How can one adjudicate 
between rival visions or how a rival vision may be related to another 
must be answered.” The answer is that rival visions do not occur to 
the visionary. If we look at Polanyi’s concepts of indwelling and the 
planes of reality, we will see the reason for this. The visionary is at first 
immersed in his research and gains an inkling of reality: the first vision. 
He continues his immersion until a second insight arises: the second 
vision. This process is continued until an absolute vision of reality is 
reached. However, at each stage there is only one vision: one insight 
that deserves to be called a vision. I t may indeed be the case that a 
vision on a higher plane of reality may contradict a vision on a lower 
plane, but this is because the vision on the lower plane only revealed a 
smaller aspect of reality, and the new vision is a higher synthesis. Only 
to the outsider can there be a contradiction, for the process of revealing 
the planes of reality prevents the appearance of a contradiction to the 
visionary. He knows why and how he has arrived at his new vision.
Even so, in Polanyi’s example of a community bound together by 
faith, the “ Republic of Science,” it is true that different scientists have 
different visions of reality. In other words, there are contradictory 
discoveries. But the reason for this is that behind appearances there 
exists -the thing in itself, and this is organically linked to the whole of 
reality. One discovery in a particular area of research may contradict 
another in the same area because it is, if it is true, revealing a different 
aspect of reality. A knowledge of the whole of reality would indicate 
that no contradiction in fact existed.
Yet a major question still remains, for how can we know whether a 
vision is true when we cannot test it by the experience of our senses, 
and can we really call a vision knowledge at all if we cannot test it ?
25 M. Polanyi, “The Creative Imagination” (paper delivered August, 1 9 6 5, at 
Oxford).
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Kant’s answer to this double-barreled question would of course be that 
we cannot know that our knowledge of a thing in itself is true because it 
is beyond sense, and we cannot for this reason call it knowledge. Tillich 
has suggested that we can test ontological knowledge experientially by 
the life process,26 but this is not a strictly realistic proposition. We could 
perhaps test it in infinity, although this is questionable, since it could 
be argued that super-sensible reality is outside space and time; but, in 
any case, a test in infinity would be beyond comprehension.
It is for this reason that Polanyi insists that a member of his Republic 
shall be an utterly moral man, completely obliged to tell the truth 
about the aspect of reality he has apprehended, and entirely responsible 
for, and committed to, the discovery he has made. Yet even this 
morality and personal commitment, which all members of the com­
munity accept that the discovering scientist has, does not mean that his 
vision will be taken into the Republic’s body of ideas. Before the 
Republic accepts a new vision it is judged by the other members of the 
community who will judge it by the visions the community has already 
received and accepted: it is judged by accepted belief. Only if it fits 
into this knowledge which the community already has will it be 
accepted. Naturally this process may slow down the revealing of reality, 
as it is well within the bounds of possibility that a new vision may reveal 
an aspect of reality well away from that already known by the Republic. 
Therefore only at a later stage in the history of the Republic, as the 
knowledge of the Republic advances, will this vision, if it were true, be 
accepted. However this process of acceptance does at least guard against 
the dishonesty of charlatans, or even people who have arrived at a 
wrong vision because of an incorrect interpretative framework.27
Polanyi, then, not only produces an important theory of how we can 
gain a knowledge of super-sensible reality, but his model of a community 
bound together by faith can quite well be used as a model of church 
history: the unitary church, the breakaway movement, further break­
away movements, and even movements away from the breakaways. 
Yet, as church history continues and doctrine is revised and altered, 
there again appears the possibility that an earlier breakaway movement
2 6  S e e  T i l l i c h ,  Systematic Theology, V o l .  I.
2 7  T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  is t h a t ,  i f  a  v i s i o n a r y  h a s  f o l l o w e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
i n d w e l l i n g  a n d  m o v e d  u p  t h e  p l a n e s  o f  r e a l i t y ,  h e  is c e r t a i n  t o  a r r i v e  a t  t h e  t r u t h ;  
h e  is c e r t a i n  t o  a c h i e v e  p e r s o n a l  k n o w l e d g e .  I f  h e  h a s  n o t  a r r i v e d  a t  t h e  t r u t h  a f t e r  
t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  o n l y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  le f t  is t h a t  h e  h a s  u s e d  t h e  w r o n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  
f r a m e w o r k  a n d  h i s  k n o w l e d g e  t h e r e f o r e  r e m a i n s  s u b j e c t i v e  k n o w l e d g e .
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can be accepted once more into the main movement, since the doctrine 
of the breakaway movement may now be acceptable to the mother 
church. Polanyi’s Republic is a model of this type of happening. There 
are certainly other problems, since, although a breakaway church may 
have a doctrine which has become acceptable to the mother church, 
it may well have formed an administrative structure and hierarchy of 
its own. It may well be psychologically opposed to the mother church 
because of the traumatic experience of the original breakaway and the 
attempts to bring it to heel. Nevertheless, Polanyi’s model still appears 
of fundamental importance and use in understanding the development 
of the different churches, while his epistemology appears to be the first 
attempt to set out in a rational and detailed way our approach to 
“ supersensibilia.” 28
2 8  T h e  w r i t i n g s  o f  T i l l i c h ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  w h i c h  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  P o l a n y i ’s i n  a  n u m b e r  o f  
w a y s ,  n e v e r  r e a l l y  g i v e  a  d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  o f  o n t o l o g i c a l  k n o w l e d g e .  A n d  o n e  o f  t h e  
i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t s  o f  P o l a n y i ’s w o r k  is t h a t  h e  h a s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  t y p e  o f  k n o w l ­
e d g e  c a n  r e a l l y  o n l y  f u n c t i o n  i n  a  l i k e - m i n d e d  c o m m u n i t y .
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“ SC1ENTIA,,
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SYNTHfeSE SCIENTIFIQUE
R . J . Brownhill 
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY
Extrait de “ Scientia „ - Novembre-Decetnbre 1969 
VOL. CIV, N. DCXCI-DCXCII
1969 Septieme Serie 63eme Ann6e
A U  L E C T E U R
Monsieur,
« S c i e n t i a  » est, en 1969, dans sa 63hme annee de vie, ay ant repris pleinement sa fonction  
traditionnelle de synthhse scientifique vraiment internationale.
Qu’il nous soit perm is, a cette occasion, de rappeler les considerations que suggdre I’histoire 
de soixante-trois dns de publication de la Revue. -
Lorsqu’cn 1907 un groupe d ’am is et de colUgues fonda  « S c i e n t i a  », elle se presenta au 
public avec un programme dont les poin ts principaux etaient les suivants:
« La production scientifique actuelle —  enongait le programme de 1907 —  est aujourd’hui 
plus que jam ais caracterisee p a r le fa i t  qu’elle est circonscrite a des disciplines diverses, quant a 
lour objet et aux m6thodes de rechcrches. C est contre cette tendance d la specialisation a outrdnce 
que « S c i e n t i a  » vcut justem ent reagir, cherchant a unir les efforts des savants, a elever la vision des 
buts scicntifiqucs au dessus de toutes form es particulikres de la recherche. C’est dans ce but que la 
Revue s’adrcsse d  tous ceux qui excellent dans un domaine quelconque afin qu’ils concourent a cette 
oeuvre, laissant de cole, pour un moment, le langage technique usuel, pour agiter, de lafagon la p lus  
accessible, quelque probUme general, que d ’autres, avec autant de liberte et d ’indipendance, eclair- 
ciront sous d'autres poin ts de vue ».
E n un demi-sUcle le monde de la pensie  et de la science s ’est transforme profondement en ce 
sens qu'il a realise un grand progris vers V unity. Les differences qualitatives de la m atiire ont 
disparu; il  s'est opire une vaste fusion  des disciplines physico-chimiques et une revision des probli- 
mes de Vastronomie et de la geographie physique; et c’est encore dans le sens de I’unite que prochdent 
les dSveloppements de la recherche biologique.
M ais devant cette tendance a la synth&se et a ^unification de la pensee scientifique, les exigences 
de Vinvestigation ont cependant developpe a Vinfini des methodes et des langages techniques particuliers 
qui rendent peut-etre encore p lus difficile la comprehension reciproque des savants. D ’ou le fa i t  que 
la nicessite d ’un organe de synthese scientifique comme « S c i e n t i a  » s e fa it  sentir aujourd’hui, non 
moins qu’il y  a de cela soixante-trois ans, et son programme et son action, s’ils ne preconisent p lus, 
comme alors le progrhs unitaire scientifique, mais le reflitent, ont toujours pour but de rendre 
riciproquement comprthensibles les conceptions et les principes generaux qui se basent sur des 
procedes techniques et se servent de langages techniques non moins eloignes les uns des autres 
qu’ils ne Vetaient jad is .
C’est dans sa comprehension des exigences des temps, dans la continuity de son action, que 
repose la raison du succits de « S c i e n t i a  ».
La Revue publie toujours le Supplement en frangais, afin que ses articles, qui sont tous publics 
dans la langue de leurs auteurs, puissen t etre lus et compris meme p ar qui ne connait que la langue 
frangaise.
La constitution d ’un large Comity Scientifique de la Revue, dont fo n t partie  des savants illustres 
dans les domaines les p lus divers de la science, reflyte, en le confirmant a nouveau, le programme 
de « S c i e n t i a  », qui est de considerer les diverses disciplines scientifiques comme les branches d ’une 
science unifiee, de s ’adresser aux savants de tous les P ays afin qu’ils deviennent les collaborateurs 
pour une recherche solidaire de la verity, unissant ainsi les esprits dans une aspiration supyrieure, 
dans une haute vision du monde matyriel et spirituel, qui est aussi prym isse et gage de concorde et 
de pa ix .
C’est au nom de ces ideals et de ce programme, que nous avons la confiance de pouvoir vous 
compter vous aussi parm i les abonnys de « S c i e n t i a  », contribution pour nous prydeuse, acte de fo i  
dans la collaboration, dans la coopyration, dans la confraternity des savants, des hommes de science, 
des personnes cultivbes de tous les Pays.
L a  D ir e c t io n
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY
M o d e r n  t e c h n o l o g y  c a n  b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  K a n t i a n  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  s c i e n c e .  T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  K a r l  
P o p p e r  m a k e s  b e t w e e n  s c i e n c e  a n d  m e t a p h y s i c s  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  a r b i t r a r y ,  a n d  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  s c i e n c e  
f a r  t o o  w i d e .  Y e t  P o p p e r ’s  b e l i e f  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  k n o w l e d g e  h a s  t o  c o n s i s t  o f  p o s s i b i l i a  i s  a c c e p t e d .  
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n t i n u o u s  f l o w  f r o m  m e t a p h y s i c a l  s p e c u l a t i o n  t o  p r a c t i c a l  u s e .  A s  m e ­
t a p h y s i c s  n o  l o n g e r  l a y s  t h e  g r o u n d  f o r  s c i e n c e  t h e  s c i e n t i s t  h i m s e l f  h a s  t o  b e c o m e  a  s p e c i a l i s e d  
m e t a p h y s i c i a n ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  s c i e n c e  h a s  n o t  e f f e c t i v e l y  l a i d  t h e  g r o u n d  f o r  t e c h n o l o g y  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i s t  
h a s  h a d  t o  b e c o m e  a  s c i e n t i s t .  T w o  f o r c e s  a p p e a r  t o  b e  a t  w o r k :  a  d r i v e  f o r  i n s t a b i l i t y  a n d  a n  u r g e  
f o r  s t a b i l i t y .  T h e  i n t u i t i v e  s p e c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m e t a p h y s i c i a n - s c i e n t i s t  h a v e  t o  b e  s t a b i l i s e d  b y  
c r i t i c a l  r e a s o n ,  s o  t h e  i n t u i t i v e  a p p r o a c h  o f  M i c h a e l  P o l a n y i  h a s  t o  g o  h a n d  i n  h a n d  w i t h  t h e  c r i ­
t i c a l  a p p r o a c h  o f  K a r l  P o p p e r .  Y e t  b e c a u s e  s c i e n t i f i c  k n o w l e d g e  r e m a i n s  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  t h e  f i n a l  
s t e p  i n  c r e a t i n g  s t a b i l i t y  h a s  t o  b e  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  c o n v e r t  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  t o  p r a c t i c a l  u s e .  M e t a ­
p h y s i c s ,  s c i e n c e ,  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  u n i t y  m a d e  u p  o f  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  i n  a n  
a t t e m p t  t o  a p p r e h e n d  a n d  f i n a l l y  m a s t e r  n a t u r e .
Applied science or technology has taken second place to pure 
science in our cultural heritage. Applied science has remained essentially 
of utilitarian value with little intrinsic value. I t  has not been allied 
with any great intellectual movement, or has a firm place been found 
for it in the body of philosophical tradition.
" The eminent philosopher/scientist Michael Polanyi follows a com­
mon attitude towards applied science when he declares that pure science 
is concerned with furthering knowledge and applied science is «tied 
to the market place a1. Yet Polanyi has a particularly unusual attitude 
towards pure science, as he conceives that the task of the pure scientist 
is more than an attempt to further knowledge. I t  is an attempt to 
grasp and reveal ultimate reality: a reality that is not accessible to our 
senses as it is external to us, and, is partly hidden from us 2. He states: 
« To say that the discovery of objective truth in science consists 
in the apprehension of a rationality which commands our respect 
and arouses our contemplative admiration: that such discovery 
while using the experience of our senses as clues transcends this 
experience by embracing a vision which speaks for itself in guiding 
us to an even deeper understanding of reality — such an account 
of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside as out­
dated Platonism: a piece of mysterymongering unworthy of an 
enlightened age. Yet it is precisely on this conception of objecti­
vity that I  wish to insist in »3.
As it appears, therefore, that we cannot rely on our normal senses
. 1 Polanyi, M. T h e  P l a n n i n g  o f  S c i e n c e ,  Society for Freedom in Scienco, Occasional Pamphlet, 
1946.
* See M. Polanyi, T h e  C r e a t i v e  I m a g i n a t i o n ,  paper delivered at Oxford, August, 1965.
* Polanyi, M. P e r s o n a l  K n o w l e d g e ,  Itoutledgo and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, pp. 5*6.
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to apprehend this reality we have to rely on the «tacit co-efficient))1 
of knowledge, our intuitive faculties, before we can draw back the 
veil and reveal the hidden reality as it really is.
Polanyi, it would seem,has rejected the traditional Kantian concept 
of the task of the pure scientist, as an attempt to gain an increasing 
knowledge of appearances. Polanyi’s scientist is certainly concerned 
with gaining a knowledge of appearances but his main task is to go 
beyond the mere appearance of reality, and to understand reality as 
it is. In  Kantian terminology he is attempting to gain a knowledge 
of the thing-in-itself. Kant tried to show that it is not possible to gain 
a knowledge of things-in-themselves as all knowledge has to originate 
in, the experience of our senses, and unfortunately a thing-in-itself is 
beyond sense. Kant declared that knowledge necessarily has to be a 
knowledge of appearances2. If a knowledge of a thing-in-itself is to 
be obtained it can only be obtained by intellectual intuitions but this 
is impossible as our intuitive capacity is confined to our senses. I t  is 
not possible for a pure scientist,to gain a knowledge of things-in- 
themselves but only an increasing knowledge of appearances.
In rejecting Kant’s view of intuition Polanyi is able to argue that 
the pure scientist is able to gain a knowledge beyond sense. Science 
appears as an attempt to understand ultimate reality, and the task 
of the metaphysician or theologian seems inherently similar3 to that 
of the pure scientist. And in his rejection of the Kantian view of science 
Polanyi also kicks down, or at least ignores, the barrier Karl Popper 
has attempted to build between metaphysics and science by his criteria 
of falsifiability.4
Yet if, as Polanyi apparently argues, the scientist is concerned 
with obtaining a knowledge of things-in-themselves we are entitled 
to ask, ccHow can we know whether the knowledge of a thing-in-itself 
is knowledge or mere belief? » Or, more specifically, «How can we 
test our knowledge? » We certainly cannot test out knowledge of things- 
in-themselves by our knowledge of appearances. Paul Tillich faced 
the same problem when considering ontological knowledge, and sugge­
sted a solution could be provided by testing this sort of knowledge 
by the life process5: a difficult task for finite humanity. Another pos­
sible solution is to test or at least judge a person’s knowledge of supra 
sensibilia by other people’s knowledge of supra sensibilia. This could 
allow confirmation but neither verification or falsification. In  other 
words the intuitions of one member of an intellectual community are 
judged against the intuitions which other members of the community
1 This expression is used in M. Polanyi, T h e  M o d e r n  M i n d :  I t s  S t r u c t u r e s  a n d  P r o s p e c t s ,  
lecture delivered at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, October, 1964.
3 This is Kant’s argument in the C r i t i q u e  o f  P u r e  R e a s o n .
3 See R. J. Brownhill, Michael Polanyi and the Problem of Personal Knowledge, J o u r n a l  
o f  R e l i g i o n ,  Vol. 48, No. 2, April, 1968. In this paper an analysis is made of the relevance 
of Polanyi’s theories to the theologian.
* Popper, K. R. T h e  L o g i c  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  D i s c o v e r y ,  Basic Books, New York, 1959.
3 Tillich, P. S y s t e m a t i c  T h e o l o g y , ' V o l .  1, S.C.M., London, 1955.
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have obtained and accepted. If a new vision or intnition fits in with 
these accepted intuitions it is confirmed and taken into the body of 
knowledge which the community possesses.
This, in fact, is Polanyi’s solution. A pure scientist, who has arrived 
at an intuitive knowledge of reality, will put his theory before the scienti­
fic community and they will judge it by the scientific knowledge they 
already possess, and only if it fits into this knowledge will the scientific 
community accept the theory as being confirmed.
Polanyi’s concept of science represents a view of pure science which 
many of the founders of the Eoyai Society would have accepted but 
it belongs to a very old tradition which can be designated Pythagorean. 
Pythagoras argued that, « Everything is disposed according to numbers » 
and Plato thought that numbers were the essence of harmony and that 
harmony was the basis of the cosmos and of man. He argued that 
movements of harmony « are of the same kind as the regular revolutions 
of the soul))1. This philosophy of numbers was further developed in 
Hebraic, Gnostic, and Cabalist thought and the alchemists were also 
much influenced by it. J . E. Cirlot2 argues that the same basic univer­
sal notions were found in oriental thought, and gives the example of 
Lao tse, « One becomes two; two becomes three, and from the ternary 
comes one — the new unity of the new order — as four ». He argues 
that modern symbolic logic and the theory of groupings go back to 
the idea of the quantitative as the basis for the qualitative.
On the otherhand a more orthodox writer on science, Michael 
Oakeshott, rejects the idea that science can give us a knowledge of 
ultimate reality, and the notion that a veil has to be drawn back to 
reveal a hidden and external reality. Pure science for Oakeshott is 
an attempt to bring stability to our perceptions but in order to do this 
it must leave our perceptions behind. Oakeshott states: ;
« Science may belaid to begin only when the world of perceptible 
things has been left on one side, only when observations in terms 
of personal perception have been superceded.... Scientific kno­
wledge is not ‘organised common sense’ it is a world of knowledge 
which begins to exist only when common sense and its postulates 
have been forgotten or rejected. Experience becomes scientific 
experience when it is a world of absolutely communicable expe­
rience. Scientific experience is based upon a rejection of merely 
human testimony; its masterconception is stability »3.
The scientist achieves this absolutely communicable and stable 
experience by considering nature under the category of quantity. He 
states:
«Hature, matter or what is experienced in science are nothing
1 See M. Ghyka, Philosophic et mystique du nombre, Paris, 195'.'.
* Cirlot, J. E. A  D i c t i o n a r y  o f  S y m b o l s ,  Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 220.
* Oakeshott, M. E x p e r i e n c e  a n d  i t s  M o d e s ,  Cambridge University, 1933, pp. 169-170.
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other than the world considered under the category of quantity, 
because the method of science is incapable of elucidating any 
other world, and the method of science is restricted in this way 
because the world sought is a world satisfactory to the purpose of 
scientific experience, a world of ideas before all else common and 
communicable »x.
Polanyi’s pure scientist considers that he is revealing the ratio­
nality found in external reality, and Oakeshott’s pure scientist consi­
ders he is examining the world under the category of quantity in an 
attempt to give stability to our perceptions but both recognise that 
their task is to expand the systematic ideas of science. And both 
seem to include the notion that the quantitative can lead to the quali­
tative, which is a notion derived from the Pythagorean tradition. I t  
is these beliefs which bring Polanyi and Oakeshott together, as both 
consider that the aim of pure science is to further knowledge, and 
that any attempt to introduce the aim of utility into pure science would 
bring about its destruction. Pure science must be allowed to pursue 
its own ends without any re-orientation towards utility. The conver­
sation of the community of scientists must not be interrupted by 
material consideration.
These two views of pure science, the Pythagorean view and the 
neo-Kantian view, which Polanyi and Oakeshott represent have had 
interesting results in the Western world. They have led to the belief 
that pure science is in some respects a better pursuit than applied 
science. I t  is a more worthwhile study as it is allied with the intellec­
tual traditions of the West, and is a more stimulating study for it is 
concerned with the expansion of abstract ideas for their own sake 
and has no concern for the sordid money grubbing of the market place2. 
Polanyi’s position is, of course, far more traditional than the neo- 
Kantian stance of Oakeshott as it recognises the Pythagorean inheri­
tance, and re-introduces metaphysics as a respectable occupation. The 
new metaphysician appears under the guise of a scientist. Polanyi’s 
scientist attempts to understand ultimate reality or the Kantian thing- 
in-itself and the scientific norm of testability is thrown out of the 
window. Whereas it would, in a sense, appear to be possible to test 
our knowledge of appearances, the possibility of testing our knowledge 
of a thing-in-itself would appear remote or at least suspect. For the
1 Ibid., p. 190.
s This attitude to applied science has a long history in the Western World, for instance, 
we find in Plutarch’? L i f e .  o f  M a r c e l l u s :  « These machines (for the defence of Syracuse) he 
(Archimedes) had designed and contrived, not as matters of any importance but as mere 
amusements in geometry. Eudoxus and Archytas had been the first originators of these 
far-famed and highly prized art of mechanics, which they employed as an elegant illustration 
of geometrical truth, and as a means of sustaining experimentally, to the satisfaction of the 
senses, conclusions too intricate for proofs in words and diagrams... But what with Plato’s 
indignation at it, and his invective against it as the mere corruption of the one good of geom­
etry, which was thus shamefully turning its back upon the unembodied objects of pure intelli­
gence to recur to sensation, and to ask help (not to be obtained without base supervisions and 
deprivations) from matter: so it was that machines came to be separated from geometry, 
and neglected by philosophers, took its place as a military a r t».
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individual the certainty of knowledge has to be confirmed by a commit­
ment to a belief, so St. Augustine’s doctrine credo ut intelligam1 reappe­
ars as a doctrine of scientific method.
Oakeshott is a slightly unorthodox Kantian for he would agree 
that the possibility of gaining a knowledge of a thing-in-itself is remote. 
He would even go along with A. J . Ayer and speculate on the possi­
bility of the thing-in-itself existing at all, and certainly he would reject 
as outrageous the suggestion that scientific knowledge can give us a 
knowledge of ultimate reality2. At the best pure science can only 
give us a restricted knowledge of appearances: a knowledge which 
has been developed under the category of quantity. Yet pure science 
remains a branch of philosophy, perhaps not the paradigm of philo­
sophy which many neo-Kantians seem to indicate but at least a po­
werful branch of philosophy well within the neo-Kantian tradition.
In  both cases science is allied with respectable philosophical tra­
ditions. I t  is this fact which has made pure science as compared with 
applied science so attractive to the Western mind.
However, the theologian Paul Tillich has tacitly recognised that 
the neo-Kantian attempt to move science away from its Phythagorean 
inheritance has not only split the intellectual world but has ‘de-na- 
turised’ or ‘de-historicised’ modern science, as well as doing the same 
for much of modern philosophy. The de-naturisation of science has 
meant that science has become primarily concerned with techniques, 
and the development of systematic quantitative ideas about appearan­
ces. I t  has no concern for ultimate reality. Tillich has attacked mo­
dern science and modern neo-Kantian philosophy as ‘controlling 
knowledge’ which he declares «transforms the object into a completely 
conditioned and calcuable thing... controlling knowledge objectifies not 
only logically (which is unavoidable) but ontologically and ethically »3. 
He states that the philosopher, in the wake of English empiricism, 
tries to maintain a detached objectivity and feels no different from 
the scientist, unlike the theologian who «is not detached from his 
object but involved in it »4. Tillich states:
« He (the theologian) looks at his object with passion, fear, and love. 
This is not the eros of the philosopher or his passion for objective 
truth. The basic attitude of the theologian is commitment to 
the content he expounds. Detachment would be a denial of 
the very nature of this content))5.
Polanyi, of course, has met this criticism by arguing that in prac­
tice scientists do not work in this way6. He rejects the concept of 
the detached objectivity of the scientist, and has replaced it by insi-
1 I believe so that I may understand.
* See Oakeshott, op. cit., p. 214, «The world of scientific experience in virtue of its 
explicit character is a world of supposals, an abstract and incomplete world of experience.
8 Tillich, op. cit., p. 109.
* Ibid., p. 21.
8 Ibid., p. 26.
8 Polanyi, M. P e r s o n a l  K n o w l e d g e ,  op. cit., p. 3.
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stenco on the heuristic passion of the scientist who is committed to 
his discovery1. By returning to an older tradition this type of neo- 
Kantianism is as much scorned by Polanyi as by Tillich. I t  is as if 
neo-Kantian science is downgraded to the position of an applied science. 
This for our purpose is fortunate for we can make no claim that applied 
science is concerned with understanding ultimate reality but we can 
make a claim that applied science meets all the formulations of a 
science. That in fact applied science can be admitted into the neo- 
Kantian formulation of a science. In order to do this we will first 
examine the threefold division Polanyi makes when discussing science.
He divides science up into pure science, technically justified science, 
and systematic technology2. He argues that there is not a profound 
difference in the logical development of pure and applied science as 
both are concerned with the development of systematic ideas. They 
differ for Polanyi in the following respects. Pure science is concerned 
with revealing ultimate reality. Technically justified science is concerned 
with that part of pure science which can bring great utilitarian be­
nefits, e.g. the study of coal, but has little relevance to the main body 
of pure science. Systematic technology is the study of a technology 
which has developed systematic ideas of its own, e.g., electronics. 
I t  can be seen then that for Polanyi applied science consists of techni­
cally justified science and systematic technology, and that these differ 
from pure science by the fact that the main reason for their pursuit 
is their utility, whereas pure science is pursued in order to apprehend 
ultimate reality3.
If we do not' go along with Polanyi’s claim that pure science is 
attempting to reveal ultimate reality, and ideally I  think it is not, 
we have to accept the lesser claim that it is concerned with furthering 
knowledge. We may believe its concern for furthering knowledge is 
not its sole concern but at least it appears that it is one of its concerns. 
I t  would seem that as the structural make up of the three classifications 
of science are the same that they themselves must be the same. Yet 
it is still possible to argue that the difference continues to lie in the 
aim of these sciences. Applied science continues to be mainly concerned 
with practical problems and in this way differs from pure science. 
However, this is not so as applied science is not dealing with specific 
problems. The concept of systematic ideas suggests that these ideas 
exist outside particular problems. The problems dealt with need only 
be related to each other by the fact that their solution is provided
1 See a discussion of the relevance of these ideas to the planning of science in R. J.
Brownhill, A  C r i t i q u e  o f  M i c h a e l  P o l a n y i ’s  T h e o r i e s  o n  t h e  O r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  S c i e n c e ,  Higher 
d e g r e e  thesis, Manchester University, 1966.
3 See Polanyi, P e r s o n a l  K n o w l e d g e ,  op. cit., ch. 6.
3 Polanyi’s scientist is trying to apprehend «inexhaustible reality », If this reality is 
inexhaustible we can assume that no other reality of the same nature can exist. As Polanyi 
argues that there is only one reality we can assume that the scientist is attempting to apprehend 
ultimate reality. Unlike Oakeshott’s scientist Polanyi’s scientist would never be able to complete 
his work, and necessarily would be forced to become a metaphysician.
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by relating them back to the Bame system of ideas, while the actual 
system of ideas has an independent existence of its own. I t  may be 
true that in the case of systematic technology the systematic ideas 
haye been created in the first instance by the examination of parti­
cular problems of a similar type until generalisations have been made 
about a group of these particular problems but this could also refer 
to pure science. But a major way of expanding systematic technology 
is by the expansion of the systematic ideas themselves without re­
lating them to concrete problems. One can therefore create new theories 
by generalising about particular problems or by expanding the logic 
of the systematic ideas without relating them to any problems. The 
same can apply to pure science and in the case of technically justified 
science a particular area of pure science is being studied in the hope 
that eventual practical benefits will arise from it. The development 
of this particular area of pure science takes place in the same way 
as that of systematic technology. The logic of the system can be ex­
panded on its own or the ideas can be expanded in the process of pro­
viding a solution to particular problems. As these systematic ideas, 
according to Polanyi, are part of pure science (although according to 
Polanyi not a very important part) we are expanding pure science in 
the same way as we expand systematic technology.
As the structure, the development and the nature of the ideas 
of pure and applied science are the same, as both are attempts to in­
crease our knowledge of appearances, we are entitled to wonder how 
a distinction within the neo-Kantian tradition can be made between 
them. Both are furthering knowledge and both are attempting to 
understand appearances under the category of quantity in order to 
bring stability to our perceptions. I  do not think a distinction can 
be made within this tradition, as a distinction would have to refer 
back to the Pythagorean tradition. Polanyi can make a distinction suc­
cessfully, and argue that the ideas of systematic technology have 
no intrinsic value for the pure scientist, and that the ideas of technically 
justified science have only minimal intrinsic value for the pure scien­
tist. This argument would be sound if we accepted Polanyi’s argument 
that the pure scientist is attempting to grasp ultimate reality but an 
argument such as this cannot be used effectively by a philosopher 
like Oakeshott. As both applied science and pure science study appea­
rances there can be no difference in their intrinsic value1. Oakeshott’s 
defence of pure science against utilitarian interference would suggest 
that he had accepted the Pythagorean tradition of the qualitative 
nature of quantity or failed to see that applied science can be included 
in the Kantian concept of a science.
- ' I t  would seem that we can include applied science as within the
1 It does not seem possible to rank things according to their intrinsic value, as no reaso­
nable criteria can be found to do this but for a philosopher such as Polanyi it should be possible 
to rank them on emotional grounds.
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Kantian definition of a science as tlie applied scientist is attempting 
to gain an increasing knowledge of appearances. Certainly the applied 
scientist does this hut surely he does more than this1? He is trying 
to gain an increasing knowledge of appearances for the purpose of 
controlling our environment, whereas it has been argued that the pure 
scientist tries to gain an increasing knowledge of appearances for its 
own sake. This would be the argument that the pure scientists pursue 
their task because they believe pure science has intrinsic value and 
applied scientists pursue their task because of the extrinsic value of 
applied science. As we have shown that within the Kantian view of 
science there is no difference between pure and applied science the 
distinction must lie in the task of the pure and applied scientist. The 
applied scientist undertakes the same task as the pure scientist in under­
standing appearances but then has the other task of applying this 
knowledge. In practice this distinction cannot always be made as an 
applied scientist, although expanding knowledge with the intention 
that it will be of use may not actually apply the knowledge himself. 
This is why the term ‘fundamental research’ is often used to refer to 
the development of the ideas of pure and applied science, and the term 
applied science is used to refer to the application of these ideas to solve 
specific problems. This seems to be a tacit recognition of the fact that 
there is a difficulty in distinguishing between pure research and much 
of modern .applied research, for instance, in the field of electronics. 
The old distinction between formulating ideas and the application of 
them has to be expressed in a different form. The line has to be redrawn 
below areas that would have previously have been considered the domain 
of application. Within this new area of fundamental research only 
a fine line can perhaps be drawn between pure and the new applied 
sciences, and the distinction could be made by referring to the scien­
tist’s intention. However, 1 cannot see how this distinction can be 
made as there seems to be no particular reason why a pure scienstist 
should not pursue his task for the sake of knowledge or with the hope 
that this knowledge will eventually be useful. Likewise, there is no 
reason why an applied scientist working in the field of electronics 
should not pursue his task without reference to utility. He may be 
entirely engrossed in the task of expanding the ideas for their own 
sake.
This analysis could lead us to define an applied scientist as a person 
who is soley concerned with applying fundamental research. Ideally 
this would be a useful definition but unfortunately it would not be 
correct in. all cases, and traditionally areas of fundamental research 
have been classified as belonging to applied science.
The great value of applied science is that it has enabled us to gain 
a greater control over our environment. This value is itself derived 
from the fact that it has enabled us to have a greater stability in our
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existence. I t  has enabled us to consolidate our present ley el of material 
well being, and has even enabled us to move to a higher level of ma­
terial well being. This in its turn has enabled us to have the leisure to 
pursue speculatory activities. Simon Eottenburg1 has argued that 
we can conceive of pure science as a luxury commodity that we are 
better able to consume as our leisure increases. In  other words that 
as we move rapidly away from a subsistence level economy we are 
more able to provide for purely speculative activities. This notion 
again seems to include the concept that pure science is pursued for 
its own sake, and that if it is pursued for this reason in a materialistic 
society it must be thought of as a leisure activity. This would be ac­
ceptable if pure science was pursued for this reason. Yet I  think we 
can challenge this tradition that the task of the pure scientist is to 
further knowledge merely for its own sake. I t  certainly is a tradition 
that has powerful adherents. I t  was the ancient Greek tradition and 
has been continued by such diverse writers as Oakeshott and Polanyi 
but it does not seem to have been the intention of the founders of mo­
dern science to further knowledge for its own sake. Descartes con­
structed his theories to make us «lords and possessors of nature ». 
Francis Bacon intended that we should control nature. The intention 
seemed to be to provide a continuous flow from theory to practical 
use. This was certainly a major reason for the creation of the Eoyal 
Society2.
In our analysis we have seemed to reject Polanyi’s notion that 
it is the ta^k of the pure scientist to apprehend ultimate reality or 
the Kantian thing-in-itself. Ideally I  think we would be correct in 
this rejection as it is not the task of the scientist to apprehend thing- 
in-themselves but the task of the metaphysician/philosopher. Ideally 
we could say that it is the task of metaphysics to lay the ground for 
science. Metaphysics lays the ground for a further apprehension of 
reality, and the task of the scientist is to stabilise this extremely un­
certain knowledge. (This is a different argument to Oakeshott’s as I  
am not arguing that it is the task of the scientist to stabilise our everyday 
perceptions but to stabilise metaphysical speculations). Eros is sta­
bilised by reason. Yet as Popper has pointed out the ideas of meta­
physics no longer lay the ground for science3. Science has had to in­
creasingly undertake the task itself. Philosophy in recent years has 
attempted to do almost the same thing as science, and in attempting 
to clarify our knowledge of appearances has abdicated the major part 
of its task.
1 Eottenburg, S. The Warrants for Basic Kesearch, M i n e r v a ,  Vol. V, No. 1, Autumn, 
1966.
2 See M. Purver, T h e  R o y a l  S o c i e t y :  C o n c e p t  a n d  C r e a t i o n ,  Boutlcdgo and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1967. She points out that Bacon was concerned not with immediate practical use 
but with the eventual control of our environment through greater knowledge. She states: 
«It was the discovery of laws that was at the heart of Bacon’s concept of science, not pro­
ficiency in utilitarian sk ills» (p. • 3). Technology in Bacon’s time would be no more than the 
crafts but modem technology has become a science in Bacon’s sense.
3  Popper, op. cit., pp. 277-8.
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We can conceive of science as a stabilising factor in our under­
standing of reality. I t  is an attempt to make more certain and concrete 
the speculations of metaphysics. In this sense it is closely allied to 
technology which ideally is an attempt at stabilising to an even greater 
extent our theoretical knowledge by making it practical. We can say 
that it is of the same nature but on a different level. I t  is all an attempt 
to master reality: to make ourselves «lords and possessors of nature ».
The ideal function of technology, then, is to stabilise the theories 
of science but again, as in the case of metaphysics and science, science 
has not provided enough theories to allow technology to pursue its 
task effectively. Technology has had to become a science in order 
to provide enough theories of the right type. I t  is no longer parasitic 
on science but has necessarily become part of science, as science has 
become part of metaphysics.
In order to give more strength to this concept of our understanding 
and eventual mastery of reality with first technology merging into 
our study of appearances and then science, the study of appearances, 
merging into speculations about things-in-themselves we have to deny 
the Kantian division between the world of phenomena and noumena.
In  this sense we are conceiving of things-in-themselves as a world 
of unformulated possibilities, possibilities that can become factual. We 
can conceive of them as similar to a prime number after n, a number 
that may eventually be known. Of course it could be argued that 
by doing this we are in practice denying the existence of the noumenal 
world, as we are stating that the noumenal world can become the 
phenomenal world. In other words the concept of the noumenal world 
is a heuristic device to further our knowledge of appearances. This 
seems acceptable as long as we realise that under this concept of the 
noumenal world made up of unformulated possibilia possibilia exist 
that can become part of the world of appearances but need not ne­
cessarily do so. This leads us to argue that the noumenal world is 
made up of at least two levels: unformulated possibilia and formulated 
possibilia1.
Ideally the task of the metaphysician would be to formulate possi­
bilia, and the task of the scientist would be to try and confirm that 
the possibilia were part of appearances. Karl Popper with his criteria of 
falsifiability tries to provide a method for heightening confirmation. 
In practice the scientist himself has to operate as a metaphysician, 
partly because metaphysicians have abdicated their task but also be­
cause the extremely complicated and technical nature of the specula­
tions required prevent a non-scientifically trained philosopher from 
particularising his speculations enough to satisfy the needs of a scientist.
Ideally scientific knowledge, if it is to be a completely stable know-
1 We could, in fact, make further divisions and argue that the noumenal world consists 
of unformulated possibilia that will never become formulated, unformulated possibilia that 
will become formulated, formulated possibilia that will never be considered part of appearances, 
and possibilia that will eventually be considered to be part of appearances.
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ledge of appearances, should meet the test of some methodological 
norms. In  practice, as Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn1 have pointed our, 
theories do not have to meet a strict test hut merely have to fit into 
the prevalent beliefs of the scientific community to be accepted as 
part of scientific knowledge. Yet even if the scientific formulations 
of Popper were followed by the scientific community scientific know­
ledge would remain in the strict sense noumenal knowledge (in the 
way I  use the term), because it would always be made up of possibilia, 
and could never be absolutely verified.
Popper in formulating his theory of falsifiability follows two impor­
tant steps. Firstly he argues that a scientific theory must be arranged 
in a falsifiable form, in order that the next step can be taken, which 
is the falsification test. He states:
« A system is to be considered as scientific only if it makes asser­
tions which may clash with observations; and a system is, in 
fact, tested by attempts to refute it »2.
Popper meets a difficulty here for the case can arise where a certain 
statement can belong to science as it is testable, i.e. it can be refuted, 
whereas its negation is not testable. He gives the example of the uni­
versal laws of science:
«I recommend... that they should be expressed... in a form like 
‘There does not exist any perpetual motion machine’; that is to 
say, in the form of a negation of an existential statement. The corre- • 
sponding existential statement — ‘There exists a perpetual motion 
machine’ — would belong, I  suggested, together with ‘There 
exists a sea serpent* to those below the line of demarcation ».3 
Popper argues then that the negation of an existential statement 
is a scientific statement, while an existential statement is metaphysical. 
He is not, of course, arguing that one is meaningful and the other is 
not as this would not be logical.
Popper’s suggestion does not seem to be entirely acceptable as why 
should we assume that metaphysics is made up of meaningful but 
untestable statements'? And if we negate them why should they sud­
denly become scientific statements'?4 This for us is not a problem as 
we make no attempt to take up a two world theory. The noumenal 
world is a world of possibilia, and the possibilia move to their realisation 
as appearances as they are confirmed or stabilised. Popper’s method 
is useful as it heightens the possibility of confirmation but it greatly
1 Kuhn, T. S. T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  R e v o l u t i o n s ,  University of Chicago, 1964.
* Popper, K. R. C o n j e c t u r e s  a n d  R e f u t a t i o n s ,  Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, 
p. 256. *> '
* Ibid., p. 557.
4 Metaphysics has included, and can include negations of statements. Richard Rolle 
states in his I n c e n d i u m  A m o r i s :  «Thou askest what God is? I answer shortly to thee: such 
a one and so great is He that none other is or ever may of like kind or so mickle. If thou 
wilt know properly to speak what God is, I say thou shalt never find an answer to this question. 
I have not known, angels know not, archangels have not hoard. Wherefore how wouldst 
thou know what is unknown and also untaught». This view is an expression of the doctrine 
of the v i a  n e g a t i v a  of Pseudo-Dionysius.
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widens the scope of science if all negated existential statements are 
to be scientific. All possibilia could in theory belong to the scientific 
task if they were produced in a negated form. Unfortunately, however, 
because of the impossibility of absolute verification the world of appea­
rances can never be reached. This peculiar situation is really recognised 
by Popper. He does not argue, as many people seem to assume he argues, 
that on this side of the fence is scientific knowledge which has been tested 
and that on that side metaphysical speculations which have not been 
tested. The reason why this is so is because of his criteria of falsifiability. 
A theory can only be said to have been tested conclusively when it is 
falsified, and as it is falsified it cannot be part of scientific knowledge. 
Popper would admit that if we are going to define science as a body 
of conclusively tested knowledge then science cannot exist1. Popper’s 
powerful barrier lies between possibilia and non-possibilia2. His earlier 
barrier between what he terms metaphysics and science cannot be 
adequately supported on philosophical grounds but has within his 
system great utilitarian value in enabling the later barrier to work.
The division between metaphysics and science has to appear as 
one of degree, and every barrier that is put up has to be to some degree 
arbitrary. I  think we are really left with the philosophically unsatisfac­
tory answer that science is what the scientific community is prepared 
to accept as scientific knowledge3. Popper’s barrier between meta­
physics and science would appear to be arbitrary but the judgement 
the scientific community would make under the Kuhn/Polanyi argu­
ment would not be arbitrary. I t  would be based on the reasonable 
test of estimating a theory’s validity by comparing it with theories 
that have already been accepted. I t  would be accepted if it did seem 
to fit in with this knowledge. If Kuhn and Polanyi are correct it would 
appear that some criteria does exist in practice to distinguish between 
noumenal knowledge and so called phenomenal knowledge, although 
it certainly can be argued that the criteria provide no certainty, and 
that the criteria itself is continually changing.
By being accepted as part of scientific knowledge metaphysical 
speculation becomes more stabilised and appears more certain. Its 
position as knowledge is stabilised and if this knowledge can be used 
for practical purposes it becomes even more stabilised as it has re­
ceived greater confirmation. Logically I  have to argue that under 
my concept of the noumenal world science remains a form of noumenal
1 See Popper, T h e  L o g i c  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  D i s c o v e r y ,  op. cit., p. 280. « Every > scientific state­
ment must remain tentative for ever».
* Scientific knowledge, as it remains possibilia, is not concrete fact as, for instance, a
table I thump may be but is fact in the sense that wo designato it to bo a scientific fact. We,
for the time being, give it the value of factual existence. Factual existence in this sense appears
as a value which we give to a theory, and the positivist’s clear distinction between fact and
value is challenged.
8 Karl Popper in his L o g i c  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  D i s c o v e r y ,  op. cit., p. ?77 seems to recognise the 
fact that a theory, although put forward in a refutable form, need not be part of science, as 
it is too far ahead of the prevailing science, «the testable science » of tho day.
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knowledge, and its greatest confirmation comes about when it can be 
used to control the phenomenal world.
Metaphysics, science, and technology for analytical purposes can 
be divided but modern day metaphysicians are quite likely to be scien­
tists, modern scientists certainly need to be metaphysicians, while 
modern technologists need to be scientists and thence metaphysicians. 
All are involved in the task of comprehending nature for the sake of 
mastering our environment. The method of conquering our environ­
ment has to include a combination of emotion and reason. Polanyi’s 
notion of heuristic passion and commitment is as necessary as Popper’s 
doctrine of criticism. Emotional commitment to research provides the 
possibilia and gives the incentive to their support and criticism. Eros 
and logos are both necessary for understanding and controlling our 
environment. One provides the speculations, the progress, and the 
other provides the stability. Technology fits firmly into our philo­
sophical heritage as it is the final step in the progress of the logos1.
London, University of Surrey.
R. J. B r o w n h i l l
1 Technology can he considered as the last step in the progress of the logos hut like 
science often expands because of man’s intuitive capacities. See H. H. Rosenbrock, Control: 
Past, Present and Future, T h e  R a d i o  a n d  E l e c t r o n i c  E n g i n e e r ,  Vol. 37, No. 1, January 1969. 
p. 31.
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DISCUSSION:
SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND THE COMMUNITY
T H E  A P P L I C A B I L I T Y  O F  P O L A N Y I ’S  C O N C E P T  
O F  E T H I C S  I N  T H E  S C I E N T I F I C  C O M M U N I T Y  T O  
T H E  C O M M U N I T Y  A S  A  W H O L E
M i c h a e l  P o l a n y i ,  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  c o m m u n i t y ,  r e j e c t s  s c i e n t i f i c  d e t a c h ­
m e n t  a s  a  n o r m  o f  s c i e n c e .  H e  b e l i e v e s  it is o n l y  b y  a n  e m o t i o n a l  i m m e r s i o n  i n  o n e ’s  
r e s e a r c h  t h a t  o n e  c a n  u n d e r s t a n d  r e a l i t y  a n d  a c h i e v e  d i s c o v e r y .  T h e  n o r m  o f  m o r a l ­
i t y  w i t h i n  t h i s  c o m m u n i t y  a p p e a r s  a s  a  c o r r e c t  r e v e l a t i o n  o f  r e a l i t y :  a  n o r m ,  w h i c h ,  
w h e n  e x p a n d e d  t o  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  a s  a  w h o l e ,  a p p e a r s  a s  r i g h t  r e a s o n .  A  r e a s o n  
w h i c h  is c o n f i r m e d  b y  e m o t i o n a l  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  its t r u t h  b u t  is j u d g e d  b y  o t h e r  
p e o p l e ’s c o n c e p t s  o f  r i g h t  r e a s o n .  A  m o d e l  is p r o d u c e d  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  a n  i n d i v i d u a l ’s 
v a l u e  s y s t e m  u n d e r  t h e  ‘l o g i c  o f  c o m m i t m e n t ’.
Michael Polanyi, in formulating his explanation of the scientist’s method 
of discovery, entirely rejects scientific detachment and pure objectivity as 
norms of science. He states when referring to the lip-service paid to objec­
tivity:
I t  g o e s  w i t h o u t  s a y i n g  t h a t  n o  o n e  —  s c i e n t i s t s  i n c l u d e d  —  l o o k s  a t  t h e  u n i v e r s e  
t h i s  w a y  . . .  N o r  s h o u l d  t h i s  s u r p r i s e  u s .  F o r ,  a s  h u m a n  b e i n g s ,  w e  m u s t  i n e v i t ­
a b l y  s e e  t h e  u n i v e r s e  f r o m  a  c e n t r e  l y i n g  w i t h i n  o u r s e l v e s  a n d  s p e a k  a b o u t  it 
i n  t e r m s  o f  a  h u m a n  l a n g u a g e  s h a p e d  b y  t h e  e x i g e n c i e s  o f  h u m a n  i n t e r c o u r s e .  
A n y  a t t e m p t  r i g o r o u s l y  t o  e l i m i n a t e  o u r  h u m a n  p e r s p e c t i v e  f r o m  o u r  p i c t u r e  
o f  t h e  w o r l d  m u s t  l e a d  t o  a b s u r d i t y . 1
This is quite an acceptable argument. Pure objectivity is ruled out by 
the very process of knowing but it can still be argued that the scientist must 
attempt to be as objective as possible. The way he can achieve this objec­
tivity is by being emotionally detached from his work. Only by this emo­
tional detachment can the scientist avoid the taint of subjectivity entering 
his work.
Professor Polanyi argues, however, that a scientist cannot be emotionally 
detached from his research. It is the very emotional attachment which 
leads to discovery. He states:
I n t e l l e c t u a l  p a s s i o n s  d o  n o t  m e r e l y  a f f i r m  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  h a r m o n i e s  w h i c h  
f o r e s h a d o w  a n  i n d e t e r m i n a t e  r a n g e  o f  f u t u r e  d i s c o v e r i e s ,  b u t  c a n  a l s o  e v o k e  
i n t i m a t i o n s  o f  s p e c i f i c  d i s c o v e r i e s  a n d  s u s t a i n  t h e i r  p e r s i s t e n t  p u r s u i t  t h r o u g h  
y e a r s  o f  l a b o u r . 2
The emotional attachment of the scientist to his research is, for Polanyi, a 
necessary consequence of the process of gaining knowledge. It is only by 
‘indwelling’3 in his research and by making his research virtually an exten­
sion of himself that the scientist can begin to gain knowledge.
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Polanyi believes that it is the task of the scientist to gain a knowledge of 
external reality. He envisages this reality as being made up of different 
strata or ‘planes of reality’ and it is the scientist’s task to apprehend these 
planes of reality. His task then is not to gain an increasing knowledge of 
appearances — the traditional Kantian concept of the scientist’s task — 
as appearances are only the first level of reality, but to gain a knowledge 
of the reality beyond appearances, or in Kantian terminology ‘the thing 
in itself’. He rejects the Kantian claim that we cannot have a knowledge 
of supersensibilia,4 and claims that by the process of indwelling we can 
move gradually from our knowledge of appearances to an increasing know­
ledge of supersensibilia.
The knowledge we gain of supersensibilia cannot be tested experimen­
tally by our knowledge of appearances. Indeed it cannot be tested at all as 
by definition it is beyond sense. The only estimate of truth for the individual 
scientist is his own certain feeling that the knowledge he gains is the truth. 
At each stage in the understanding of reality he must be committed to the 
belief that he has arrived at the truth before he can move on to the next 
stage of achieving knowledge, for it is only this commitment which confirms 
truth is truth. At the end of this process the scientist must be absolutely 
committed to the belief that the theory he puts forward to the scientific 
community is a correct statement about external reality.
The scientist, then, arrives at discovery because of his passionate immer­
sion in his research and his commitment to each stage of discovery: the 
antithesis of the supposed scientific norms of detachment and pure objec­
tivity. A discovery appears in one sense as an emotional trauma brought 
on by a sustained emotional achievement.
Polanyi’s scientist is therefore bound to declare truthfully the knowledge 
he has gained about external reality. Without this commitment to the 
truth the scientist cannot have knowledge and the scientific community is 
not able to function. The norm of morality in the scientific community is 
to declare a correct knowledge of external reality.5 That is a feeling which 
he is certain is indicating a correct knowledge of reality, and this vision or 
feeling must be accurate or a wrong interpretative framework has been 
used.6 Unfortunately a scientist cannot know that he has used a wrong 
interpretative framework so he is bound to declare that his theory is valid.7 
His scientific conscience obliges him to declare that his theory is true even 
if it is an erroneous conscience. He is morally bound to declare what he 
in good faith believes to be right.
Morality is of paramount importance in Polanyi’s community of scien­
tists as, within Polanyi’s philosophical framework, it is not possible to verify 
or falsify a theory. Every scientist in the community must believe that all 
other scientists are moral men who are obliged to declare truthfully the 
knowledge they gain of reality. If scientists did not believe this scientific 
progress could not be made as they would not be able to build on others’ 
theories. In fact the community could not function.
This does not mean the community will automatically accept a theory 
when it is produced, as it knows that an incorrect interpretative framework 
could have been used. It will judge the worth of a theory by seeing if it fits
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into accepted knowledge, and only if it does fit into this knowledge will the 
community judge the theory to be true.8 In other words the community 
will judge a theory by deciding whether or not it fits in with the visions 
individual members of the community have received and which already 
have been taken into the body of ideas which comprise the scientific know­
ledge of the community.
The view of morality which Polanyi expresses is an extreme personal 
conception of the moral law, and has to be for it is not possible to estimate 
from the outside the morality of an individual scientist. His morality depends 
on whether or not he has declared truthfully the vision he has gained of 
external reality, and this we cannot know. Yet the scientist is not acting 
entirely on his own initiative, for his decision as to the worth of a vision 
depends on a two-way flow between himself and reality.9 The scientist 
then has an obligation not to the vision of reality as such but to the reality 
itself. He would be breaking his relationship with reality if he lied about 
the vision of reality he had received, or if he declared his vision before he 
had confirmed that it was an accurate vision of reality. A scientist therefore 
puts a theory forward not as a hypothesis but as a statement of the truth. If 
he did otherwise he would be breaking his obligation to reality and there­
fore breaking his own moral code and the code of the scientific community. 
In any case the process of gaining knowledge, the emotional attachment of 
the scientist to each stage of discovery, and the scientist’s commitment to 
his final theory make it impossible for the scientist to present his theory 
as a hypothesis. He cannot at one and the same time state, T am certain 
this theory is true but it may not be, please judge its truth’. He can and 
according to Polanyi does state, T know this theory is true, you can con­
sider it as a hypothesis but whatever you decide I am still committed to 
its truth’.
Polanyi’s theory of morality in the scientific community raises two 
interesting questions: (1) How far is it bound up with a concept of external 
reality? (2) How far can it be used as a model of morality outside the scien­
tific community ?
Polanyi certainly believes that external reality has an existence inde­
pendent of man.10 It is neither a projection of our own minds nor a heuristic 
tool. The scientist is dedicated to a belief in this reality and to its service 
and is committed therefore to the knowledge it gives him. The scientist’s 
morality is a supra-personal morality as far as the community is concerned, 
but it is not in fact, as it is reality which demands the morality, and it is 
reality which in the end reveals what form morality will take. Yet a non- 
revelationary morality exists in Polanyi’s framework of revelationary mo­
rality, while his concept of morality in the scientific community is appli­
cable to the community as a whole, as its essence is commitment to that 
which we believe is right.
We can summarize the concept as follows:
Right is what we believe to be right. Even if we are wrong and we believe 
we are right we must declare we are right, for if we did not we would be 
acting against our moral code. Rightness is a correct statement about a 
reality we believe exists. The key word is ‘believe’, and if external reality
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does not exist we are still committed to that which we believe is right. How­
ever in this case we cannot be wrong as our belief is the only criterion of 
truth, whereas if an external reality does exist our belief is the criterion 
of truth for us, but its agreement with reality is the real criterion of truth. 
Even so we could be wrong if in a particular situation we have wrongly inter­
preted our own moral code — the same situation as when the wrong inter­
pretative framework has been used in the scientific community. In other 
words we have failed to logically relate a particular situation to our own 
moral code. It would indeed be surprising if we had a moral code which 
could be easily applied to all situations. The problems we may have to 
judge by our own moral code may create paradoxes, and our own moral 
code may not itself be stable.
If we follow some modern social theorists11 we can say our moral code is 
created by internalizing the moral norms of the community, or more partic­
ularly by internalizing the norms of our own sub-group. Our moral code 
will be similar therefore to other members of our own sub-group, but will 
not be the same as we may interpret the norms differently, we may have 
internalized norms from other sub-groups — this will be related to our 
proximity to the (Weberian) ideal member of the group — we may have 
internalized some community norms which may conflict with our sub­
group norms,12 we may have added norms of our own. Everyone is to 
some extent a deviant from the ideal member. Our moral code, therefore, 
will be our own, although similar to other members of our sub-group. 
Yet because it is our own we are ourselves responsible for it and responsible 
to it: it is our own personal morality.
We can expand Polanyi’s concept of morality under the ‘logic of com­
mitment’13 to the community as a whole in the following way:
There are certain values to which we are absolutely committed at our 
arrival at adulthood. Besides this absolute commitment to certain values 
there lies a range of values to which we are committed to a lesser degree. 
We can say we have a diminishing commitment to other values. Even 
so these values can be considered to be part of our moral code and only 
under pressure will we relinquish our commitment to them, whereas we 
would never relinquish our commitment to certain values. As we move 
along the line of our value system we will perceive that there are values 
to which we may or may not be committed. Our moral code at this point 
will reflect our degree of commitment and be unstable. We can represent 
our moral code by the following diagram:
|  ----------------------- J O  O O o >  x x x
The vertical line represents absolute commitment, the diminishing hori­
zontal lines represent values to which we are committed, the length of the 
line representing the degree of commitment, i.e. a longer line representing 
greater commitment than a shorter line. The sign J represents the dividing 
line between commitment and non-commitment. The circles represent 
values to which we may be committed, and the diminishing areas enclosed 
in the circles represent the likelihood of commitment, the size of the area
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indicating the degree of likelihood. The sign > represents the point beyond 
which are values to which we will never be committed, and the signs x 
values to which we will never be committed.
The dividing line J can fluctuate between — and o, the signs represent­
ing commitment and non-commitment, but cannot occupy the same space 
as notation |, absolute commitment, as this would be inferring commit­
ment and non-commitment are the same thing, which would be nonsense. 
We would at least be committed to a morality of non-morality. The sign 
J cannot occupy the same space as sign > although it can be next to it. 
This is because sign > really represents death. The signs x are values 
which exist for other members of society or which in theory can exist. As 
they are beyond the sign > we can never be committed to them as they 
are values to which we are not committed at the time of our death.
What can we make of this theory of morality which makes an individual 
a moral legislator, a legislator who in the process of his legislation has 
passed through an arduous emotional experience which has given him a 
considerable emotional attachment to his legislation,14 especially if we re­
ject the notion of a reality with an independent existence of its own? Are 
we not indicating a situation of moral anarchy ? The answer is in the nega­
tive for an individual’s moral code is to some degree representative of the 
norms of the community and his own sub-group. An individual’s actions 
will enable the sub-group and society to judge his moral code, and they 
will judge it by the code they themselves uphold. An individual, therefore 
will never be allowed to deviate too far from the norms of his sub-group and 
society15 without socialization and social control techniques16 being brought 
to bear on him. Our moral code is our own, and is based on our own beliefs, 
but it operates within the authority of the community. A conclusion which 
agrees with the morality apparent in Polanyi’s community of scientists and 
in point of fact with the theory of morality inherent in the views of the 
Harvard School of social theorists.
R. J .  Brownhill
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Situational Method: An Experiment
BY R. J. BROWNHILL
The situational method of teaching social philosophy1 was used in combination 
with an orthodox lecture programme in a 4 term experiment during 1968/9 
at the University of Surrey, England, following a two term pilot experiment 
the previous year. The situational method was taught to and practised by a 
first year intake of Human Relations degree students. This article includes 
an analysis of the methods used with an estimation of the success of the 
experiment.
The first year social philosophy lecture programme is a combination of 
the history of social philosophy combined with a more detailed analysis of 
some of the important concepts which philosophers deal with, such as concepts 
of justice, freedom, etc. A direct attempt is made to see how philosophers 
formulate principles and attempt to justify them by reference to their value 
systems. During the period of the experiment a unifying theme was provided 
in the lecture programme by Karl Popper’s distinction between open and 
closed societies.2 The theme orientated the students to take an interest in 
the structure of different societies and provided a useful adjunct to the ex­
periment and the situational method of teaching social philosophy.
There were 48 students in the first year intake and they were divided 
into four groups of 12. Each one of the groups conducted a project where the 
situational method was applied. The projects were concerned with: the ethics 
of drug legislation, selectivity and the welfare state, student participation in 
government with special reference to the universities, and censorship and 
legislation. The projects were chosen because of their immediate relevance 
with the likelihood that imminent government action would take place in the 
area of the four topics. This had the twofold result of heightening student 
interest and taking advantage of the copious material that was likely to be 
available for student perusal.
The method is intended not only to teach social philosophy but to train 
students to analyse practical problems b y  recognizing and formulating different 
principles for action inherent in the situations themselves, for instance, by 
examining the arguments used by the participants in the public debates on 
the different situations.3 This enables students to realize that social philosophy
R . J .  B R O W N H I L L  i s  A s s o c i a t e  L e c t u r e r  i n  P h i l o s o p h y  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S u r r e y ,  E n g l a n d .
IN. Haines, Situational Method: A Proposal for Political Education in Democracy, 
E d u c a t i o n a l  T h e o r y ,  vol. 19, Winter 1969, No. 1.
2K. Popper, T h e  O p e n  S o c i e t y  a n d  I t s  E n e m i e s ,  Vol. 1, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1966.
3For instance, the British Home Secretary’s arguments in refusing to put into effect the 
proposals of the Wooton Report on drugs.
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is not only an academic subject but has vital practical applications as well: 
that reference to principles and values are continuously being made in the 
sphere of practical politics.
During discussions on the situations emphasis was put on the necessity 
to justify proposed courses of action by reference to principles and values and 
that these principles and values had themselves to be justified in accordance 
with the hierarchy of preferences in the structure of our value systems.4 
This led to a gradual recognition that legislation in a democratic society has 
to give considerable recognition to the customs and traditions of that society. 
Legislative action need not agree with majority feeling but cannot be too far 
ahead of it. It has to be justified by appeals to important values within that 
society. This recognition brought out the realization that within a democratic 
society compromise is a value of great importance and can itself be justified 
by reference to a major principle in our society which is that the democratic 
process must be kept in operation.5 The possibility of compromise expressed 
in the public debate was most noticeable in the ‘selectivity and welfare state’ 
project. Superficially there appeared to be a clear distinction between the 
proposals of the two major British political parties but a break down of the 
arguments into principles and values showed that in practice the political 
lines were blurred. The same principles and values were being referred to 
and were often given the same ranking, although certain symbolic language 
was being used to emphasize ideological differences. For instance, the term 
‘the universality of the social services’ has a strong symbolic political appeal 
to the left in British politics but in all cases considered it did mean in practice 
selectivity of sorts.
The projects consistently brought to the forefront conflicts between au­
thority and individual freedom and between paternalism and the possibility 
of individual responsibility and initiative. The students put much stress on 
J. S. Mill’s concept of self regarding actions6 but this was found to be inade­
quate to cope with the problem of drug addiction.7 From the analyses under­
taken in the projects it would seem there are serious deficiencies in liberal 
theory when put into practice as compared with Marxist or conservative 
theories. The reason for this may be that both conservative and Marxist the­
ories have organic concepts of society8 and in an interlocking system of ideas
4Paul W. Taylor in his N o r m a t i v e  D i s c o u r s e ,  Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1961, uses a 
similar method to justify ethical decisions.
5Bernard Crick, I n  D e f e n c e  o f  P o l i t i c s ,  London, 1964 argues for the importance of 
compromise in democratic politics. Dorothy Emmet in R u l e s ,  R o l e s  a n d  R e l a t i o n s ,  Mac­
Millan, 1966, p. 50 stresses the importance of casuistry in practical philosophy.
6J. S. Mill, O n  L i b e r t y .
l i t  could be argued that M ill’s concept of self regarding actions would allow one to 
take drugs as long as one did not break an obligation to an assignable individual. Hlowever, 
drug addiction could destroy one’s reasoning ability so M ill’s assumption of a rational indi­
vidual would no longer be correct. Could the state interfere under the notion that the 
individual could no longer see that he had a duty to himself and was not in a position 
to develop himself to the fullest? Or would we have to leave him because of the self 
regarding argument?
8Modern conservative theories are very much influenced by Burke and Hegel and both 
have organic concepts of society. iMarx is also derived from Hegel and continues to have this 
concept. Indeed Marx attacks Feuerbach for moving close to the nominalist concepts of the 
Utilitarians.
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it is much easier to enmesh a challenge and render it harmless. Organic 
concepts of society are often of the ‘closed society’ variety, although they 
need not necessarily be of this sort. An Aristotelian or a Hegelian society is 
of this sort but they are not closed in the sense that they are completely 
stable as, for instance, Karl Popper would say Plato’s Republic is.9 However, 
they are closed within their own potentiality and it is not possible for them 
to develop in any direction. The important point about conservative and 
Marxist theories, and both are in the Aristotelian tradition,10 is that they have 
a framework of ideas which is able to meet internal attacks by reference to 
different parts of its own system: in effect by circular arguments. Liberal 
theories on the other hand are not of this type and in a sense have to rely on 
their own effectiveness and persuasiveness and not on the consistency of the 
whole system.
The deficiencies apparent in Mill’s theories on application led students to 
examine much closer the work of Mill and other philosophers to see how 
they themselves would cope with actual problems. It led them to realize that 
the philosophers studied in the lecture programme were often dealing with 
real problems in their own society, and that sometimes the arguments they 
produced were attempts to overcome difficulties within their own philosophical 
tradition.11
The use of the interrogatory style12 on the part of the teacher and its use 
by the students themselves helped students to formulate points more effectively 
because of the necessity to provide justification for their arguments. It often 
had the effect of heightening a student’s commitment to an answer because 
he had worked out justificatory procedures and reasons to support the principle 
he had formulated. The commitment of a student to his answer, to a particu­
lar principle, then led to an attempt to justify further a principle when it 
appeared that it had been successfully challenged. The interrogatory style 
created a situation where before a principle was put forward some reasons 
for its support and application would already have been worked out. A student 
would not put forward a principle arbitrarily, and therefore would have some 
commitment to it. The questioning of the teacher and the other students 
would produce the reasons for the principle. and lead to a quest for further 
justification thereby heightening commitment even further. It could, on the 
other hand, bring the student; to realize himself the weakness of his own 
arguments, and thereby weaken his commitment to a particular principle. 
The attempt was to make a student decide for himself the strength of a 
particular principle. In other words test his own arguments for consistency 
and establish other principles and values referred to in a hierarchy of pref­
erence; to find out what value he put on different justificatory arguments and
9See K. Popper, op. cit.
lOHegel in a sense brings Aristotle up to date. See H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution
for the development of this argument.
11 An example of this is J.S. M ill’s introduction of the concept of self regarding actions
to find some area where an individual is free from governmental interference. Under
Bentham’s ‘greatest happiness’ principle any action can be interfered with if it gives the 
majority happiness.
12See N. Haines, op. cit.
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on the principle itself, and to develop some notion of the value society would 
put on the principle and justification by examining the public debate.
The situational method very soon brought out an important facet of 
questions about principles qua principles, and this is that one cannot talk 
about the truth of a principle but only about its reasonableness, the reasonable­
ness of its supporting justificatory arguments, and the results of adopting and 
following it. A principle in ethics and social philosophy cannot be absolutely 
true or even barely true, but only absolutely reasonable or the most reasonable 
for the circumstances in which it is going to be applied.
The situational method as a method for heightening student participation 
in democracy13 was successful in that it put students in a situation where 
they not only had to comprehend and analyse the arguments of the partici­
pants in the public debate but had themselves to operate within a democratic 
structure: a structure where anyone could challenge their arguments and ask 
for justifications for different procedures. The decision orientated projects, 
where the students were requested to consider themselves as legislators who 
had to arrive at a decision even when a decision was extremely difficult, 
enabled them to recognize one of the problems of operating within a dem­
ocratic society. Far from being a spontaneously co-ordinating system as, for 
instance, David Ricardo’s static laissez faire model of an economy or Michael 
Polanyi’s model of the scientific community14 was, a democratic society needed 
a tremendous effort, and commitment to its procedures to make it work. 
Consensus does not arise automatically and often only arises because of the 
participants’ recognition that compromise has great instrumental value in 
keeping the system operating.
The situational method then is a method for initiating students into 
democratic procedures. It teaches the vocabulary of public discussion as well 
as the methods of this discussion. In other words it is a ‘deliberate and system­
atic introduction to the ways of thinking, speaking, and judging which- are 
called for by critical .situations.’15 It is an introduction to the know how of 
government which Oakeshott16 so much insisted on for the potential ruler. 
In order to be entirely successful at inculcating democratic procedures the 
method should be consistently used in schools. At university level it certainly 
increases student interest in political problems and democratic procedures and 
develops them as mature adults already participating in democracy.
A useful by-product of the method may be found in its use for manage­
ment training. A number of recent studies of large firms have shown they 
have a distinct resemblance to political structures. The method would provide
13This is the major aim of the situational method.
14In R. J. Brownhill, Scientific Ethics and the Community, Inquiry, Vol. 11, 1968 an 
attempt is made to see how the ethics of the scientist in Polanyi’s scientific community 
could be expanded to an ethic for an individual in the outside community and^what this 
would entail for the individual and society.
15N. Haines, T he Ballot and the Dream: Footnotes to a Century of “Educated De­
mocracy,’’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXXIII, No. 4, December, 1968, p. 547.
16M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, Methuen, London, 1962.
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a training-in-committee procedure, a method for elucidating and solving prob­
lems in industrial relations and above all provide a training in a method of 
decision making which orientated the decisions to the application of values 
inherent in our own society.
In the field of academic philosophy the situational method provided a
useful adjunct to orthodox teaching methods. It enabled students to recognize 
that all of the important branches of philosophy were related and in the final 
analysis were relevant to practical application. The method increased the 
students’ understanding of the work of social philosophers and heightened 
their interest when it became clear that they were ultimately concerned with 
actual problems arising in society. It provided insights into the problems of
formulating and defending concepts in social philosophy, for instance, a con­
cept such as political obligation. Has the term a different meaning to different 
philosophers, what sort of justification do they provide for their concept, to 
what extent is the justification tied up with the rest of their philosophy, is it 
connected to the type of society they live in or is it an ideal? Perhaps the 
major contribution the method gave to the teaching of social philosophy was 
that it gave an increased apprehension of the use and formulation of princi­
ples, and practical experience in ranking them in order of individual preferences 
and public preferences.
